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ABSTRACT
The Politics of Leshian ‘^Nature”: A Feminist Critique
of Scientific Knowledge and Practice
by
Jaime L. Phillips
Dr. Kathryn Hausbeck, Examination Committee Co-Chair
Associate Professor of Sociology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Dr. Maralee Mayberry, Examination Committee Co-Chair
Professor of Sociology
University of South Florida

This dissertation is a feminist analysis of scientific articles published from 19902000 reporting findings from research on biological origins of lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women. Informed by feminist standpoint epistemologies and the theories
and empirical research of the interdisciplinary field of feminist science studies, I assert
that scientific efi^orts to locate biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in
women are likely to be infused with culturally-based assumptions and beliefs regarding
sex, gender, sexual orientation, and race. To the extent that these assumptions and beliefs
go unacknowledged in the science, they place limitations on the knowledge claims that
can be made from the scientific research.
Based on prior, related analyses conducted by scholars in feminist science studies
and in gay and lesbian studies, 1 utilize two distinct yet overlapping research methods to
analyze the scientific research: methodological critique and discourse analysis. The
iii
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methodological critique analyzes scientific flaws and limitations in the explanatory
framework, the sampling procedures, and the interpretations and conclusions drawn from
the data. The discourse analysis analyzes the contextual meanings associated with the
language used in discussing sex, gender, sexual orientation, and race. Both analyses
provide evidence for the influence of culturally-based assumptions and beliefs on the
scientific research.
By integrating the results of the two methods I show how they work together to
place constraints on the scientific knowledge claims made in the body of research
analyzed. I argue for the necessity for researchers to situate their research within the
social, political, historical, and cultural contexts in which it arises, as well as within the
context of the background assumptions that shape it. Only in this way can we evaluate
the validity of scientific claims about the “nature” of lesbian orientation.

IV
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The most important development in science in the next
30 years will be the sequencing of the human genome. By
the 60* anniversary of The Advocate, we will have a complete
picture of every single one of the 100,000 or so genes that
determine all our inherited characteristics, including how we
look, the way we think, even whom we sleep with.
- Geneticist Dean Hamer, in the gay and lesbian
magazine The Advocate, 1997.
What is clear is that we are riding another wave of biological
determinism. Scientists suggest that everything from human
sexuality, criminality, and alcoholism to thrill-seeking by jumping
off planes and our society’s definition of beauty is in our genes.
Consequently, it is essential that feminist scholars continue to
monitor science’s claims and continue to refute and challenge
them where necessary.
- Feminist science scholar Banu Subramaniam, in the
feminist magazine Sojourner, 1997.

Background
The past decade has seen an enormous surge in public and scientific discussion of
the possibility of finding biological origins of homosexuality in humans (Fausto-Sterling
2000; Stein 1999). De Cecco and Parker (1995) trace this increased momentum slightly
further back, to the 1980s, citing the growing influence of the American Psychological
Association’s removal of homosexuality from classification as a mental illness (1995:2).
Two main factors make the 1990s the pinnacle of the discourse on scientific explanations
for homosexuality: the scientific advances that have made studying the human genome a

1
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reality (Hamer and Copeland 1998; Keller 2000), and the “media feeding frenzy” touched
off by the 1991 publication of researcher Simon LeVay’s study asserting a distinction in
brain structure between homosexual and heterosexual men (Fausto-Sterling 1992b:256).
Recent claims from the realm of genetic research have given rise to popular
beliefs that all human characteristics can be explained by genes. Nelkin and Lindee
(1995) write: “Increasingly in the 1990s, differences between men and women and
between racial groups are appearing in popular culture as genetically driven” (387).
Many feel that sexual orientation difrerences, too, will be explained through genetic
research (Hamer and Copeland 1998). That belief, combined with LeVay’s controversial
1991 study, gives us the current scientific, media, and public fascination with biological
origins of homosexuality. According to Web of Science,' through December 2(XK), 266
articles from the natural and social sciences had cited LeVay’s 1991 article as a
reference. A related article published one year earlier (Swaab and Hoftnan 1990), by
contrast, has been cited 103 times. These numbers do not necessarily illuminate the
importance of the respective studies to the scientific community, of course, as some
citations come from the social sciences and some are critiques of the work. Still, the
number of citations of LeVay’s article speaks to the influence this single study has had on
the discourse of the biology of homosexuality, and the contrast with the earlier article
helps demonstrate the immense growth in discussion that has occurred since LeVay
published his work.
This work has not gone unnoticed by feminist science scholars and those working
in gay and lesbian studies, who argue that categories of human sexuality (as well as
' A database of scholarly science articles published by the Institute for Scientific
Information.
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3
categories of sex and gender, on which they depend) have been socially constructed and
that such scientific endeavors as LeVay’s are examples of reductionism and biological
determinism (Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999). They have challenged the premises on which
the science is based, the methodologies and design of the research itself, and the
interpretations of findings as being influenced by cultural norms and beliefs regarding
gender and sexuality. They charge that the science, which makes claims to objectivity
and value-fieedom, is in fact infused with values that stem firom hegemonic ideologies.
As of yet, however, the research done in recent years specifically on origins of
sexual orientation in women has received little attention compared to the research done
on men. I propose to help fill this gap in the literature by critically analyzing the recent
body of research on origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. Informed by
feminist standpoint epistemologies and previous work in feminist science studies, this
research project seeks to answer the following questions: What assumptions and beliefs
regarding sex, gender, sexual orientation, and race inform the scientific research? Whose
interests are served by the way in which the research is conceptualized, conducted, and
interpreted? Last, how is the scientific knowledge produced by these research projects
impacted by the assumptions and beliefs that inform it? These questions guide this
research by taking up Subramaniam’s (1997, quoted above) challenge for feminist
scholars to “monitor science’s claims” and “refute and challenge them where necessary”
(5).
Previous analyses have addressed these questions with regard to specific studies
or bodies of research on biological origins of sexuality and have found two general ways
in which cultural bias has influenced the research (Bleier 1988b; Byne 1995; De Cecco
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and Parker 1995; Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999). First is the methodological or empirical
adequacy of the research, which refers to the degree to which the design, conduct, and
interpretation of scientific research reflect thoroughness and carefulness in the study.
Problems noted include the failure to consider alternative approaches or interpretations,
poor sampling procedures, and overstatement of findings when drawing conclusions
(Bleier 1988b; Byne 1995; Fausto-Sterling 1992b, 2000; Spanier 1995a). The second
way in which cultural bias has been found to impact scientific research is in the language
(or discourse) used in conceptualizing and reporting research, and in constructing the
knowledge claims. Examples of this issue include language used in ways that reflect
androcentric, heterosexist. Western, and racist biases (Cohn 1996; Keller 1992; Martin
1991; Stepan 1996).
I assert that the research questions I posed above can be answered by conducting
the types of critiques just described. Specifically, I propose a dual-method study that
makes use of both methodological and discursive analyses. In this way the limitations of
each method can be minimized and the interdependencies of the discourse and the
methodologies can be highlighted. I will sample research articles on biological origins of
lesbian and bisexual orientations in women firom 1990-2000 and conduct a
methodological critique that examines a) the explanatory framework for what I call the
“masculinization hypothesis,” b) the sample in terms of how subjects are recruited, how
they are placed into categories of sexual orientation, and the diversity of the sample in
terms of demographic characteristics, and c) the interpretations of the findings and
conclusions drawn, in terms of whether sample limitations are considered and whether
there is any overstatement of findings or their significance. I argue that by uncovering
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patterns of methodological limitations in the articles, underlying assumptions can be
made visible.
Next, I will conduct a discursive analysis of the scientific articles in terms of the
language they use in discussing sex, gender, sexuality, and race. I will identify words
and phrases in the articles that I interpret as referring to one or more of the concepts just
mentioned, and analyze their meanings from the contexts of their use. Then, I will
identify patterns or themes of meanings related to sex, gender, sexuality, and race in the
scientific articles. The themes will be examined and interpreted for ways in which they
may illuminate underlying assumptions in the research. The methodological and
discursive analyses will be integrated in discussing the implications of the findings in
terms of how the underlying assumptions may result in limitations on what the scientific
research can say about lesbian and bisexual orientations in women.

Significance of the Study
This research will analyze a sample of scientific research articles published from
1990-2000 on biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, utilizing
elements of both feminist critiques of methodological inadequacies and principles of
discourse analysis and integrating them to demonstrate how they intersect. My project
fits into a body of literature critiquing current scientific efforts to locate origins of sexual
orientation categories in the body. While scientific efforts to “explain” homosexuality
have been analyzed already, the majority of the critiques have not focused on the current
scientific research being done on lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, looking
instead at the higher-profile research done primarily on gay men. As a result, little
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attention has been paid to how lesbians and bisexual women might be considered and
treated in ways different from gay men in these scientific endeavors. Also, the ways in
which race might intersect with gender and sexuality in the science have not been
analyzed. Given that women and men of color in our society have not had the same
relationship to the medical and scientific establishments as have white men, particularly
around issues of sexuality and reproduction, these intersections deserve consideration
(Harding 1986; Hubbard 1991; Martin 1987).
In terms of the scope of the study, this project adds to the current body of
literature by attempting to characterize the scientific discourse of the entire time period of
the 1990s, rather than of a few, selected studies or a single type of research. In this
project careful efforts are made to identify the body of research in question so that a
reasonably representative sample could be analyzed, in order to make findings relevant to
the entire body of research and the discourse it constructs. This project does not single
out particularly “bad” studies or offensive lines of inquiry from this time period for
critique, but rather systematically samples from the population of published research
articles so that the results may be said to be reflective of the discourse.
In addition, this study adds to the scope of empirical critiques by conducting a
discursive analysis, and attempting to integrate the empirical and discursive analyses such
that their intersectionalities and interdependencies are illuminated. In this way I hope
that the relatively limited nature of my methodological critique will be expanded upon
and made more useful.
This project takes seriously the urgings of femirtist science scholars positioned
within the natural sciences, who have called for feminist scholars from other disciplines

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7
to engage more directly with scientific research and writing (Fausto-Sterling 1992a,
Spanier 1995a). The scrutiny of scientific methodology conducted as part of the current
project is of the sort typically performed by feminist scholars trained in the natural
sciences. While I have some science background, my primary training is in sociology;
thus I have no illusions that my critique is likely to be as thorough as what a feminist
scholar working in the natural sciences could produce. However, I believe the
methodological critique in this project is sound and could potentially serve as a model for
other scholars trained in the social sciences or humanities.

Situating the Assumptions that Inform this Study
Feminist standpoint theorists and science scholars have suggested that knowledge
claims and the researchers who make them be situated in terms of social positioning and
background assumptions that may inform the work (Haraway 1991; Harding 1991;
Longino 1990). Because my assumptions and beliefs influence the way I approach topics
of study, what I see, and what I can say about them, such influences should, as much as
possible, be self-reflexively acknowledged and brought to the surface. Being forthright
about assumptions and beliefs allows for findings to be situated and evaluated within the
context of the positioning that informs them.
To situate my own social positioning, I should point out that I am a woman, I am
white, I am 31 years old, of a middle-class background, and currently able-bodied. My
gender presentation usually does not seriously conflict with the expectations for my sex,
though I often find those norms very constraining. In addition, I do not identify as
heterosexual, though beyond that, I do not have a fixed statement of sexual orientation. I
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have at times identified as bisexual and at times as lesbian. I both do and do not
experience my sexual orientation as something that was “always there.” It would be
naïve to think that my personal (and political) dissatisfaction with the options for gender
presentation and sexual self-identification within my cultural and historical context does
not influence my assumptions and beliefs about the biological research on sexual
orientation.
Di terms of education and training, it should probably be noted that while I have
most recently been educated as a sociologist and feminist scholar, my education and
employment prior to that were in the field of audiology—the science of hearing and its
disorders. I feel this background bears upon not only my interest in science, but also
some of my basis for evaluating it. Also, my social-science training influences my
writing insofar as encouraging (or at least not discouraging) the tendency to write in a
traditional, “removed” manner. Though I later will critique this writing style as helping
to erase the people behind the knowledge claims, it must be acknowledged that the
expectations of a dissertation in the social sciences create some hurdles to overcoming
the “distant” writing style. I hope that by reiterating my commitment not to be removed
from my research I might overcome the appearance of value-freedom, complete
authority, and total objectivity that such a writing style helps create. I am not certain in
what other ways my educational background informs the way I approach, conduct, or
interpret my study, but feel it needs to be acknowledged nonetheless.
Politically speaking I am a feminist with a commitment to ending systems of
oppression, particularly concerning gender and all that intersects with gender. Because of
my personal positioning, I am especially aware of and opposed to the inequalities faced
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by lesbian women, gay men, and bisexuals of any gender. These personal and political
commitments inform my sociological research in many ways, possibly the most
important of which is in my desire to analyze the ways in which systems of knowledge
and other hegemonic discourses reproduce social inequalities, so that they might be
changed.
Finally, regarding biological approaches to understanding gender and sexual
orientation, I believe that biologically reductionistic and deterministic approaches are not
likely to be the best way to understand those concepts and identities, given the evidence
for the ways in which they have been constructed specific to social, historical, political,
and social contexts. I believe, based on my feminist theoretical framework and
positioning, that biological reductionism and determinism in understanding gender and
sexual orientation are in fact likely to be detrimental to feminist goals of ending systems
of oppression. This is not to say that all scientific claims to knowledge about gender and
sexual orientation always are or must be reductionistic and deterministic, however.

Overview of the Remaining Chapters
Chapter 2 consists of a review of the literature relevant to this project. The
interdisciplinary nature of the current research leads to its being informed by different but
related bodies of work. Discussed in the literature review are works in the areas of
feminist standpoint epistemologies, feminist science studies, and lesbian and gay studies’
analyses of medical and scientific efforts to explain homosexuality.
Feminist standpoint epistemologies serve as the major theoretical frame of this
research project. Derived initially from Marxist thought regarding the privileged
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standpoint accorded to the proletariat, feminist standpoint suggests that the knowledge
that comes to be accepted as "Truth" tends to be that which serves powerful groups in
society, including men, heterosexuals, white people, and the upper class. The knowledge
produced from these positions is necessarily partial and serves to uphold the dominance
of those powerful groups (Harding 1986, Hartsock 1983). By recognizing the
situatedness of all knowledge claims and the ideological nature of knowledge that is
asserted to be universally valid, it is possible to produce knowledge that is “more
accountable” and thus less likely to reproduce oppressive social relations (Haraway
1991). For this project, feminist standpoint theories help provide the basis for analyzing
the scientific effort to explain lesbian and bisexual orientations in women through
biology as being based in knowledge that is produced from privileged positions and that
serves to maintain them.
Belatedly, work in feminist science studies also informs this project, both
epistemologically and empirically. Feminist science studies is an interdisciplinary field
that seeks to apply feminist insights about categories such as gender, race, sexuality, and
social class to critiquing modem. Western science’s claims to objectivity and
universality, and to provide grounds for science that is less oppressive to people and the
natural world (Keller and Longino 1996; Mayberry, Subramaniam, and Weasel 2001).
Work in feminist science studies has contextualized the production of scientific “facts,”
particularly the efforts of researchers to define differences between women and men, as
arising from and perpetuating a specific set of gendered social relations. Feminist science
scholars have critiqued science both on its own terms, by analyzing its empirical validity
for methodological flaws, and exposed its ideological influences by demonstrating how
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cases in which “science is not held up to its own standards” (Spanier 1995a) tend to
coincide with beliefs that uphold gendered inequalities. They have also analyzed
discursive aspects of scientific writing, including images, metaphors, and oppositions of
concepts to understand the underlying gendered and raced themes in the textual
production of scientific “Truth” (Keller 1985,1993). The current study utilizes the
insights of feminist science studies in firaming its approach, and the methods of feminist
science studies in conducting its analysis.
The last body of work discussed in the literature review chapter is research
located in the interdisciplinary field of lesbian and gay studies that has critiqued the
medical and scientific efforts to construct theories and “explanations” for homosexuality.
The findings of such critiques inform the current project. Historical sexological studies
of lesbians from the late 1800s to the middle of the 20* century have been analyzed by
scholars such as Gibson (1997,1998) and Terry (1990,1995,1999). They have
demonstrated the ways in which these studies of lesbian “nature” have been tied up with
efforts to maintain social inequalities of gender and race. Also, more recent scientific
research has been critiqued, as in work in feminist science studies, not only for empirical
issues such as poorly designed research, methodological flaws, and conclusions not well
founded by the data, but also for the ideological structuring of the view of the issue and
the concepts used (Allen 1997; Byne 1995; Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999; Zicklin 1997).
The current project it situated within this body of research by sharing its concerns and
methodologies, and builds upon current work by extending analysis to the current
scientific discourse on origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women.
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The research methods used in this project are discussed in Chapter 3. They are
necessarily divided into two general sections describing the related but different types of
analysis—methodological and discursive. Ln addition, I describe how the research
sample is chosen and implications of that selection for my analysis. Hrst, however,
building from the discussion in Chapter 2 of work in feminist science studies, I describe
in greater detail some of the specific empirical precedents that have guided my methods
in constructing a feminist analysis of the scientific research that is the subject of my
study. Because the sort of research project this is remains somewhat atypical in
sociology and even women’s studies, such further explanation of the methods is
necessary. The heavy influence on this project of feminist science scholars such as Bleier
(1984,1986), Fausto-Sterling (1992,2000), and Spanier (1995a and 1995b) is discussed,
especially their exemplary work in critiquing scientific studies based on issues that speak
to validity of findings. Also described are some of the feminist science studies that have
analyzed the roles of cultural narratives, images, and metaphors in the scientific
constructions of reality, including those of Birke (2000), Fox Keller (1985, 1992), and
Schiebinger (1993), as the methods employed in these analyses very much influence the
current project as well.
Chapters 4 and 5 are those in which the actual analyses and their results are
described. Chapter 4 discusses the empirical critique, which focuses on three main areas:
the explanatory framework of the research articles, the sample construction procedures,
and the interpretation of findings. Each of these aspects of the scientific articles in the
study sample is critiqued on the basis of empirical adequacy and methodological
limitations, using analyses informed by the work of, for example, Bleier 1984; Byne
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1995; Doell 1995; Fausto-Sterling 1992,2000; and Spanier 1995a and 1995b. My
analyses reveal the influence of ideological assumptions and biases on the conduct of
scientific research and the results obtained from it. hi Chapter 5 ,1 subject my sample of
articles to discursive analysis, informed by the work of feminist science scholars such as
Birke 2000; Cohn 1996; Keller 1992; Martin 1991; Schiebinger 1993; and Stepan 1996.
This analysis focuses on words, phrases, and other language in the articles related to
concepts of gender, sexuality, and race, interpreting the textual meanings given them
from the contexts of their use. These meanings are then problematized with regard to
hegemonic ideologies expressed and perpetuated by their use, when applicable.
hi Chapter 6, the results of the two different analyses are integrated in the
discussion of implications of the findings for assessing the scientific research. The
integration is done in an effort to overcome the limitations of each form of analysis and to
demonstrate the interactions of scientific knowledge and practice (Collins 1999; Laslett,
Kohlstedt, and Longino et al. 1996; Longino 1990). The research implications are
described in terms of how the findings from the analyses bear upon what the science can
and cannot say about biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. In
addition, recommendations are provided for how the science might be transformed to
serve feminist goals better. The final chapter summarizes the research, its major findings
and conclusions, and discusses recommendations for directions for further research.

Summary
Informed by feminist standpoint theories and feminist science studies, I assert that
the scientific study of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women is
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a discourse infused with cultural norms and beliefs regarding gender and sexuality. My
goal is to uncover these norms and beliefs and to gain an understanding of how they
operate in constructing the scientific knowledge claims. I propose to do this by using
close, critical readings of the scientific texts as a means to construct a feminist critique of
the scientific discourse. These critical readings will draw on feminist science studies’
applications of both evaluations of scientific methodologies and principles of discourse
analysis. The results of these analyses will be integrated in the discussion of implications
of the findings, in order to highlight the intersections and interdependencies of scientific
knowledge and practice. Recommendations for doing feminist science will be provided.
This research is a contribution to bodies of work in both feminist science studies
and lesbian and gay studies that critique the ideological functions of scientific efforts to
locate biological origins of homosexuality. My project adds to this literature in terms of
form, by utilizing and integrating two difierent methods of analysis; in terms of content,
by analyzing the research of the period 1990 to 2000 on women’s sexual orientations
specifically; and in terms of use, by applying results to inform suggestions for less
oppressive knowledges and practices in scientific research on women’s sexuality.
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CHAPTER!

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
In this chapter I will discuss previous scholarly work that most strongly informs
the current project, both in terms of theoretical framework and empirical research.
Different but related areas of thought and research have helped lay the groundwork for
this feminist analysis of scientific discourse on the origins of lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women. Primary among these are feminist standpoint theories, feminist
science studies, and previous critiques of science similar to this study, in the field of
lesbian and gay studies. This research is dependent upon theories that can explain how
knowledge is different when produced from different social positions with regard to
gender and its interactions with race, class, and sexuality, and feminist standpoint
epistemologies provide those analytical tools. In addition, in analyzing science as a
specific type of knowledge production, this study is very much informed by previous
work of the same sort, done in the field of feminist science studies. An important aspect
of feminist science studies carries the epistemological framework developed in feminist
standpoint theories into the study of science, expanding and improving non-feminist
science studies by integrating the analysis of gender. Thus the connections between
standpoint theories and feminist science studies are clear, yet because feminist science
studies is a field which reaches across disciplines, there is more to be gained from it than
from only applying feminist epistemologies to the realm of science.

15
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Additionally an understanding of science is brought into feminist work,
strengthening analyses of categories of identity in which science has had input. In this
way too is this project informed by feminist science studies. Last, previous analyses of
scientific attempts to “explain” homosexuality done in the interdisciplinary field of
lesbian and gay studies are also related to the two areas of work just discussed, and
inform the current study. Such analyses are related epistemologically to both feminist
standpoint theories and feminist science studies in their assertion that contexts of social
power relations influence the types of knowledge claims that are made. In addition, they
are clearly related to feminist science studies in applying this analytical framework to the
privileged claims of the natural sciences. Work in lesbian and gay studies, however,
makes central the analysis of the deployment of sexual orientation categories. Such
work, like that in feminist science studies, has informed the current project by providing
insights from which new analyses can be built and demonstrating methods that can be
usefully applied to conducting such analyses. I will divide the review of the literature by
first discussing the relation of feminist standpoint theories to this project, followed by a
discussion of the relevant theoretical and empirical work in feminist science studies, and
concluding with a discussion of related research that has been conducted in the
interdisciplinary field of lesbian and gay smdies.

Feminist Standpoint Epistemologies
In this project, I intend to conduct an analysis of the discourse of scientific
research into biological bases for lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. The goal
of this research study is to uncover cultural norms and beliefs embedded in the
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epistemology that underlies the science. My approach to this subject is informed by
feminist standpoint theory (or epistemology), a body of work developed over the past two
decades that theorizes a relationship between gender, power, and knowledge. While
several different theorists have formulated and continue to develop slightly difierent
accounts (see Collins 1990; Harding 1986,1991; Hartsock 1983,1998; Smith 1987), my
understanding of feminist standpoint epistemology is that it makes the following
fundamental assertions: 1) that all knowledge is produced from a standpoint, or position,
within a social framework and is structured by that context; 2) that due to power
imbalances, some standpoints may produce knowledge that is more or less likely to
obscure social inequalities; 3) that the standpoints of those with greater social power are
most likely to become hegemonic ideologies, marginalizing knowledges produced from
other standpoints; and 4) that the knowledges available from the standpoints of the
socially oppressed are less likely to obscure inequality, but can be achieved only through
struggle.
It is from socialist feminism that feminist standpoint theory clearly derives many
of its basic tenets (Jaggar 1983). Socialist feminism is a branch of feminist theory that
combines elements of Marxist and radical feminisms. Traditional Marxist feminism
relies on a strict interpretation of Marxist theory to end women’s oppression, asserting
that the economic system of capitalism is fundamentally unjust and inhumane and that its
demise will be the end of women’s oppression as well. Radical feminism holds that
women are oppressed simply as women, under any sort of economic system, due to the
system of male domination known as patriarchy. Recognizing the limitations of each,
socialist feminism asserts that both capitalism and patriarchy are oppressive systems that
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can work together and therefore both must be ended in order to facilitate equality (Jaggar
1983).
The basic ideas of feminist standpoint theory come directly from Marxist thought
and have been modified to make gender rather than social class the central category of
analysis. Sandra Harding (1993) writes that
the intellectual history of feminist standpoint theory is conventionally
traced to Hegel’s reflections on what can be known about the master/slave
relationship from the standpoint of the slave’s life versus that of the
master’s life and to the way Marx, Engels, and Lukacs subsequently
developed this insight into the “standpoint of the proletariat ” from
which have been produced marxist [sic] theories of how class society
operates. (1993: 53-54)
Especially in early standpoint writings (Hartsock 1983; Rose 1983; Smith 1987), the
rationale given for the different standpoints available to women and men is based on
labor. It is asserted that women and men tend to do or are expected to do difierent sorts
of work because of the gendered division of labor; then, the difierent material conditions
resulting from labor create difierent sets of understandings of social relations. This is an
expansion upon Marxist explanations of oppression based upon relationship to the means
of production, as it proposes additional within-class oppression based on gender. For
example, whereas Marx believed that the dominant class controlled the mental labor and
created the hierarchy of mental over manual work, early standpoint theorists suggested
that because of housework and childcare expectations, women tend to do the bodily work
that men would rather not do.
The control over capital that structures society such that a dominant group has the
power to determine the labor activities of other groups also makes possible the ability to
make this power imbalance less visible. The oppression of women and others through
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the structuring of labor practices is obscured through ideology. That is to say that, as
explicated by Marx, dominant ideology serves the needs of the ruling class. This concept
of ideology explains how it is that the perspective of the dominant group becomes
popularly accepted. As Jaggar (1983) states, “hi a society where the production of
knowledge is controlled by a certain class, the knowledge produced will reflect the
interests and values of that class" (370). People’s assumptions and understandings
regarding “how things are, ”about what is a “given,” or what is “natural” are all shaped
by this dominant ideology through our social institutions. This is accomplished because
the economically powerful have the means to shape what we know about the world.
Additionally, while ideology arises from the dominant class through relations of
production, understanding its manifestations and effects helps explain how the
implications of holding a standpoint can extend far beyond the actual laboring practices
of an individual or group.
Thus it is that a standpoint from the view of the oppressed might be more likely to
recognize the injustice caused by the power difrerences. For the powerful, actual life and
dominant ideology are in greater coherence with one another than for the oppressed,
providing less opportunity to see the injustices concealed by that ideology. For example,
it is less likely that men (specifically, socially dominant men) would challenge the
ideology that views women as being the natural ones to care for children, as they may
benefit economically from making it harder for women to advance in the workforce. The
oppressed have less investment in maintaining that ideology than those who benefit
directly from it, although active, engaged thinking is necessary to recognize dominant
ideology. The standpoint of the oppressed is a position of privilege in terms of the ability
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to view social relations as they “really” are (a “truth” challenged in later standpoint
writings), as opposed to the distorted view available to the oppressor. One’s very
knowledge of the world and social relations is so structured by ideology that it is an
achievement to see otherwise. Feminist standpoint theory is an example of such an
achieved understanding.
hi Hartsock’s foundational work on feminist standpoint theory, it was stated that
“[a] standpoint carries with it the contention that there are some perspectives on society
from which, however well-intentioned one may be, the real relations of humans with each
other and with the natural world are not visible” (Hartsock 1998 [1983]: 107). Hartsock
has engendered some controversy and confusion by her use of the concept of “reality,” as
in “the real relations of humans with each other... ”(italics mine). It seems clear to me
that this concept of “reality” involves assumptions and value commitments that underlie
socialist feminism and other critical theories and are not held by everyone, and that the
failure to make these commitments explicit is partially responsible for some of the
debates over standpoint. Among these assumptions are that people are in fact oppressed
by gender, race, and class and that these oppressive social relations should be ended. 1
believe this understanding of “reality” is necessarily implied by Hartsock’s statement. In
a 1997 article, Hartsock states that “[s]tandpoint theories are technical theoretical devices
that can allow for the creation of accounts of society that can be used to work for more
satisfactory social relations” (370). An ethical judgment grounded in socialist feminism
is made in that statement as to what constitutes “more satisfactory social relations.”
Hartsock is reiterating that the project of feminist standpoint theory is based largely on
the project of Marxism, which sought social change. She is proposing the feminist
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standpoint as a means to achieve knowledge that has been distorted through ideology. As
with Marxism, achieving this knowledge is not the sole end in itself, but rather is a means
to ending oppression.
In my mind, the theory would be better stated as proposing that a feminist
standpoint provides a view from which relations o f domination may be seen more clearly.
As Collins (1997) states, standpoint theory is “an interpretive framework dedicated to
explicating how knowledge remains central to maintaining and changing unjust systems
of power” (375). Feminist standpoint has epistemological concerns but is, 1 think,
primarily a critical social theory. It provides a point of entry from which to disrupt
dominant ideology. Hartsock makes this point well:
Fundamentally, 1 argue that the criteria for privileging some knowledges
over others are ethical and political rather than purely “epistemology.”
The quotation marks here are to indicate that 1 see ethical and political
concepts such as power as involving epistemological claims on the one
hand and ideas of what is to count as knowledge involving profoundly
important political and ethical stakes on the other. (Hartsock 1997:373)
There are and must be “better” standpoints than others, if the theory is to have any
meaning whatsoever. But they cannot be said to be better in terms of representing an
abstract reality as how it “really” exists. Rather than being characterized as truer, some
perspectives on society may make a more useful contribution toward making oppressive
relations visible. I would call this the pragmatic element of feminist standpoint. A
standpoint should be judged less on its abstract “truth” and more on its usefulness for
analyzing systematic oppression. To do this, we must recognize the interactions of
oppressions based on not only gender but also, for example, race and class.
An inevitable confusion arises over the notion of a “standpoint of women.” The
first task is to separate the concept of a feminist standpoint from that of a standpoint of
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women. They are not the same. To my understanding, a feminist standpoint is not a
standpoint at all, in the sense of being a social position or perspective. Rather, it is more
like a paradigm of thought; it is a way of understanding the world. It represents an
attempt to explain some of the impacts of social power relations on knowledge using
critical feminist theoretical approaches. The notion of a standpoint of women, on the
other hand, gets at the idea of social positioning. Oppressed groups occupy places in the
social structure that help give rise to a standpoint that is different from the dominant
view. This has been referred to as an “oppositional consciousness” (Haraway 1990). It is
tempting to abandon the notion of a standpoint of women altogether because of the
confusion it creates. However, it is this oppositional consciousness that leads to the
possibility and necessity for a feminist standpoint. The concept of a standpoint of women
is necessary in order to ensure that the focus on gender as a social category does not
become obscured.
Clearly though, one must use this concept with caution due to the possibility of
the presumption of one standpoint of women. One of the primary debates regarding a
standpoint of women is whether it universalizes women’s diverse experiences. Certainly
all women do not share a singular standpoint, and occupying the social position of
“woman” has different effects depending on other factors. I would argue that the diversity
of women was not always made clear in standpoint writings. For example, Hartsock’s
original work (1983) makes only a fleeting reference to “the danger of making invisible
the experience of lesbians or women of color” (1998 [1983]: 112). Jaggar notes that
differences between women are erased by the presumption of a singular “standpoint of
women” (1983:385). Work by Anzaldua (1987), Collins (1989; 1990), and Harding
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(1986), for example, helped rectify this shortcoming of standpoint.
Anzaldua (1987) made clear with her writings on the “new mestiza” that one can
occupy different standpoints based on different aspects of identity, and that the very act
of occupying these different spaces and moving amongst them creates an even different
standpoint. She writes: “From this racial, ideological, cultural and biological crosspoUinization, an ‘alien’ consciousness is presently in the making—a new mestiza
consciousness, una conciencia de mujer. It is a consciousness of the Borderlands ” (77).
While she never discusses standpoint theory per se or engages in dialogue with theorists,
her work is considered to have contributed to a less modernist vision for standpoint
theory, one of mutable identities based on the concept of the new mestiza. “The new
mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity....
She has a plural personality, she operates in pluralistic mode...” (1987:79). What is
recognized in Anzaldua’s work is the lack of a stable identity from which to derive a
singular standpoint, an important step in the development of feminist standpoint
epistemologies in that a postmodern understanding of the subject is theorized. In
addition, because of the subject position of the new mestiza, Anzaldua helps construct a
relationship between postcolonial feminism and feminist standpoint.
Another controversy over the notion of a standpoint of women focuses on whether
it essentializes “woman” as a natural category. This too is a complicated issue, because
while some writings in standpoint theory seem to rely on essentialist conceptions of
woman, others do not, and my belief is that it can be essentialist but does not have to be.
It is important once again to make the distinction between a standpoint of women and a
feminist standpoint. If one accepts the definition of feminist standpoint provided above, I
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think it is clear that there is nothing essentialist about it. Likewise, I think it is possible to
conceptualize “woman” as a socially constructed category that has real, material effects
on the people so categorized. The definitions of this category vary across time and
culture and, due to other areas of diversity, within time and culture. But it is an
undeniably important social grouping, with effects that cannot be ignored.
Beyond the concerns about standpoint theory as essentializing and universalizing
women’s experiences, one of the most important debates seems to revolve around the
issue of “truth.” This debate additionally manifests itself in discussions of partiality/
impartiality, objectivity, and reality. These are complex debates that are likely never to
be resolved completely.* They result from standpoint’s focus on how power relations
affect what we know and can know. Additionally, the area of standpoint theory that
focuses on science studies is faced with the tension of combining “situated knowledges”
with “a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world” (Haraway 1991
[1988]: 187). Truth is reconstructed in standpoint theory as truths, based on knowledge
that is situated and self-reflexive. Harding states that “there are as many interrelated and
smoothly coimected realities as there are kinds of oppositional consciousness. By giving
up the goal of telling ‘one true story,’ we embrace instead the permanent partiality of
feminist inquiry” (1986:194).
Collins states that “standpoint theory was never designed to be argued as a theory
of truth” (1997:375). By this I think she means that standpoint theorists are more
interested in exposing how what we think of as truth is determined by control of those
*Published debates over the effectiveness of feminist standpoint epistemologies, as well
as their relevance to science, can be found in two separate issues of Signs: Journal o f
Women in Culture and Society —one in 1997, vol. 22, no. 2; the other, 2001, vol. 26, no.
9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25
institutions that “discover” and disseminate it. I see a parallel to Foucault’s work in the
relationship between power and knowledge, about which he writes, “Since Nietzsche this
question of truth has been transformed. It is no longer, ‘What is the surest path to
Truth?’, but, ‘What is the hazardous career that Truth has followed?”’ (1980:66). In
other words, the issue of concern is not what “Truth ”is or how to achieve it, but rather
what are the effects of “Truth’s” “employment.” Standpoint theory makes its
epistemological claims based in part on the idea that the work of “Truth” is not best
understood by those who profit most from its labor.
One of the primary claims of standpoint is that truth cannot be produced from
“nowhere, ”the traditional claim of scientific objectivity. Rather, knowledge claims must
be evaluated in their social context. In this way we can have truths based in what
Harding calls “strong objectivity.” Strong objectivity “requires that the subject of
knowledge be placed on the same critical, causal plane as the objects of knowledge”
(1993:69). It is a concept with similarities to Haraway’s “situated knowledge” or
“positioned rationality,” as well as Collins’ “ethic of personal accountability,” in which
“people are expected to be accountable for their knowledge claims” (1990:217-218).
Thus feminist standpoint theory argues a very different model for objectivity firom that of
traditional science.
In summary, I argue that feminist standpoint theory provides a useful theoretical
framework from which to build a critical examination of the scientific study of biological
origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. By suggesting that relations of
power in society in part determine what gets accepted as truth, feminist standpoint theory
provides a rationale and purpose for analyzing the scientific “truths” being produced. As
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Harding (1998) states, “Standpoint theories direct us to identify whose questions a
knowledge project is asking and whose problems it has been designed to resolve” (100).

Feminist Science Studies
In this section I will identify and discuss some of the ways in which the current
project is theoretically and empirically informed by previous work in feminist science
studies, a field that follows epistemologically (though not exclusively so) from feminist
standpoint theories. “Feminist science studies” is the name of the interdisciplinary effort
to apply and integrate feminist insights about gendered social power relations with that
system of knowledge production we call science. It has been defined, for example, in the
following ways;
1. A field under constmction. 1. A body of work that applies feminist
analyses to scientific ideas and practices to explore the relationship
between feminism and science and what each can learn from the other.
3. A field that explores the intersectionalities between race, class, gender,
and science and technology. 4. The effort to work out the implications of
‘situated knowledges’ (knowledge seen as a social activity embedded in
a certain culture and world view). (Mayberry, Subramaniam, and Weasel
2001:5-6)
Feminist science studies as a field has developed over the course of the past
twenty years across academic disciplinary boundaries, with work originating from the
humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. Its differing origins are at least
in part a result of the different kinds of problems noticed and addressed by scholars from
various fields. Scientists who were feminists, frustrated with the masculinist bias in
science, conducted critiques of such bias by pointing out, for example, the ways in which
the scientific work was not being conducted nor interpreted in an objective manner.
Feminist critiques of empirical inadequacies in the biological sciences, particularly in
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research on women and on sex differences, were conducted by scientists including Ruth
Bleier (1984,1988b), Aime Fausto-Sterling (1985), and Ruth Hubbard (1983).
Simultaneously, feminist scholars in the humanities and social sciences studying science
recognized the absence of analyses of gender in existing science studies work.
Philosophical and epistemological critiques were developed by feminist scholars
including Evelyn Fox Keller (1985), Sandra Harding (1986,1991), and Donna Haraway
(1988,1989). There was (and still is) a great deal of overlap between these categories, as
should be expected in such a interdisciplinary field. In fact the crossing of academic
borders to conduct feminist science studies has been encouraged, especially by those in
the natural sciences who have struggled with the lack of “scientific literacy” on the part
of their feminist peers from the humanities and social sciences (Fausto-Sterling 1992a;
Spanier 1995a). Thus feminist science studies is a transdisciplinary field committed to
improving and integrating both feminist analyses and the natural sciences.
hi feminist science studies, science is analyzed both as an institution and as a
specific, highly-valued form of knowledge production (Harding 1986). While analyses
such as those described have gone on for some time under other headings, including
philosophy and sociology of science, sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), and the
inclusive “science studies” (see for example Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983; Latour and
Woolgar 1983), only feminist science studies is particularly concerned with
understanding the role of gendered social relations in the ways science operates and in the
knowledge it produces. As an institution, science is analyzed by feminist science studies
for the ways in which the networks and hierarchies in scientific education and
occupations have tended to exclude or marginalize white women and people of color (see
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Rosser 1990; Davis, Ginorio, and Hollenshead et al. 1996): “the science which is
dignified as such and passed on in academic and industrial circles is primarily done and
taught by [white] men” (Lennon 1998:187). As a system of knowledge, modem Western
science is critiqued for its claims to universality and objectivity (Lloyd 1996; Longino
1990). As stated by one sociologist: “there is no novelty to the suggestion that scientific
theories have often been shaped by prevailing cultural values. Over the past 2 decades,
however, feminist theorists have demonstrated that many theories are permeated
specifically by androcentric biases missed entirely by earlier investigators” (Carroll
1998:739).
While it is scientific knowledge rather than the institutional structure and
practices of science studies that most directly applies to the current project, and on which
I will focus my discussion, it must be acknowledged that the two issues are not
completely separable. Feminist science studies argues that the characteristics of modem
scientific knowledge are at least partly a consequence of who has been included and who
has been systematically excluded from participation as knowers (Harding 1991; Collins
1999). It is most clearly on this point that feminist science studies is influenced by the
insights of feminist standpoint epistemologies. The earliest work in this area carried over
standpoint theory’s original, Marxist-derived emphasis on the gendered division of labor
as being that which influenced science’s particular viewpoint. According to this
argument, the existence of gendered labor suggests that women might have unique
knowledges based on the work traditionally assigned to them, knowledges that have been
excluded from the production of science. For example. Rose (1983, 1986) suggested that
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the relative absence of women, traditionally assigned “caring” and “bodily” labor,
contributed to the absence from science of knowledge grounded in such work.
This emphasis on gendered labor soon broadened to incorporate an analysis of
how different experiences in general that result from occupying different positionalities
within social structures affect one’s perspectives; thus science’s dominance by a
particular positionality - white, middle- to upper-class, heterosexual men - has tended to
create knowledge that reflects the experiences of the intersection of those identities
(Collins 1999; Harding 1997b). This peculiarity of scientific knowledge production is
accomplished by the failure to recognize the influence of standpoint on the assumptions
and understandings that inform the production of scientific knowledge. In particular,
assumptions are made based on historically and culturally situated understandings of
social categories such as gender, which are not recognized or acknowledged as
influencing the direction of scientific research. In some cases, “cultural values and
beliefs that shape the predominating explanatory frameworks in science hold sway over
the scientific evidence” (Spanier 1995a:56).
Unacknowledged assumptions regarding gender are particularly problematic
when science is used to prove the “naturalness” of gender differences by asserting their
cause to reside in biological sex differences. Scientific research on “sex differences”
often examines differences between men and women that feminists argue are actually a
result, when they exist at all, of gendered social arrangements (Fausto-Sterling 1992b).
The result of such research is to reinforce the belief in the biological origins of what we
consider “masculine” and “feminine” characteristics of human beings. Lennon (1998)
points out that “science itself yields some of the major texts informing our conceptions of
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masculinity and femininity” (188). Thus beliefs about gender inform scientific research
by way of assumptions, the research “proves” what is “natural” for women and men, and
the results become cultural texts that reinforce the beliefs that informed their production.
Feminist science studies scholars also engage in critiquing scientific research on
sex differences with regard not only to its assumptions but also its methodological flaws
and limitations. Feminist scientists such as Anne Fausto-Sterling (1992b) and Bonnie
Spanier (1995a) contend that particularly in culturally-charged issues such as the basis of
gendered characteristics, one cannot count on the “rigor” of the scientific process to catch
“bad science.” Sometimes such research has been published and received much positive
attention even when it contained many flaws and limitations. In addition, good science is
not always given recognition when it does not support the notion of essential differences
between women and men. Spanier (1995a) notes that “[t]he field of sex[-]differences
research is framed as an interest in differences. Studies with ‘null findings,’ results
showing no effect or no difference, are inherently of less interest, while even
questionable studies showing difference are accorded a place of scientific respect” (57,
italics in original).
In addition, a fundamental assertion of feminist science studies is that gender is a
construct that overlays our understandings of other things. Harding (1986) notes that
within a feminist framework of analysis
gender is a fundamental category within which meaning and value
are assigned to everything in the world, a way of organizing human
social relations. If we regarded science as a totally social activity, we
could begin to understand the myriad ways in which it, too, is structured
by expressions of gender. (1986:57)
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Feminist science scholars have shown that the gendering of concepts ultimately
has effects on how we come to understand the world through science. Evelyn Fox Keller
was among the first to demonstrate that scientific approaches to obtaining knowledge
about nature have built within them the conceptual hierarchical binary of
masculine/feminine (1985). The devaluing of those things gendered feminine in science
has implications for how research is conducted and thereby what is ultimately
“discovered.” For example, Keller notes that in biology, “hierarchical” theories,
associated with masculinity, are often preferred as an explanatory framework over
"interactionist " theories, which are associated with a “feminine” emphasis on
relationships and interactions (1992). Similarly, Bonnie Shulman (1994) elucidates the
association contained within the primacy placed on rationality in science, the devaluing
of other modes of understanding, and the gendered conceptions of each. In addition, she
points out that the belief in rationality as the “best” way to produce knowledge about the
natural world is not inevitable, but has come to be seen as such;
It is the privileging of the rational mode over, say, the empathetic
mode of obtaining knowledge, and the power relations implied in
the assumption of the superiority of reason (gendered as male) over
feeling (gendered as female) that must be challenged. There is an
underlying assumption in claiming that we can know the world through
rational inquiry that is so “natural” that it goes uimoticed; that is, that
the world we seek to know and understand is itself rational and orderly,
and that human reason alone can discover principles and laws that govern
the behavior of things. We forget that it takes a leap o f faith to believe
this. (1994:3)
Feminist science studies is committed to exposing these “leaps of faith,” demonstrating
the effects they have had on how science is done and what knowledge is produced, and
suggesting ways in which science might actually be improved by acknowledging its
standpoints. Doing this requires redefining traditional scientific objectivity. Haraway
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(1991) describes this goal as “an epistemology and politics of engaged, accountable
positioning... The science question in feminism is about objectivity as positioned
rationality” (196). The feminist version of scientific objectivity, then, requires
contextualizing knowledge claims in the social conditions of their production. In this
way “truths” can be produced, while at the same time not presuming a claim to a
universal “truth”; according to Haraway, “feminist objectivity means quite simply
situated knowledges” (1991:188).
A goal of the current project is to uncover the assumptions inherent to the
standpoints from which the scientific efforts to explain lesbian and bisexual orientations
in women through biology are produced. Feminist science studies provides the
theoretical framework through which this can be accomplished. In addition, feminist
science studies inform this study in terms of the methods of analysis, those involved both
in exposing bias in scientific methodologies and in uncovering the role of gendered
associations in “objective” science. Thus the current study is associated with the field of
feminist science studies at every level, yet the focus on sexual orientation requires
positioning this research within the body of similar work in the field of lesbian and gay
studies. I turn now to discussing the influences on this study of such previous work.

Historical Medical and Scientific Explanations
for Lesbian Identity, and Their Critiques
It is important to locate the current scientific research that seeks to explain lesbian
and bisexual orientations in women as biologically based in terms of its historical
positioning within such scientific research, in order to understand better the development
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of the current paradigms of thought In addition, critiques of these historical projects
have created important insights into the social influences upon the scientific theories
about homosexuality and the ideological functions served by them. These critiques
inform the current project’s effort to situate socially the modem scientific effort to find
biological explanations for lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, hi this section I
will provide an overview of ideas put forth in texts from the modem (beginning in the
19“*century) medical/scientific effort to explain homosexuality, focusing on the
discussions about women, as well as some insights from critiques of these projects. This
discussion will help position the scientific research that I will analyze as well as my own
critiques of it.
Historical Lesbian Sexology
It is first important to recognize that “sexuality” and “sexual orientation” as we
may think of them today were not always conceptualized as such. According to the
French theorist and historian Michel Foucault in his The History o f Sexuality Vol. 1
(1978), the construction of “sexuality” into a domain of knowledge and practice occurred
in the nineteenth century. It occurred through the development of what Foucault calls a
“scientia sexualis” a science that is concerned with “the task of producing true
discourses concerning sex, and this by adapting - not without difficulty - the ancient
procedure of confession to the rules of scientific discourse” (1978:67-68). Confession,
according to Foucault, has been established in Western societies for many hundreds of
years “as one of the main rituals we rely upon for the production of tmth” (1978:58), one
which has become a procedural aspect of many social institutions, and the power of its
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truth-producing effects ingrained into our understandings of ourselves and others. Of the
confession, Foucault notes that it
is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject
of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship,
for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a
partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires
the confession... (1978: 61)
The obligatory nature of the confession in regard to sex has become disguised, according
to Foucault, such that we see the act of confessing as liberating and its constraint as
oppressive. The scientia sexualis “connects the ancient injunction of confession to
clinical listening methods”, which enabled medical/scientific authorities to construct
“something called ‘sexuality’ to embody the truth of sex and its pleasures” (1978:68).
Not surprisingly, “sexuality” became a realm in which physicians and scientists
held the role of the one to whom “confession” was expected and by whom its meanings
were interpreted and judged. Also not surprisingly, “sexuality was defined as being ‘by
nature’: a domain susceptible to pathological processes, and hence one calling for
therapeutic or normalizing interventions...” (1978:68). In this way, according to
Foucault, Western societies in the 1800s “set out to formulate the uniform truth of sex”
(1978:69).
Part of constructing this uniform truth involved “the setting apart of the
unnatural’ as a specific dimension in the field of sexuality” (1978:39). “Perverted”
sexualities came to be identified and located in the body: “In the course of the century
they successively bore the stamp of ‘moral folly,’ ‘genital neurosis,’ aberration of the
genetic instinct,’ ‘degenerescence,’ or ‘physical imbalance’” (1978:40). Importantly, in
this period “perversions” that had previously been merely actions came to be reflective of
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types of people. This leads us to Foucault’s well-known contribution to understanding
modem Western society’s understanding of homosexuality; he writes that “[t]he
nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a
childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an
indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology” (1978:43). During the late
1800’s, “homosexuality” came to represent a medical category in which types of people primarily men - could be placed by the nature of their perversion, which actually was
“less by a type of sexual relations than by a certain quality of sexual sensibility, a certain
way of inverting the masculine and feminine in oneself’ (1978:43). Of course the
transition was not perfectly clear-cut; as Fausto-Sterling writes, “[mjerely coining a new
term did not magically create twentieth-century categories of sexuality, but the moment
does seem to mark the beginning of their gradual emergence” (2000:13). However, in
Foucault’s famous words: “Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality
when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a
hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the
homosexual was now a species” (1978:43).
Slightly pre dating Foucault’s chronological location of the creation of the
“homosexual” as a type of person was the work of Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, a German man
who was not a scientist or a physician, but who in 1864 began publishing his own writing
on the “natural” categories of people who loved those of their own sex (Mondimore
1996). Ulrichs, himself homosexual, wrote his theories about the naturalness of the
existence of a “third sex ” to explain homosexuality, in an effort to promote tolerance.
While Ulrich’s theories were largely rejected by many in the medical community of that
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time period (see discussion of Krafft-Ebing, below), Ulrichs holds a distinctive status; he
“was the first to come up with a scientific theory of homosexuality” (Terry 1999:43). His
work influenced the thinking of medical researchers even if they rejected his theories;
Terry states that “[h]is writings gave rise to the paradigm of sexual inversion which
structured most nineteenth-century scientific theories of homosexuality” (43). While not
all of his theories came to be accepted, “his idea of a homosexual identity did”
(Mondimore 1996:32).
The next major text concerning homosexuality produced by the new field known
as “sexology” was Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis, the first edition of
which was published in 1886 (Mondimore 1996). Krafft-Ebing was a German
neurologist who compiled case studies of over 200 persons with various forms of
“psychopathological manifestations of sexual life” (Mondimore 1996:35). In a way that
sounds similar to Ulrichs’ writings, Krafft-Ebing defined the homosexual as “sexually
inverted;” however, as implied by his book’s title, Krafit-Ebing rejected the idea that
homosexuality might be a natural condition of sexuality. Krafft-Ebing proposed that
“inversion” could be “congenital” or “acquired,” and defined “congenital inversion” in
the following way: “The essential feature of this strange manifestation of sexual life is the
want of sexual sensibility for the opposite sex, even to the extent of horror, while sexual
inclination and impulse toward the same sex are present” (in Storr 1998:18). Storr (1998)
critiques Krafft-Ebing’s categories and gradations of categories, noting that they are
applied in ways that are at times contradictory or indistinct from one another. According
to Storr, “Krafft-Ebing is deploying a category - ‘congenital inversion’ - which covers a
multitude of perversions and reduces the diversity of desires and practices to a single
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clinical e n ü t/' (1998:19). Thus although Krafft-Ebing asserted that individual cases of
homosexuality could be placed into the taxonomy he created, in fact his definitions and
distinguishing characteristics did not adequately describe the cases he discussed nor
reliably separate them from one another.
The inclusion of lesbians (though not called by that name) in the Psychopathic
Sexualis offers evidence that homosexuality or “inversion” in women did not escape
scrutiny from early sexologists. Storr (1998) notes that Krafft-Ebing “acknowledges the
paucity of data on inversion in women, but insists that despite the relative invisibility of
female homosexuality, as many women as men are congenitally inverted” (19).
However, Krafft-Ebing’s categorization scheme apparently suffers due to this paucity of
data, as the distinction between congenital and acquired inversion is even less clear for
women (Storr 1998: 20). According to Storr
Here we again find Krafft-Ebing applying distinct categories to material
which exceeds their boundaries. Not only are the gradations which
constitute congenital and acquired inversion woefully inadequate to the
case histories they present as evidence, particularly when faced with
subjects who doggedly desire and engage sexually with both women
and men, but the very distinction between the congenital and acquired
itself is thoroughly unstable. (1998:20)
In addition to critiquing the limitations imposed by the ideologies underlying KrafftEbing’s work, Storr critiques the methodological limitations, due to the impreciseness of
the categories and the inability to handle cases that did not fit established criteria.
Krafft-Ebing also did not limit himself to describing and categorizing types of
“inversion;” causes and cures were suggested as well. According to Mondimore (1996):
Despite Krafft-Ebing’s statement that his goal is simply to ‘record’ the
varieties of human sexual expression, he does not hesitate to propose a
theory of causation for homosexuality. He states that, without exception,
this anomaly of psychosexual feeling may be called, clinically, a
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functional sign of degeneration.’ (36)
In Krafft-Ebing’s diagnosis of the etiology of inversion, “degeneration” referred to what
has been called “degeneracy theory,” used by the medical and scientific communities in
the late 1800s-early 1900s to describe people who were inherently “of lesser stock” and
considered to blame for many social problems (Mondimore 1996:36-37). As Gibson
(1997) notes:
The medical literature of the late nineteenth century indicates an
ever-present awareness of evolutionary theory which served as an
especially versatile, scientific, objective model for rationalizing sexual
and social values that had previously been regulated by religion and
the law. Degeneration, or the slide down the evolutionary ladder, was
a common explanation for mental disease in general, and sexual
perversion in particular. (115)
Degeneracy theory was applied in ways, not surprisingly, that upheld dominant beliefs
about the superiority of certain classes - for the most part white, upper-class,
heterosexual men. Certain groups were “determined ”to have features that marked their
evolutionary regression or degeneration, in contrast to the normal features attributed to
those who were considered to represent the pinnacle of human evolution. For example,
in her analysis of primarily American physicians’ writings on “female inverts” during the
late 1800’s, Gibson points out a seeming fascination with certain bodily manifestations of
the women’s “masculine” natures, most notably the attribution of large clitorises (1997).
The descriptions of the lesbians’ “hypertrophied” genitalia drew upon an already-present
discourse of the physical superiority of the white race. As Somerville writes: “One of the
most consistent medical characterizations of the anatomy of both African American
women and lesbians was the myth of an unusually large clitoris” (2000:27). ‘Too much”
interest in sex or physical arousal noted by researchers was similarly attributed to both
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lesbians and African Americans and deemed evid^*^^®

evolutionary regression to a less

civilized and more animalistic state (Gibson 1997) Th®se pronouncements about
lesbians and women of African descent served to fcinforce each other and the
“superiority” of whites and heterosexuals.
The next sexological work to achieve grea^ importance after Kraftt-Ebing s
Psychopathia Sexualis was the 1897 English-lang^^S® publication o f Sexual Inversion,
written by British physician Havelock Ellis (with contributions by literary figure John
Addington Symonds) (Mondimore 1996). Like

“Ellis sought to reform what he

thought were archaic attitudes toward sexuality, ai'^ he advocated what he believed was
an enlightened approach to homosexuality” (Terry 1999:50). According to Mondimore,
Ellis suggested that “except for their sexual parmc^» homosexuals are not terribly
different from everybody else,” and that he “dispeP®®^

degeneracy theory

(Terry

1999:49). Terry, however, argues that although E ^^ generally argued against the
association of homosexuality with degeneracy and pathology, [he] discussed the subject
in terms that often defied this claim” (1999:53). homosexuality was associated with
weakness and was, according to Ellis, more likely

he triggered in the lower races and

classes” because of their undesirable living enviroP™®^^ (Terry 1999.52-53). Thus
Ellis utilized already-present beliefs in other grouf*^ inferiority’ in the construction of
his theories about homosexuality. As stated by So®®^*^® (2000), Sexual Inversion
“illustrates the ways in which the development of P®"' sexual categories was mediated by
methodologies and conclusions borrowed from prf^^°^^ studies of racial difference
(10).
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While a contemporary of Ellis, German physician Magnus Hirschfeld, is widely
known in sexological literature for his advocacy of the medical view of homosexuality as
a “natural variation,” this positive perspective “was overshadowed by a consensus among
most physicians that inversion and homosexuality were, by definition, troublesome
disorders” (Terry 1999:55). Ellis’s main theory of homosexuality was one of “innate
biological predispositions acted upon by environmental influences and experiences,”
much like many modem theories today (Mondimore 1996:50). However, also
resembling some current lines of thought, Ellis’s work reinforced the idea of
homosexuality as an undesirable condition, as his case studies seemed to suggest that
homosexuality could have been avoided “if congenitally predisposed children were
protected firom unhealthy conditions” (Terry 1999:51).
hi addition, regarding Ellis’s relatively respectful view of his male case studies,
Terry notes that “Ellis did not extend the same charitable understanding to lesbians. To
the contrary, he emphasized their mannishness and their tendencies toward predation,
while criticizing their feminist beliefs as pathological” (1999:51). The connection
between Ellis’ apparently negative perceptions of lesbians and his dislike of “their
feminist beliefs” is an interesting one, in that it suggests the inter-relatedness of the
regulation of lesbian sexuality (and the lesbian body) and of women’s roles in society in
general at that time. In her study of the history of lesbian identity, Martha Vicinus writes
the following of Krafit-Ebing and Ellis:
However revolutionary these men may have thought their descriptions
to be, both were simply confirming the long-standing representation of
women’s social transgression as both the symptom and die cause of their
sexual transgression. The incipient biologism of an earlier generation of
medical men now moved to the forefront. These theorists all insisted
upon the primacy of the body as the definer of public, social behavior.
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(1993:443)
With the body as “definer” of behaviors deemed unacceptable, the body was then itself
described and defined in ways that reinforced notions of innate deviance from an
assumed norm: As Gibson (1997) notes:
the medical concern over clitoral hypertrophy highlighted a variety of
social and metaphorical fears and issues. “Hypertrophy' was applied to
both the body and behavior - Havelock Ellis descrikd “hypertrophied
friendship’ in his treatise on female sexual inversion (1895,147),
suggesting that these women’s relationships and their bodies revealed
a pathological expansion that threatened to overwhelm the physical
and social body. ( I l l )
While ““clitoral hypertrophy” certainly received a great deal of attention, other anatomical
features also were deemed “too large” or “unattractive” compared to those of ‘“normal”
(upper-class, heterosexual, white) women (Gibson 1997). One could say that the co
construction of lesbian and African women’s bodies (and ““lesser” natures) in this way
was in part a mechanism to keep “proper” women constrained, socially and spatially,
firom “pathological expansion” (for further discussion of the construction of the
‘“difference” of African women’s bodies in this time period, see Fausto-Sterling 1995;
Gilman 1985; and Stepan 1996).
It is also important to note that during this time period, even privileged women
were considered to be naturally intellectually inferior to men. The white male brain had
been determined to be larger in general and more developed in crucial regions than the
brains of women and “lesser races” (Gibson 1998). Thus the designation of lesbians, in
particular the lesbian brain, as both ‘“masculine” and ““lesser” posed a contradiction. This
problem was circumvented in part, according to Gibson (1998), by the association of the
lesbian brain with that not of white men, but ‘“inferior” men of other races:
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By connecting female homosexuals’ brains to other races, doctors
could undermine any connotations of superiority that surrounded their
intellectual masculinity. This strategy points to a multiplicity of
masculinities that could be called upon in the construction of a lesbian
intellect. The diversity of masculinities that were created by differences
such as class and race was expanded upon through the creation of the
lesbian herself. (1998:86)
Concomitantly, intelligence in a woman was constructed as a sign of underlying
“degeneracy,” and “the specter of an intelligent, sexually deviant woman became a threat
to the status of any ambitious woman” (Gibson 1998:87). With education suggested to
be a mechanism by which bodily and behavioral “femininity” could be destroyed, many
women could be effectively kept away from intellectual pursuits, and the pathology of the
lesbian’s “masculine intellect” was reinforced (Gibson 1998). Thus have analyses of the
scientific discourse regarding lesbians in the late 1800s demonstrated its ideological
functions in maintaining gendered social arrangements.
As Terry (1990,1995,1999) recognizes, the interrelationships between medical
pronouncements about lesbian bodies and ideological beliefs about women’s roles
continued into the 20* century. Notably, in the United States during the 1930s, the
Committee for the Study of Sex Variants began the search for physical features capable
of distinguishing heterosexuals from homosexuals, with a special interest in lesbians
(Terry 1995:139). Forty lesbians agreed to participate, and among other forms of
examination the study included an intense inspection of the women’s genitals. Terry
writes:
Regardless of the absence of a heterosexual control group, ten typical
characteristics of lesbians were established that supposedly distinguished
their genitals from those of ‘normal women.’ The typical female sex
variant had a larger than average vulva, longer labia majora, protruding
labia minora, a large and wrinkled prepuce, a notably erectile’ clitoris,
an elastic and insensitive hymen, a distensible vagina, a small uterus.
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and erectile nipples. The list bore a remarkable resemblance to that
assembled by Havelock Ellis several decades earlier, suggesting that
a standard had been set for what counted as a lesbian body. (1995:143)
Terry, then, conducts a methodological critique of the Sex Variant Study (lack of
adequate controls and other issues) in addition to pointing out its ideological nature. In
addition to the noted continuity of these descriptions with those of Ellis, there was a
consistency in the racist emphasis on the abnormal degree of “masculinity” noted in
African-American women. Terry writes:
Some gynecological sketches noted the race of the subject (‘negress’)
next to what was seen to be an unusually long clitoris, recalling the
lesbian counterpart to the stereotypical savage with an unusually long
penis. Here, as in other representations combining racial difference
and sexual deviance, we find a link in the white medical imagination
between blackness and hypersexuality, this time through a clinical
reading of lesbian masculinity in female genitals. (1995:144)
Thus the late 19* century co-construction of the large-clitorised, masculine AfricanAmerican and lesbian continued on in research conducted in the 1930s and early 1940s.
The bodies of African-Americans and lesbians were still understood in masculine terms,
such as having denser musculo-skeletal stmctures; but in addition to the body itself were
the attributions of masculinity to behaviors such as “marmerisms and postures selfconfidence and determination” - all forbidden attributes of “proper” women (1990:317).
It can be seen from this analysis that the construction of the “variant” still in this era was
intertwined with the maintenance of the “natural” superiority, and resulting social
dominance, of white men.
Yet while it appears the vast majority of sexological literature defined lesbians as
pathological and in need of explanation, Carlston (1997) challenges the notion that it was
universally so. While the pathologizing of lesbian identity by the scientific and medical
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communities certainly existed, it was not the only approach. Her historical analysis of
medical literature in the US from 1926-1940 demonstrates competing explanatory
paradigms: “In fact, the medical discourse on homosexuality was never uniform: while
there were many who characterized homosexuality as a disease, there were others who
emphatically did not” (1997:177). In addition to dissenting views, Carlston notes that
even negative representations of lesbians were taken up and recast by those so
pathologized in order to enact resistance, in what could be described as a “reverse
discourse” in Foucauldian terms. Foucault writes:
There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century
psychiatry, jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses
on the species and subspecies of homosexuality... made possible a
strong advance of social controls into this area of ‘perversity’; but it
also made possible the formation of a ‘reverse’ discourse: homosexuality
began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or
naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using
the same categories by which it was medically disqualified. (1978:101)
It is important to note the existence of dissenting views because understanding the
full context of the medical discourse provides for a better critical analysis of the apparent
hegemony of the pathologizing views. Also, however, as Carlston points out, it should be
understood that lesbians were not completely victimized by the medical and scientific
discourse; rather, they were actively engaged in constructing “strategies of resistance”
(1997:193).
Interestingly, the Sex Variant study, according to Terry, ended up concluding that
these bodily manifestations of lesbianism were actually the result of such an identity
(rather than a sign of congenital aberrance), specifically the result of the type of “sex
play” in which lesbians presumably engaged. The markers were insufficiently reliable to
distinguish sex variants from normals, and the psyche was determined to be the locus of
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homosexual origins (1995:151-152). This idea drew upon contemporary models, inspired
by the work of Sigmund Freud, of the psychogenesis of homosexual orientations. As
such, the Sex Variant study itself shed little light on explanations for the “variance” it
studied. The scientific climate in terms of confidence in the ability to locate bodily
distinctions between homosexuals and heterosexuals began to change in this era, in part
as a result of this study, hi addition, the publication of Alfred Kinsey’s research (in 1948
and 1953) helped put forth the idea that sexual orientation exists along a continuum,
which suggested absolute biological distinctions between heterosexuals and homosexuals
could not be found because they did not, in fact, exist (Terry 1995:154-156). Terry
writes:
Looking back over this history, we can say that, for an anxious
moment, the homosexual body vanished not only because of
methodological contradictions in such projects as the Sex Variant
study, but also because rigorously conducted empirical science
revealed that perhaps homosexuality was in every body. Indeed,
following the Sex Variant study and Kinsey’s research, constitutional
studies were for the most part discontinued; but the quest for finding
homosexuality in the body was far from exhausted, taking new forms
which focused on the vicissitudes of the hormonal system and on
patterns of sexual response. (1995:160)
It is here in part that we find the current era of the scientific search for biological
explanations for lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, as hypotheses focusing, for
example, on the effects of hormones are still widely in use. Scientific advances have
made it possible to look past the surface, to parts of the body inaccessible to earlier
researchers. Magee and Miller state: “By the 1970’s, scientists studying homosexuality
had left behind such crude measures. By then they believed that the essential differences
that made the difference, such as hormone levels and brain structures, would not be
visible to the unaided eye” (1997:74). Thus scientific research into bodily explanations
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for homosexuality, rather than ending, has flourished and proliferated in the wake of new
technologies and discoveries.
Historical lesbian sexology, in summary, was driven largely by the overarching
belief in lesbianism as a condition of inverted sex and/or gender characteristics. Even
advocates tended only to see homosexuality within such a framework, suggesting how
deeply rooted was the belief in the naturalness of a heterosexual orientation as a
constitutional part of one’s maleness or femaleness. Sexual orientation was
unproblematically tied to sex and/or gender, and sexual orientation categories were taken
to be essential to human nature, their relatively recent construction (per Foucault) taken
as discovery.
The science was often used as a means to establish the boundaries between the
“fit” and the “unfit,” by which ideological notions of superior and inferior groups of
people were reinforced through a medico-scientific discourse. The pinnacle of women’s
evolution was accorded to those who were white, heterosexual, and undoubtedly upperclass. The ranking was “proven” by constructing the bodies of “lesser” women - white
lesbians and women of color - as having similar evolutionary deficiencies.” Also, being
a lesbian was associated in the scientific imagination with taking up too much space bodily, sexually, and socially. It served to help reinforce ideologies of a woman’s
“proper place,” helping to maintain patriarchal relations of power.

~ A recent article (Miller 2000) also suggests that the deviance of lesbians’ bodies was
constructed in tandem with that of the bodies of prostitutes.
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Overview of Current Scientific Efforts and Critiques
Rather than existing only as an archaic mode of thinking, the quest to “explain”
identities considered deviant through scientific and medical means persists today, hi fact
it is argued that advances in knowledge and technologies have helped such research
efforts proliferate, as we are now capable of examining aspects of the body unimaginable
to early sexologists, down to our very DNA (Hubbard 1995; Keller 2000; Rothman
1998). Modem medical science continues to attempt to locate biological origins of
homosexuality in various anatomical sites and physiological processes, most commonly
those thought to be sexually dimorphic, revealing a continued view of homosexuality as
an “inversion” of sex and/or gender. The current research being conducted to find
biological origins of homosexuality is argued to persist in reproducing the ideology of
homosexuality as deviant. I will overview the current lines of scientific inquiry and
major areas of critique.
There are four very general types of scientific research being conducted in the
current time period (1990 to present) to locate biological origins of homosexuality:
differences in the brain structure, in endocrinological effects, in cognitive abilities, and in
the genetic code (De Cecco and Parker 1995; Stein 1999; Zicklin 1997). Brain studies
are exemplified by work such as that by Allen and Gorski, 1992; LeVay, 1991; and
Swaab and Hofinan, 1990. Each of these studies examined structures of the brain thought
to be sexually dimorphic for correlates to homosexuality. De Cecco and Parker (1995)
point out that “[i]n brain research, reports of studies claiming to have found new areas of
‘sexual dimorphism’ often precede reports claiming to have identified new markers for
homosexuality” (4).
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the discourse. It is at this point that the relation between the first part of this discussion
and the second should be most clear. Scientific knowledge and practice are
interdependent and must be examined as such. To do so is to resist the dichotomous
thinking that has been so central to maintaining the power of science to name, define, and
control. As Collins (1999) states:
Science speaks the language of power because it is the language
of power. However, science is about much more than language or
discourse. Given its significance in Western thought, scientific
knowledge and the practices it constructs and defends are intersecting
dimensions of the struggle to shape reality. Whether feminist
analyses of science maintain this struggle remains to be seen. (279)

Explanation of This Project
From the preceding discussion emerges not only the rationale for the type of
analysis I am proposing, but also suggestions for how to proceed. In this section I
describe how I go about conducting this analysis. Discussion of the two different
emphases I have just discussed, on science “as science” and on the language used in
constructing the scientific claims, at first are separated out in the interest of clarity. After
the elements are described separately, the analysis resulting from their integration is
discussed.
Empirical Critique
The empirical critique of the science focuses on three distinct aspects of the
articles: the explanatory framework, the study sample, and the interpretations and
conclusions drawn from the data. First is the explanatory framework. As discussed by
Spanier (1995a), this is the portion of the research that sets up everything that follows.
One particular paradigm of thought has served as the explanatory homework for a great
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deal of sexual orientation research, which has been called the “intersex assumption”
(Byne 1995). The intersex assumption sees homosexuality as representing an
intermediate identity existing between heterosexual men and women (Byne 1995). The
goal of this section of the critique is to determine whether and to what extent an intersex
assumption underlies the current body of research on lesbian identity.
hi this study, the explanatory framework of each study is evaluated for the
presence or absence of the “intersex assumption.” The explanatory framework is first
revealed in the introductory section of the article. This is the section on which the
analysis focuses. Specifically, the analysis is conducted by locating in the introductory
section a passage that states the research questions, hypotheses, goals, or expectations.
Then, these statements are analyzed for the presence of particular words, phrases, and
concepts that are considered to be associated with the intersex assumption. A critique of
the problematic aspects of the intersex assumption’s role in the scientific research on
origins of sexual orientation in lesbian and bisexual women is then discussed.
Second, the samples of subjects used in the research studies are critiqued. There
are three bases for the critique: the selection of the samples, the categorization of sexual
orientation in the samples, and the composition of the samples. These aspects are
critiqued separately. The sample selection is analyzed for biases in the populations form
which the researchers sampled, and the methods used to recruit subjects. Bias in either of
these aspects can create a research sample that is not representative of the population at
large, thus imposing limitations on how the findings may be interpreted. The section of
the article discussing the sample selection procedure is read for the kinds of potential
bias-inducing factors that have been discussed by previous scholars (Allen 1997; Spanier
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1995b, Zicklin 1997). Next the categorization of subjects’ sexual orientations is
analyzed. The methods used to place subjects into a category (lesbian, bisexual, or
heterosexual) are read to see what criteria and standards were in place in each article.
Then issues with these processes that could cast doubt on their reliability, validity, and
ultimate usefulness in the construction of scientific knowledge claims are then discussed.
The third aspect of the sample analyzed is that of composition in terms of demographic
variables such as age, race, social class, and education levels. If the samples are very
skewed on important demographic variables, the generalizability is again put into
question. The diversity of the samples on these aspects is critiqued in terms of the
representativeness of the population in general.
Last, the empirical critique of the scientific articles analyzes the interpretations
and conclusions drawn from the research data. These are present in the final section of
each article, typically called the “Discussion” section. Two aspects of the interpretations
and conclusion are analyzed. First, they are read for the degree to which the researchers
acknowledged sample-related limitations when interpreting their findings and drawing
conclusions. As discussed in the section on the critique of the samples, bias in the
selection, categorization, and composition of the study samples creates serious limitations
to how the data may be interpreted and to whom the findings may be considered
applicable. In interpreting the findings and drawing conclusions about them, these
potential limitations must be taken in account, yet it has been suggested by past research
that scientists may “fail to be cautious” in work on topics such as sex difrerences and
sexual orientation (Spanier 1995a). The acknowledgement of potential sample-related
limitations is examined and implications discussed. In addition, the interpretations and
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conclusions are analyzed for mechanisms of exaggerating the importance or significance
of the findings (Spanier 199Sb;74). These mechanisms include basing interpretations and
conclusions on findings that did not achieve statistical significance or that are otherwise
questionable. The implications of overstating one’s research findings are then discussed.
Discourse Analvsis
The part of the project that involves utilizing discourse analysis methods
examines the meanings associated with lesbian and bisexual orientations in women using
the sample of scientific articles as texts for the analysis. The goal of this analysis is to
uncover ideological assumptions and understandings in the discourse regarding lesbian
and bisexual orientations and their intersections with sex, gender, and race.
The analysis of the scientific discourse begins by identifying words or phrases
related to gender, sexual orientation, or race and reading the texts for the presence of
these concepts. Once all identifiable usages of language relating to gender, sexual
orientation, and race are located, the words and phrases and the context in which they
arise is read closely to interpret the meanings associated with them in the text.
The meanings associated with the concepts of gender, sexual orientation, and race
are interpreted based on the explicit meaning given in the text (if any), as well as implicit
meanings that can be attributed through the analysis, informed by feminist standpoint
theories. These meanings, then, are read to uncover patterns or “themes” that are
generated inductively firom the texts themselves. The themes that arise are then analyzed
for the assumptions that inform them and the purposes they serve in the discourse. From
this analysis, ideological beliefs, assumptions, and understandings are brought to light.
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fotegrating the Nfethodoloeical and
Discursive Analyses
The findings firom the methodological and discursive analyses are integrated in
the process of interpreting their implications for what the science can say about lesbian
“nature.” The integration is done in part to examine the interdependencies of scientific
knowledge and practice, as discussed by Collins (1999). Collins argues that analyses of
either scientific knowledge (epistemological critiques) or practice (here, methodological
critiques, though Collins’ discussion focuses more on institutional practices) alone miss
important ways in which the two work together, suggesting instead the value of
“intersectional analysis.” Feminist critiques of the empirical inadequacies of scientific
research have been criticized for ignoring the androcentrism inherent in “science as
usual” (Lermon 1998; Longino 1990). While as discussed earlier I think these criticisms
are not entirely well-founded, it is true that critiquing science only by its own standards
may fail to get at more fundamental biases that exist within science as a system of
knowledge. However, discursive critiques of science have also been criticized for
ignoring the material effects of scientific practice (Collins 1999). Also, as discussed
earlier feminist scientists have made convincing arguments for the necessity of analyzing
the cases in which scientific research does not measure up to its own standards (FaustoSterling 1992a, 1992b; Spanier 1995a). When these analyses serve as a means to
furthering imderstanding of whv this occurs, or may occur more frequently in some types
of research as opposed to others, the connections between the critiques of empirical
inadequacies and of ideological elements in science are made clear.
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This project asserts that underlying assumptions influence both the
methodological and discursive choices made by researchers, and that the limitations
imposed by those choices intersect in complex ways to place boundaries on the scientific
knowledge claims. While the methodologies and discourse are analyzed separately, they
affect one another and ultimately work together to create implications for the reach of the
claims of the science. Thus the two analyses are integrated in the process of interpreting
these implications. In this way it is hoped that both analyses can be more meaningful and
produce more useful results.

Sampling
The discussion of the sample of articles analyzed is divided into five subsections.
The first subsection describes the process by which the full sample of all relevant articles
in the time period under consideration (1990-2000) is constructed. Second, the
characteristics of the sample itself are described. Next, the process by which the full
sample is reduced to a subsample of articles for analysis is described. The characteristics
of the full sample are then compared to the subsample in order to establish that the
smaller set of articles adequately represents the full set. Last, potential limitations of the
sample are discussed.
Construction of the Full Sample
The full sample consists of all English-language articles published in academic
science journals from January 1990 to June 2000 that report research findings from a
scientific study of possible biological or genetic correlates for lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women. This decade was chosen because it represents the period of
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dramatic increase in not only such biological research but also media and public interest
in it. The 1991 publication of LeVay’s brain research represented the beginning of major
public attention to the possibility of definitively locating a biological difference between
gay and straight people (Fausto-Sterling 2(XX); Zicklin 1997).
The articles were gathered by use of comprehensive online search indexes
including “Web of Science,” a database published by the Institute for Scientific
Information, which was used as a main source; “Medline,” a database of the National
Library of Medicine; and “UnCover,” another online database of journal articles. The
article searches were conducted primarily in June and July 2000, and were concluded in
November 2(XX). The searches were initially conducted utilizing relevant search terms
and various combinations thereof, including “lesbian”, “bisexual”, “sexual orientation”,
“homosexuality”, “heterosexuality”, “women”, “biological”, “genetic”, “heritable”, and
“etiology”. When these search terms returned no additional articles, other methods were
employed to ensure thoroughness. For example, I used functions available on the “Web
of Science” database to locate additional articles, such as “find related articles,” a
function that locates articles containing similar reference lists; another function that lists
the works that have cited the article in question; and an additional method by which one
can search for all articles written by specific authors or that have cited works by specific
authors.
In addition, to avoid failing to identify articles published in journals not indexed
in the databases utilized, I searched the reference lists of articles that were obtained for
any additional articles that might be qualified for inclusion. Articles were excluded if
they: a) reported results of a study of men only; b) reported results of a study on animal
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subjects rather than humans; c) primarily or solely reported results of a psychological
study; d) consisted of a review of other studies rather than original research; or e)
consisted of a “meta-analysis” * or “re-analysis” ^ of others’ findings.
Overview of the Full Sample
The full sample consists of articles published in English-language academic
science journals from January 1990 to June 2000 that report results of original scientific
research testing hypotheses of biological or genetic explanations for lesbian or bisexual
orientations in women. The number of articles in this sample is 35 (see Appendix). Five
of these articles are different from the other 30 in that their focus is on identifying
possible lesbian or bisexual orientations in girls and women with sex-hormone related
disorders. These articles are considered separately, as their primary focus is on potential
efrects of pathological conditions rather than lesbians and bisexual women specifically.
Some characteristics of the full sample, including area of scientific research and
lead authorship, are described here in order to establish a basis for comparison to the final
subsample upon which the actual analysis is performed. It is important to know the
similarities and differences of both sets of articles on these meaningful characteristics to
support the claim that the subsample is in fact representative of the sample as a whole. If
the subsample is very different from the full sample, it carmot be claimed that the results
of the analysis have significance for the general scientific discourse that is reflected by
the full sample.
^ Lalumiere ML, Blanchard R, Zucker KJ. Sexual orientation and handedness in men and
women: A meta-analysis. Psychol Bull 2000; 126 (4): 575-592.
~ Daniel WF, Yeo RA. Handedness and sexual preference: A re-analysis of data
presented by Rosenstein and Bigler. Perceptual Motor Skills 1993; 76: 544-546.
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In tenns of authorship, the lead author for each article is noted in order to
determine potential similarities in research approaches and programs across multiple
studies. The main set of 30 articles has 19 different lead authors. Two different
researchers have lead authorship on four studies each (Bailey and Gladue); five other
researchers each are lead author to two studies (Bogaert, Domer, McCormick,
McFadden, and Wegesin); and the remaining 12 articles each have different lead authors.
The other main issue noted of importance to the representation of the full sample is that
of the area of scientific focus. Based on preliminary readings, the sample is first divided
into two general categories reflecting a notable divergence of scientific approach: studies
of genetic influences and studies of neuroendocrine effects. Nine of the 30 analyze
possible genetic influences on sexual orientation, while the remaining 21 study various
anatomical and physiological sites and processes thought to be affected by the
neuroendocrine system. Then, the two groups are read further to determine if additional
divisions can be made on the basis of multiple (defined as two or more) articles focusing
on very similar areas. From this, the 21 neuroendoctine-approach articles are further
subdivided into two groups by separating out seven whose primary focus is on brainfunction or cognitive effects. No other multiple groupings are established. By using this
separation process the subsample can be constructed in a way that reflects accurate
proportions of the different research areas.
Construction of the Subsamnle
Because the full set of articles is too large to conduct a full analysis on them in
entirety, sampling methods are employed to create a subset of the full sample for further
analysis. The primary rationale behind the sampling procedures is that the sample for
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analysis should be chosen in such a way as to reflect as much as possible the full range of
biologically-oriented research conducted, both in terms of the type o f studies and
publication across the full time period under consideration, 1990-2000. Thus the final
sample needs to include enough articles to adequately reflect this range, while still being
manageable for such in-depth analysis.
First, the articles are divided into three groups according to the type of study
being conducted: the “Genetic” group consists of those with a genetic focus; the
“Brain/Cognition” group, a brain-fimction and/or cognitive focus; and the
“Neuroendocrine” group, a focus on neuroendocrine effects other than cognition-related
ones. This categorization scheme is informed by discussions in Byne, 1995; Stein, 1999;
and Zicklin, 1997, and is implemented in order to categorize most accurately the types of
research conducted on lesbian and bisexual women during the time period under
consideration in order to identify the relative emphasis (as judged by numbers of articles)
of each type of research. In this manner, the final sample could be constructed in a way
that best reflects these emphases, rather than having an over-representation of any one
relative to its actual representation in the full sample. It should be noted that the
groupings are not perfectly clear-cut in two cases, for which decisions were made
regarding the article’s primary emphasis. Specifically, one article placed in the
Brain/Cognition group, because of its multiple focuses of study, could be placed into the
Neuroendocrine group,^ and two articles placed in the Neuroendocrine group also have
genetics-research components and thus could be placed into the Genetic group."* In both
Gladue BA, Bailey JM, 1995 (see Appendix for full citation).
"*In chronological order, these are articles are: Domer G, Poppe 1, Stahl F et al., 1991;
Domer G, Lindner R, Poppe I, et al. 1995 (see Appendix for full citations).
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cases the relative emphases of the different study areas are evaluated in order to
deteimine placement, and the dominant emphasis in terms of quantity of discussion is the
determining factor.
Next, the studies that are primarily following outcomes of disorders identified in
sample subjects are excluded fix)m consideration for the final sample. Specifically, the
articles excluded are four studies on girls and women with a disorder called congenital
adrenal hyperplasia (CAH),^ as well as one study on girls exposed prenatally to the
synthetic estrogen drug diethylstilbestrol (DES),^ so that five total articles are excluded
fi’om the original 35. The reasoning for their exclusion is that these articles, unlike the
rest of the sample, have by definition an approach to understanding lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women to be a potential outcome of an abnormal condition relating to sex
hormones. In the remaining articles, this is an approach for which analysis is conducted;
therefore, including articles that necessarily are based on an understanding of
lesbianism/bisexuality through the lens of pathology would bias the analysis in that
direction.
Additionally, the articles are different from the rest because, as the focus of these
studies was on the effects of a disorder, their samples are chosen based on that status
rather than on sexual orientation, as in the remainder of the sample. Thus it could be said
that for most of the articles, the research is conducted in such a way that sexual

^ In chronological order, these articles are: Dittman RW, Kappes ME, Kappes MH, 1992;
Slijper FME, van der Kamp HJ, Brandenburg H, et al., 1992; Berenbaum SA, Snyder E,
1995; Zucker KJ, Bradley SJ, Oliver G, et al., 1996 (see Appendix for full citations).
®Meyer-Bahlburg HFL, Ehrhardt AA, Rosen LR, et al., 1995 (see Appendix for full
citation).
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orientation was an independent variable and some other, potentially biologically-related
site or process is the dependent variable; whereas in these five articles, the reverse is true.
It is acknowledged that these studies can certainly provide insights into assumptions
made by researchers regarding biological explanations for lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women and are related to efforts to find such evidence, and they are
included in the descriptions of the full sample for those reasons. Also, some of the
studies in question as well as similar, previous ones have already been critiqued
elsewhere, as noted in the review of the literature.
Of the remaining studies, there are nine articles in the Genetic group, seven in the
Brain/Cognition group, and fourteen in the Neuroendocrine group, for a total of 30
articles. Within each group, the articles are organized chronologically by year of
publication, starting with the earliest. If there is more than one article in any given year,
the articles published in the same year are alphabetized by the last name of the lead
author. It is not practical to construct within-year chronologies because o f the differences
in the ways journals publish (some monthly, some bimonthly, et cetera).
Once the groups of articles are organized in this way, the selection process can
proceed in a systematic manner. For each categorization group, the first listed article is
selected for inclusion in the final sample, then every third article listed after the first one.
The only deviation from this sampling process is made if the article to be selected has the
same lead author as one already selected within that grouping. If this happened, the next
sequential article is chosen instead, for purposes of representing a wider range of
research. The process results in the selection of three articles fi-om the Genetic group.
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two from the Brain/Cognition group, and five from the Neuroendocrine group, for a total
of ten articles in the final sample (see Appendix).
The Full Sample Compared to the Suhsample
In order to use the findings from this project to make claims about the scientific
discourse in the 1990s on lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, the articles
analyzed need to be reasonably representative of the entire set of articles from which they
are sampled. Systematic sampling procedures are utilized specifically in order to
maximize the probability that this would be the case. Ideally, systematic sampling
procedures should not produce a subsample for analysis that is different in meaningful
ways from the whole sample population. For this reason I examine and compare the
subsample and the full sample on some key characteristics to identify their similarities
and differences. Large differences between the two sets of articles on these key
characteristics would suggest that much caution should be exercised when applying the
results of this study to the general scientific discourse on lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women during this time period. Small differences increase confidence in
the reliability of this research and representativeness of this sample, because they reflect a
greater degree of similarity between the full sample and the subsample.
The characteristics evaluated are the following: 1) the proportion of types of
studies in the full sample and the subsample, where “types” refers to the scientific
approach and issue studied; 2) the proportion of lead authors in each set of articles; and 3)
the proportion of articles in each set that assert findings of evidence supporting biological
differences between lesbians and/or bisexual women and heterosexual women.
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The first issue, that of the proportion of types of approaches represented in the full
sample and the subsample, is important because different explanatory frameworks,
research focuses, and conclusions are likely to be found in different approaches to the
subject. Thus a subsample that is, for example, composed predominantly of only one
type of approach, will poorly reflect the scientific discourse as represented by the full
sample. For this reason, this is an area in which some effort is made in the sampling
procedure to achieve similarity (see previous section). Specifically, the full sample of 30
articles contained nine articles (30.0%) that focused on possible genetic influences, and
21 (70.0%) that focused on various neuroendocrine effects, which was further subdivided
into seven (23.33% of the full sample) focusing on brain function and cognition, and 14
(46.67%) on all other neuroendocrine-related studies. The group of 14 does not lend
itself to further subdivision, as there are no other areas of focus consisting of more than
two articles.
The subsample of 10, in comparison, contains three articles (30%) on genetic
influences; two (20%) on brain-function and cognitive effects; and five (50%) on other
neuroendocrine-related research. Thus the Genetic group is exactly proportionate to its
representation in the full sample, the Brain/Cognition group is very slightly under
represented (by 3.33%), and the Neuroendocrine group is very slightly over-represented
(by the same 3.33%). In terms of different types of approaches to research on biological
bases for lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, the subsample can be considered to
be representative of the scientific discourse of the time period in question.
The issue of lead authorship is important because it can suggest similarities in
approaches to the topic and in the processes imder consideration. For example, if there
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are only a very few number of lead authors in the full sample, it could suggest a
predominance o f a few types of explanatory frameworks, hypotheses, and anatomical or
physiological sites under consideration. If this were the case, in order to represent
faithfully such a predominance, the subsample should contain a proportionate number of
same-authored articles. As noted previously, the full sample has several instances of
multiple lead authorships. Two lead authors represent four each of the 30 articles
(13.33% each of the sample), while an additional five lead authors represent two articles
each (6.67% percent each). A closer examination of the first two reveals that one
researcher, JM Bailey, is lead author to four of the nine (44.44%) studies o f genetic
influences. Another researcher, BA Gladue, is lead author to four of the 21 (19.05%) of
the articles analyzing neuroendocrine effects, which are divided such that two of the
articles were placed into the Brain/Cognition group (two of seven, or 28.57%), and the
other two were placed into the Neuroendocrine group (two of 14, or 14.29%).
The composition of the subsample, on the other hand, is constructed, as discussed
previously, in such a way as to exclude multiple lead authorships. This is done in order
to achieve the widest possible representation of the scientific discourse on lesbian and
bisexual orientations in women from the time period in question. An examination of the
sampling process reveals that using the process described, no articles by JM Bailey were
actively excluded; rather, the systematic procedure employed resulted in the selection of
only one article for which Bailey is lead author. For BA Gladue, one article was actively
excluded using the process described for avoiding multiple lead authorships in the
subsample. It might be considered a more faithful representation of the discourse to
construct the subsample proportionate to the full sample with respect to the multiple lead
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authorships, at least in the cases of the two researchers discussed. However, achieving a
representation from a diverse set of lead authors is considered to be of value in terms of
reflecting the scope o f the research. Representation of types of approaches is achieved by
the process of constructing the different groupings and sampling within them so that each
approach is represented proportionate to the full sample.
In addition, it was decided that in constructing a manageably-sized subsample,
proportioning according to lead authorships would necessarily produce other problems.
For example, with proportionality of authorship as the main goal, it would be much more
difficult to be systematic in selecting articles by other authors (without multiple lead
authorships) without creating an unman^eably large subsample. Also, while certainly
important, constructing the sample to be proportionate by that criterion would actually
overemphasize the significance of the issue of lead authorship, as it is only one measure
of a single researcher’s importance to a particular study. Additional authors, and other
factors not easily determinable such as research relationships and mentors, can have as
much or more influence on a study’s approach, focus, and conclusions. For these reasons
it was decided to construct a diversified sample in terms of lead authors and to sample
groupings of different types of approaches in a systematic manner. Future studies may
want to emphasize instead the influence of multiple lead authorships and determine if an
effect on results is found.
The third issue of comparison between the full sample and the subsample
concems the conclusions of the study, specifically, whether the two sets of articles are
similar in terms of the proportion claiming results supporting theories of biological bases
for lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. Because the scientific assertions about
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biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women are to be analyzed, the
subsample must be relatively similar to the full sample in terms of results concerning
such findings. In other words, it is important that there not be a large discrepancy
between the two sets of articles in the percentages that claim findings supporting and not
supporting possible biological evidence. Systematic sampling methods are employed to
help minimize any meaningful differences between the full sample and the subsample in
this area, but they are not guaranteed to produce similarities between the two sets of
articles.
An examination of the results from all 30 studies shows that in 14 (46.67%), the
results do not support a biological or genetic basis for lesbian or bisexual orientations in
women, while in the remaining 16 (53.33%), they do. The subsample of 10 articles
consists of four (40.0%) with findings not supporting biological bases, and six (60.0%)
with findings that do. Thus the subsample slightly under-represents (by 6.67%) studies
whose results do not support theories of biological explanations for lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women, and slightly over-represents (by the same 6.67%) studies claiming
positive findings of such evidence. This small difference should not affect the
applicability of the findings from the analysis of the subsample to the scientific discourse
as represented by the full sample, but its existence should be noted.
Limitations of the Sampling Procedures
There are several potential limitations in constructing a sample such as the one
used in this research. It is my belief that my procedures minimize them enough so that
they will not adversely impact the results of this study or their usefulness.
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First, one must be systematic in defining the set of articles in their entirety. My
intent is to identify all English-language scientific articles published in academic journals
between January 1990 and June 2000 relating to research conducted relating to
identifying biological correlates to lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. Though
my search is conducted as thoroughly as possible, there is always a chance that some
articles were somehow overlooked. Primarily, the negative effects that could be produced
by a failure to identify all articles qualified for inclusion in the study would be on the
potential accuracy and utility of the findings. Results produced fi-om such research could
not be said to be representative of the entire set of research articles described as that
under study. The application of the findings to understanding the scientific construction
of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women would be hampered because it could be
said that the findings themselves were only relevant to a specific (and perhaps somehow
biased) portion of the whole set of articles. However, I argue that my search procedures
could not have failed to identify enough articles to have a limiting impact on my findings
or their ultimate usefulness.
The second issue concems the construction of the subsample. Once the entire set
o f articles under consideration is identified, it is still possible to introduce limitation due
to the process of sampling to create a manageable subset of the original sample. This
procedure also needs to be conducted in a systematic manner. The sampling procedure
described above is implemented in order to minimize limitations that could be imposed at
this point. For example, if the subset were chosen in an unsystematic way or if it were
comprised of an insufficient number of articles, it could not be said that the results firom
the analysis of that subsample are relevant to the entire set of articles in question. In
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other words in such a case it could be argued that findings produced would not accurately
reflect the set of articles about which statements are being made. Because the subset is
selected in a fair and systematic manner, which has been described in sufficient detail to
be replicated fully by another researcher, this possible limitation is minimized.
The decisions made during the construction of the subsample certainly impact the
results, as some articles are chosen at the expense of others. However, no article’s
chances o f selection are significantly greater or worse than others, with two possible
exceptions: 1) the decision to include only one article from each lead author means that
multiple articles by the same lead author could be considered to have a worse chance than
other articles to be included in the subsample, an issue that has already been discussed at
length; and 2) articles published very early in the time period in question could have a
slightly greater chance at inclusion, since the starting point for the sampling procedure is
the chronologically first article from each of the three categories described earlier. This
second issue could have been eliminated by choosing a random starting point within each
category; however, the simplicity of having a clear starting point that is consistent across
the three subgroups was deemed valuable as well.
Also, the decision to exclude the articles following the course of disorders
imposes a limitation on the relevance of findings for those types of studies, but limiting
the scope of this project in that way was considered necessary due to the breadth of the
subject as it is. Last, it is possible for limitations to be introduced by the categorization
scheme itself, for if the articles are categorized in a different manner, there may be
different chances for each article to be chosen for inclusion. The possibility for actual
limitation imposed by the categorization decisions made is remote; rather, the
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categorization scheme has value in helping to better reflect the representation of the types
o f research in the full sample.

Summary
In conclusion, two different but related methods used by feminist scholars to
analyze scientific writing are employed in this project, and an effort is made to integrate
them to build a stronger, more thorough analysis. Questions regarding the ways in which
science is practiced are not considered to be truly separable firom questions about
ideologies in scientific knowledge reflected through the discourse, and integrating their
critiques exposes the ways in which they intersect. In this way a feminist analysis can be
constructed that allows for an understanding of the material effects of the standpoint from
which science is produced.
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CHAPTER4

METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
OF THE SCIENCE
Part I: Litroduction to the
Methodological Critique
This research project analyzes a sample of 10 scientific research articles published
firom 1990-2000 on biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women,
utilizing elements of both feminist critiques of methodological inadequacies and
principles of discourse analysis and integrating them to demonstrate how they intersect.
The first layer of analysis is described in this chapter and consists of the critique of
empirical limitations in the scientific studies. By “methodological limitations and
inadequacies,” 1 refer to aspects of the reported research in which the smdy’s
conceptualization, design, implementation, analysis, or interpretation fails to measure up
to the standards expected of scientific research (Longino 1990; Spanier 1995a).
This analysis is informed by previous critiques of scientific research into
biological origins of homosexuality conducted by scholars in the interdisciplinary fields
of feminist science studies and lesbian and gay studies (Byne 1995; Doell 1995; FaustoSterling 2000; Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999; Terry 1999). hr addition, this research is
informed by analyses conducted by feminist science studies scholars on other types of
scientific research, most prominently sex-differences research (Bleier 1984,1988b;
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Fausto-Sterling 1992b). These analyses have demonstrated instances of questionable or
biased explanatory frameworks, flawed research designs, misrepresentations of data, and
failures to consider alternative explanations or reconcile findings with contradictory data
(Bleier 1988b; Byne 1995; Spanier 1995a). Such critiques are important in debunking
some potentially oppressive scientific claims about the “natures” of men versus women,
or heterosexuals versus homosexuals (Bleier 1988b; Fausto-Sterling 1992b, 2000;
Spanier 1995a).
At least as important as providing grounds by which to argue against biological
claims that legitimate oppressive social relations is the ability of such critiques to provide
insight into assumptions and biases of the researchers who conducted the study and of the
scientific community at large (Byne 1995; Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999). Spanier writes:
By analyzing any study we can locate where and how the authors
make judgments affected by biases, and then we can draw our own
conclusions about the limitations of the study as well as the ways
that scientists incorporate their biases into their work—and how
that affects what we can learn fix>m scientific research. (60)
Also, the fact that flawed research on differences between the sexes or sexual orientations
gets published and its findings become accepted is indicative of “values shaping
decisions about when to give more leeway on what is labeled valid science,” according to
Spanier (1995a). Pointing out instances in which published research supporting
biologically deterministic explanations is weaker methodologically than scientific
standards require may, then, provide a window into the values that influence the
construction of these scientific claims.
To accomplish this, one might “work backward”—utilizing the standards of
science to uncover methodological weaknesses, then interpreting the assumptions and
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values held by the researcher from which such methodological oversights might follow
logically. Stein (1999) demonstrates this approach when he writes:
My g o al... is not simply to criticize scientific research on sexual
orientation; rather, it is to tease out and evaluate its unquestioned
assumptions. Evaluating its assumptions is a precondition for
strengthening the foundations of this research program, although
my critical examination does not guarantee that the research program
will in fact be strengthened. It might instead lead to the conclusion
that scientific research on how humans develop their sexual desires
can progress only if it is dramatically reconceptualized. (190)
In addition one can uncover the assumptions of the dominant explanatory paradigm
within the scientific community of the publication of flawed research, by interpreting the
“blind spots” that facilitated such publication (Byne 1995):
The peer review process ... allows seriously flawed studies to be
published in prominent interdiscipUnary journals if and when they
support the biologically deterministic paradigm. On the contrary,
studies that challenge this paradigm, even if methodologically superior,
may not receive a ready welcome. They may either be relegated to
relative obscurity in specialty journals or fail to be published at all. (330)
Thus, this type of methodological critique should not be considered merely to be
upholding traditional standards of scientific methodology in an uncritical manner. Such a
position has been criticized, and rightly so, as failing to challenge the cognitive authority
of traditional science or of its claim to objectivity and value-freedom (see Laslett et al.
1996; Lennon 1998; Longino 1990). Rather, methodological critiques challenge the
validity of certain scientific claims while not necessarily confirming the “truth” of others,
a necessary step to enter into debate with scientific communities over the validity of their
predominating explanatory frameworks (Fausto-Sterling 1992a; Spanier 1995a). In
addition, the critiques help expose the presence of assumptions and values as the origin of
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the methodological limitations and help in the interpretation of what these assumptions
and values are.
hi other words, as suggested by feminist standpoint epistemologies, the social
locations from which the scientific study of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women is produced influence not only the values and assumptions that
inform the research, but also the scientists’ ability (and that of their peers) to recognize
the cultural influences. Pointing out methodological flaws is an empirical means to
demonstrate the influence of standpoint on the knowledge produced. Thus, the critiques
are not conducted to suggest that the science would be inherently better if values were
removed from the research process, or that they can even be so removed (Harding 1991;
Keller 1992; Longino 1990). Rather, they demonstrate how values that inform research
affect the decisions made by researchers about the conduct of the study, what counts as
evidence, and how to interpret the findings. Ultimately, feminist science scholars assert,
awareness of these issues should be a part of the scientific process itself: “If we are
successful in changing science sufficiently as a consequence of liberatory
transformations, one day ‘traditional science’ may well include—no, require—the tools
and insights of feminist critique and experience ” (Spanier 1995a).
I will examine three aspects of my sample of research articles: 1) the explanatory
framework; 2) the selection, categorization, and composition of the study sample; and 3)
the interpretations of the data and conclusions drawn. While the analytic procedures are
informed by several previous critical analyses of scientific methodologies, the overall
structuring of the analysis owes much to the work of Bonnie Spanier (1995a), in which
she articulates the aspects of scientific research that should be analyzed:
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To analyze validity, we can examine and critique a number of points
in the construction of any scientific claim: the explanatory framework
and premises upon which it is based, the methods and design of the
study, the presentation and manipulation of data and conclusions
drawn, and the interpretations of data and conclusions. (59)
Spanier’s clear explanation of the importance of each of these elements, suggestions
regarding problems that can be encountered in them, and examples provided by
conducting a critique utilizing this framework have all been exceptionally informative in
guiding this methodological critique.
The first section of the methodological analysis, the critique of the explanatory
framework, focuses on evaluating the articles for whether they approach the topic of
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women through a framework
that asserts these orientations to be the result of biological masculinization. Labeled here
the “masculinization hypothesis,” this explanatory framework, I argue, points not only to
the potential for certain types of conceptual and empirical limitations, but also to
assumptions and beliefs of researchers regarding relationships among sex, gender, and
sexuality. Also, I argue that the degree to which this explanatory framework can be
revealed to underlie the current body of scientific work on origins of sexual orientations
suggests the dominance of a paradigm of thought that is inherently biased toward
reproducing hegemonic ideologies of sex, gender, and sexuality.
The second section of the methodological critique analyzes the sampling
procedures and study samples used in the ten scientific articles. This section is divided
into three parts, all analyzing different aspects of the research samples. First, an
evaluation of the means by which the authors recruited their subjects for the study.
Flawed recruiting methods can lead to a subject group that is not representative of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93
larger population from which it was drawn, placing serious limitations on the validity of
results and limiting the ability of the authors to generalize legitimately their research
findings to groups beyond their own subjects. The second element of the critique of the
sampling methods analyzes the ways in which the authors assign sexual orientations to
their subjects. Because sexual orientation is the primary distinguishing characteristic of
the sample groups for the purposes of the experimental design, problems found in these
procedures have great significance for the validity of any results obtained. The third part
of the critique of the sampling procedures consists of an examination of the composition
of the samples, hi particular the diversity of the samples in terms of social identity
characteristics that may bear upon the main characteristic of sexual orientation are
examined. I argue that failure to acknowledge socially-influenced differences in the
understanding and expression of sexual orientation may make the study sample
unrepresentative of larger populations of lesbian and bisexual women.
hi the third and final section of the methodological analysis, the interpretations of
data and conclusions drawn from them are subjected to critique. This section is divided
into two parts. The first part focuses on whether the researchers acknowledge the
limitations of their sample when interpreting their data and drawing conclusions. It is
understood that most samples will have limitations in some form, but these limitations
must be recognized and findings interpreted accordingly, particularly regarding the
applicability of results to larger populations. I examine whether such considerations are
present in each article. The second part examines the interpretations and conclusions for
forms of inconsistency with data and “misleading” statements (Spanier 1995b) in
reporting of findings, in which interpretations and conclusions are drawn in ways that are
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not as well supported (either by the study’s own data or by previous studies) as the
researchers suggest is the case. The types of inconsistencies and misleading statements
analyzed are informed both by previous analyses conducted by feminist science scholars
critiquing studies of sex differences or sexual orientation and by issues noted upon initial
readings of these sections. Awareness of inconsistencies and misleading statements in
research interpretations and conclusions is of great importance to evaluating the validity
of not only claims made by individual research studies but of dominant scientific
explanatory paradigms as well.
Each of these three aspects of the methodological critique is discussed in detail in
its respective section of this chapter. Each section and subsection consists of an
introduction to the relevant issues, an explanation of the methodology used in the
analysis, description of research results, and discussion of the significance of the findings
for evaluating research claims, as well as of the implications of the findings for
understanding the assumptions and beliefs that underlie the scientific search for
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. In addition. Table 1
provides some basic information on the research topic of each article, the methods used,
and research conclusions. Information is provided on all articles reporting scientific
research on biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women from 19902000 (including the full sample gathered initially and the subsample selected for analysis)
for comparison purposes.
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Table 1. Information on scientific articles reporting research on biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women
from 1990-2000.
Article
Primary issue examined *
Methods*
Conclusions *
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Articles 1-10: Sample analyzed in the current study
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1. King M,
McDonald E
1992.
2. Bailey JM,
Pillard RC,
Neale MC,
Agyei Y 1993.
3. Patlatucci
AML, Hamer
DM 1995.
4. Gladue BA,
Beatty WW,
Larson J, Staton
RD 1990.
5. Wegcsin DJ
1998.
6. McCormick
CM, Witelson
SF, Kingstone
E 1990.
7. Holtzen DW
1994.

Rate o f homosexuality in twins of
homosexuals

Questionnaire

Rates o f homosexuality in twins and
adoptive sisters o f lesbians and bisexual
women

Interviews o f probands,
questionnaires sent to sisters of
consenting probands

Rates o f homosexuality in family
members o f lesbians, bisexuals, and
heterosexuals
Abilities o f homosexual and heterosexual
men and women on spatial tasks

Interviews

“clear evidence o f a familial component to female sexual
orientation was obtained in our sample" (417)

Interview and administration of
tests o f spatial and other
cognitive abilities

“homosexual women are either no different from their
heterosexual counterparts, or are even more ‘female-like’ in
their spatial abilities. (106)

Verbal and spatial ability in homosexual
and heterosexual men and women

Verbal ability and spatial ability
tests administered

Incidence o f left-handedness in
homosexuals compared to general
population

12-item hand preference
questionnaire administered

“The majority o f measures, including those o f spatial
perception and verbal ability, indicated that lesbians
performed more like HT women than HT men” (104)
“homosexuals showed a higher prevalence o f left-hand
preference than did the normative sample" (72)

Handedness distribution in homosexuals
and bisexuals compared to heterosexuals

5-category self-assessment
handedness questionnaire
administered

"the discordance for sexual orientation ...confirms that
genetic factors are insufficient explanation o f the
development o f sexual orientation” (409)
“genetic factors may play a role in the origin o f female
sexual orientation” (221)

“the non-heterosexuals in this study demonstrated a
significantly higher incidence o f non exclusive right
handedness compared to their heterosexually-oriented
counterparts” (709)
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Article

Primary issue examined *

8. Mail JA,
Kinnira D 1995.

Abilities o f homosexual and heterosexual
men and women on motor tasks

Two tests o f motor-task abilities
administered

9. Bogaert AF
1998.

Height, weight, and onset of puberty in
lesbians compared to heterosexual
women
SOAE patterns o f homosexual, bisexual,
and heterosexual men and women

Kinsey data analyzed

Methods*
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10. McFadden
D, Pasanen EG
1999.

SOAE data collected; number,
strength, and proportion o f each
group exhibiting SOAEs.
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"evidence suggesting that lesbians may have a more maletypical ability for a spaciomotor task ,... not at the expense
of female-typical superiority on another fine-motor task.”
(404)
“lesbians were found to report being heavier and taller than
comparable heterosexual women. No difference in onset of
puberty was observed” (118)
“the SOAEs o f homosexual and bisexual females were both
less numerous and weaker than those o f heterosexual
females. On all the SOAE measures, the homosexual and
bisexual females were intermediate to heterosexual females
and heterosexual males" (2411)

Articles 11-30; Not selected for analysis in this study
II. Bailey JM,
Bell AP. 1993.

Rates o f homosexuality in siblings of
homosexuals and heterosexuals

Interviews

12. Bailey JM,
Benishay DS.
1993.
13. Whilain FL,
Diamond M,
Martin J 1993.

Rates o f homosexuality in siblings of
lesbians and heterosexuals

Interviews, questionnaire sent to
sibling

Rate o f homosexuality in twins of
homosexuals

Interview and/or questionnaires
of twin pairs

Correlation of Xq28 with sexual
orientation

Lesbian sib-pairs and
heterosexual sisters tested with
DNA linkage studies

CD

C /)
C /)

Conclusions *

14. Hu S,
Pattatucci
AML, Patterson
C, et al. 1995.

“Homosexual males and females had an excess o f
homosexual same-sex siblings compared to same-sex
heterosexuals. Thus, homosexuality appears to be familial”
(318)
“Female homosexuality appears to run in families" (277)

“rates o f concordance for MZ twins are sufTiciently high as
to suggest a strong biological basis for sexual orientation.
The rate of concordance for both MZ and DZ twins is
considerably higher than might be expected by chance” (202)
“ it appears that the Xq28 locus does not have a major role in
individual variations in female sexual orientation” (253)
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Table 1 (continued)

Article

Primary issue examined *

15. Hershberger
SL 1997.

Genetic influences on sexual orientation
in twins

Questionnaire sent to sample of
Minnesota 1 win Registry

16. Bailey JM,
Dunne MP,
Martin NG
2000.
l7.TultleG E,
Pillard R 1991.

Genetic influences on sexual orientation
and related traits in twins

Questionnaire sent to sample of
Australian Twin Register

Cognitive abilities o f homosexual and
heterosexual men and wotnen

18. McConnick
CM, Witelson
SF 1994.
19. Gladue BA,
Bailey JM
1995.

Patterns o f functional cerebral asymmetry
in heterosexual and homosexual men and
women
Relationships among handedness, spatial
ability, and sexual orientation in
heterosexual and homosexual men and
women
Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) in
heterosexual and homosexual men and
women

Tests o f cognitive abilities and
“femininity scale” administered
to sample o f heterosexual and
homosexual men and women
Hand preference and linguistic
dichotic listening test
administered
Intelligence tests, spatial abilities
tests, and handedness
questionnaire administered

“Both HS men and women were gender-atypical relative to
matched HT controls” (314); “The cognitive results generally
do not support the hypothesis o f underlying gender-atypical
patterns in either HS women or men” (315)
“results suggest that there is less association between the two
components o f fiinctional cerebral asymmetry - language
and praxis - in gay than in heterosexual people” (528)
“the present study found no significant relations between
sexual orientation and spatial ability" or handedness (494495)

ERPs were recorded as
participants were administered
mental rotation and lexicaldccision/semantic monitoring
tasks
Mental rotation and verbal
ability tasks were administered.
T concentrations determined
from the saliva samples

“Results for the lesbians did not provide support for the
hypothesis that homosexuals differentiate in the direction of
their opposite-sex counterparts, as their ERPs did not differ
significantly from those of HT women” (86)
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20. Wegesin DJ
1998.

21. Neave N,
Menaged M,
Weighlman DR
1999.

Relationships among levels o f salivary
free testosterone (T), cognitive
perfomiance, and sexual orientation in
heterosexual and homosexual males and
females

22. DOmer G,
Poppe 1, Stahl
F,elal. 1991.

Relationship between 21-hydroxylase
deficiency and homosexuality in men and
women

ACTH stimulated, 21-DOF/F
measured

Conclusions *
“Phenotypes relevant to sexual orientation are significantly
influenced by genetic effects. Specifically, significant genetic
effects were found for self-identified female homosexuality”
(221)
“we found consistent evidence that familial factors influence
sexual orientation and two related traits, childhood gender
nonconformity and continuous gender identity” (533)

“the homosexual females demonstrated a female-typical
pattern o f performance, in each o f the tasks their
perfortnance did not differ significantly from that of
heterosexual females” (257); “the HmF group tended to have
higher T levels than the HtF group [but not enough] to
significantly influence their cognitive performance” (259)
“21-hydroxylase deficiency appears to represent a genetic
predisposition to female homosexuality in heterozygous
form” (144)
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Primary issue examined *

23. Gladue BA
1991.

Relationships among aggressive
behavioral characteristics, hormone levels
and sexual orientation in heterosexual and
homosexual men and women

24. DOmer G,
Lindner R,
Poppe 1, el al.
1995.
25. Gladue BA,
Bailey JM
1995.

Relationship between partial 21hydroxylase deficiency (2 l-OHD) and
homosexuality in men and women as well
as genetic correlation to partial 2 l-OHD
Relationships among aggressiveness,
competitiveness, and sexual orientation in
heterosexual and homosexual men and
women
Birth order in lesbians compared to
heterosexual women
Birth order and siblings' gender
distribution patterns in heterosexual and
homosexual men and women
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26. Bogaert, A F
1997.
27. Blanchard
R, Zucker KJ,
Siegelman M, el
al. 1998.
28. McFadden
D, Pasanen EG.
1998.
29. Tenhula
WN, Bailey JM
1998.
30.Willianis TJ,
Pepitone ME,
Christensen SE,
era/. 2000.

Methods*
“Aggression Inventory”
administered, blood samples
drawn and hormones were
assayed to test for levels of
testosterone and estradiol
ACTH stimulated, 21 DOF/F
ratios measured, molecular
studies o f the 21-hydroxylase
genes performed
Portions o f aggressiveness
questionnaires and
“Interpersonal Competitiveness”
subscale administered
Kinsey data analyzed
Questionnaire

Conclusions *
“Among women in the present study, heterosexuals were
similar to homosexuals on all measures o f aggression but
one, in which lesbians reported less physical aggression”
(324,cmph. in orig.)
“homozygous or compound heterozygous mutations of
CYP21A can lead to partial 2 l-OHD and appear to represent
a biological basis for homosexuality” (329)
“There was no significant difference between homosexual
and heterosexual women on any aggressiveness measure”
(482)
“results suggest that birth order does not affect women’s
sexual orientation” (1396)
“homosexual women did not differ from heterosexual
women with regard to any class o f sibling” (517)

CEOAE waveforms in heterosexual and
homosexual men and women

CEOAE waveform data
collected

“it seems that CEOAE magnitude is related to sexual
orientation in females” (2711)

Pubertal onset in lesbians compared to
heterosexual women

Questionnaire

Finger-lcngth ratios in heterosexual and
homosexual men and women

Questionnaire, finger-lcngth
ratios recorded

“there was no significant difference in the overall timing of
puberty between lesbians and heterosexual women in either
discordant twin pairs or in non-twin participants” (379)
“The right hand 2D 4D ratio o f homosexual women was
significantly more masculine (that is, smaller) than that of
heterosexual women, and did not differ significantly from
that o f heterosexual men” (455)
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Table 1 (continued)
Article
Primary issue examined *

Methods*

Conclusions *

8

Articles 31-35: Excluded from selection of sample to be analyzed
Psychosexual development of female
CAM patients compared to control sisters

Interviews o f female CAH
patients and sisters

“results corroborate earlier findings o f a delay in
psychosexual development for CAH females and a higher
rate o f homosexual/bisexual orientation” (162)

33

31. Dittmann
RW, Kappes
ME, Kappes
MH 1992.
32. Slijper
FME, van der
Kainp HJ,
Brandenburg H,
et at. 1992.
33. Berenbaum
SA, Snyder E
1995.

Psychosexual development o f female
CAM patients

Physical and gynecological
examinations, interviews.

“we could not find a homo- or bisexual orientation in our
patients” (205)

Playmate and activity preferences in male
and female CAM patients and controls;
implications for sexual orientation

Assessment o f sex-typed
activities and interests, as well as
sex o f child’s playmate
preference

34. MeyerBahlburg HFI.,
Ehrhardt AA,
Rosen LR, et al.
1995
35. Zuckcr KJ,
Bradley SJ,
Oliver G, et al.
1996.

Sexual orientation in prenatally DESexposed women compared to controls

“psychiatric and psychologic
interviews, questionnaires, and
psychometric tests” ( 15)

“These results suggest that two early-childhood sex-typed
behaviors - activity preferences and playmate preferences related to sexual orientation have different etiologies and are
minimally related to each other ” (38); “results suggest a
complex relationship among hormones, childhood sex-typed
behavior, and sexual orientation ”(40).
“women with a history o f prenatal DES exposure showed
higher Kinsey scores than nonexposed women ” (17)

Psychosexual development of female
CAH patients compared to control
relatives

“Psychosocial and medical
assessment” (gynecological
examination, interview,
questionnaire) (305-306)
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“the CAH probands had lower rates of exclusively
heterosexual fantasies..., and lower amounts o f sexual
experiences with men... There were, however, no significant
proband-control differences ... for sexual experiences with
women” (313)

*includes only those relevant to study of origins of lesbian/bisexual identity in women.
£
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Paît H; Critique of the Explanatory Framework
This methodological critique begins by examining the explanatory framework.
The explanatory framework refers to the ways in which the topic of research is
conceptualized and what theories, assumptions, and prior research inform the research
hypotheses (Spanier 1995a). It is revealed in several ways, including the ways in which
the research questions are asked, by the stated hypotheses or expectations, and by the
empirical evidence cited. The explanatory framework is of great importance because,
like the framework of a structure, everything that follows is built upon it. Thus if it is
biased against certain groups, or based on faulty logic or invalid empirical precedents, the
study itself may be apparently methodologically sound, yet data obtained may still be
inaccurate or conclusions invalid.
Spanier (1995a) explains:
When the premises on which a study is based are faulty or highly
questionable, the question being asked in the study is flawed. This
occurs, more broadly, when the paradigm within which the study is
conducted—the explanatory framework that guides the original question
and the approach taken to answer it—is defective or questionable. In
this case, measurements may be correct but whole conclusions may be
questioned or deemed invalid. The framework or paradigm of an area
of science can also influence the results obtained, as Stephen Jay Gould
has shown in remeasuring the size of skulls studied by an eminent
scientist in the nineteenth century. (59)
The researchers’ explanatory framework derives in part from their assumptions
about the issue being studied. A researcher’s assumptions frame the research study at
every level, including whether the topic is considered of value to study in the first place.
For example, if my assumptions included that the natural sciences are free of social
influences, this current project would be not only nonsensical, it would be literally
inconceivable. Certain sets of assumptions lead logically to particular explanatory
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schemes that would not follow from other assumptions. Similarly, assumptions and the
explanatory schemes that they inform lead to certain kinds questions asked about the
topic of research, and logically consequent possible answers. Thus a researcher’s
theoretical framework is like a lens through which she or he views the research topic,
which filters what is asked, answered, and how the answers are interpreted.
The “Masculinization Hvtwthesis ”
Da the scientific study of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in
women, I assert that historically, one explanatory framework has guided much of the
research—that which sees lesbian and bisexual women as being somehow
“masculinized” (Gibson 1997,1998; Magee and Miller 1998; Terry 1990,1999). I am
referring to this explanatory framework as the “masculinization hypothesis.” This
framework rests on certain assumptions about inherent connections among sex, gender,
and sexual orientation, notably that sexual desire for women is an essentially masculine
(and/or male) trait. From this explanatory framework follows research programs intent
on locating signs of “masculinity” (or maleness) in lesbian and bisexual women. As
explained in the quote from Spanier (1995a) above, even if the actual data-gathering
methods are sound, the assumptions in the explanatory frramework in these historical
studies make any findings “suspect” (see also Laslett et al. 1996). This is because the
“lens” of the presumption of masculinization excluded other possible explanations for
any differences found (Terry 1990).
The idea that same-sex desire in men or women is a characteristic of the “opposite
sex,” and that homosexual people must therefore be incorrectly sexed or gendered, has
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been critiqued by many scholars. Stein, for example, describes this explanatory
framework as the “inversion assumption” (1999:191). He writes:
Relatedly, I look at implicit and undefended assumptions that studies
in the emerging research program make about sexual orientation. ...
I argue that many of the studies accept without argument a quite
particular picture of sexual orientation; such a picture may skew the
results of such studies. For example, many studies in the emerging
research program unquestioningly accept the inversion assumption,
according to which lesbians and gay men are seen as sex-gender
inverts. Although this is a culturally salient assumption, it is
scientifically unsupported. As this assumption infiltrates much of
the emerging research program, a crucial premise of the program
remains unjustified. (191)
Stein questions the scientific basis for the inversion assumption, while also noting its
“cultural salience;” that is, that there may be culturally-specific reasons the inversion
assumption may appear to have merit, hi other words, if gay men and lesbian women
appear to have traits of the “opposite sex,” that is because of factors in our culture and not
because of anything essential in them.
Similarly, Byne (1995) refers to the same explanatory framework as being based
on the “intersex assumption” (306). He challenges the scientific basis for the differences
between heterosexual men and women that must exist for this framework to make sense,
and notes the following:
This assumption also equates the androphilia (attraction to men)
of homosexual men with the androphilia of heterosexual women,
and, conversely, the gynephilia (attraction to women) of homosexual
women with that of heterosexual men. However, to this author’s
knowledge, no research has even addressed, let alone validated,
these equations. (1995:306)
Thus the empirical basis for the inversion or intersex assumption is questioned on several
levels. In addition, like Stein, Byne notes the “culture-bound” nature of the equation of
same-sex desire with characteristics of the “wrong” sex and/or gender (306). De Cecco
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and Parker (1995) also discuss the “woeful ignorance of historical and cultural studies
that have discovered various alignments of gender roles of homosexuality” in what they
call the “cross-sex assumption” (14). k other words, all of these scholars assert that
explanatory frameworks based on the inversion/intersex/cross-sex assumption are
ethnocentric and ahistorical with regard to sex, gender, and sexuality.
Stein asserts that “[t]he inversion assumption is present to a greater or lesser
degree in most biological research on sexual orientation from the late nineteenth century
to the present” (1999:203). Thus while it can be said that the explanatory framework
based on the “intersex,” “inversion,” or “cross-sex” assumption—here the
masculinization hypothesis—has guided much of the historical research on origins of
lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, it is based on problematic associations
among sex, gender, and sexual orientation, hr addition, its empirical basis in scientific
data has been challenged, as has its apparent failure to consider differences across time
and culture. Critiques of explanatory frameworks for lesbian and bisexual orientations
that rely on assumptions of biological masculinization suggest that these frameworks are
biased with regard to culturally-specific, hegemonic ideals of gender and sexual
orientation following in a particular way from sex.
Informed by these critiques, I assert that the presence of the masculinization
hypothesis as the explanatory framework for scientific studies of biological origins of
lesbian and bisexual orientations in women makes the research inherently biased and
limited with respect to what it can see and explain. In this section of the analysis, I
examine the articles in my sample of 10 articles on biological origins of lesbian and
bisexual orientations in women to determine whether their explanatory frameworks are
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based on the masculinization hypothesis. My goal is to determine whether the
masculinization hypothesis in fact underlies the current body of research on lesbian and
bisexual orientations in women. How this question is to be answered is discussed next.
Method
This analysis seeks to identify the presence of the masculinization hypothesis in
the explanatory frameworks of the research articles. Following the work of Byne (1995)
and Spanier (1995a, 1995b), I assert that the explanatory framework is most visible in the
introductory section of the articles, and more specifically, in the statements of research
questions, hypotheses to be tested, goals, or expectations of the study. For example,
Byne (1995) states the following:
The social, cultural, and historical contexts within which scientists
work impose more than methodological constraints on their studies.
They also impose conceptual constraints—influencing the research
questions that scientists find salient as well as the hypotheses that they
generate and find worthy of consideration or dismiss. These conceptual
constraints also act as blinders that prevent plausible alternative
hypotheses firom even being formulated, much less tested. (305-306)
The examination of the introductory section of each article for the presence of the
masculinization hypothesis begins by identifying the stated research questions or
hypotheses, or, where not overtly stated, the stated goals or expectations of the study.
The statements are then analyzed for the presence of certain words, phrases, and concepts
that are associated with the assumption of masculinization. The decision of which words
and phrases to look for is informed by analyses conducted by other scholars on scientific
studies of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations (including Byne 1995;
Gibson 1997,1998; Magee and Miller 1998; Terry 1990,1999).
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Evidence for the presence of the masculinization hypothesis includes references
to: “masculine,” “masculinizing,” “testosterone,” or “hormones” in a masculinizing
context, “intermediate” or “in between” (specifically in reference to males and females or
heterosexual men and women); “sexually dimorphic” or “sex differences;” or a
comparison made of lesbian or bisexual women to heterosexual or homosexual men on
some measure. I assert that the use of these concepts in the stated research questions and
hypotheses reflects that the explanatory framework depends upon the assumption that
same-sex desire in women is an essentially “masculine” (male) trait. If this were not the
case, there would be no logic to studying the potential “masculinization” of lesbian and
bisexual women. The reliance on frameworks of “sex differences” and comparisons of
lesbian and bisexual women to men demonstrates the expectation of a correlation
between maleness and sexual desire for women (Spanier 1995b; Terry 1990).
The statements from the introduction that contain the research questions,
hypotheses to be tested, goals, or expectations are selected out for analysis and included
below. References to masculinization, where present, are underlined. They are discussed
separately according to the groupings discussed in Chapter 3, in which the sample was
divided into three subgroups reflecting different research emphases: the Genetic group,
the Brain/Cognition group, and the Neuroendocrine group. Each article is referred to
according to the number assigned to it for this project; full citation information for each
article is located in the Appendix. The discussion is divided according to these
subgroups in order to discern any differences in explanatory framework that may occur as
a result of different research emphases.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106
Results
Genetic group: Articles 1.2. and 3
Article 1:
As studies have generally failed to support heredity as a complete explanation of
sexual orientation, it has been argued that genetic factors may predispose
individuals to environmental influences leading to a homosexual orientation, or
that intense identification or other factors related to twinship might explain higher
concordance rates ... Our aim was to examine concordance for sexuality and the
extent of shared knowledge and physical attraction between twin pairs in which at
least one member is homosexual. (408)
Article 2:
The study reported herein has two broad goals: first, to determine if there is a
genetic contribution to female sexual orientation, and second, to investigate the
behavioral expression of this contribution.... We predicted that the rate of
homosexuality would be higher for MZ than for DZ cotwins, and would be lowest
for adoptive sisters of homosexual probands. (217)
Article 3:
As a first step in addressing the possible role of inheritance in sexual orientation
in females, we conducted a familial and developmental analysis of 358 female
probands. Our goal was to ascertain the degree of familial clustering of
homosexual and/or bisexual orientations and to determine if discernable patterns
of transmission could be identified. Additionally, we investigated possible
developmental differences among heterosexual, bisexual, and lesbian probands
with the aim of identifying potential markers for genetic loading. (409)
Discussion of the Genetic group
None of the selected words, phrases, or concepts related to the masculinization
hypothesis is present in these articles. The research questions, hypotheses, goals, and
expectations as stated in the introductory sections of these articles do not obviously rely
on comparisons of lesbian and bisexual women to men in any way. Rather, the
explanatory frameworks of these articles focus on the possibility of locating clustering of
same-sex orientation in families. Such hypotheses are not dependent upon the
assumption of masculinization.
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Brain/Cognition group: Articles 4 and 5
Article 4:
Since women exposed prenatally to “masculinizing” hormones are more likely to
report lesbian or bisexual orientation in adulthood (Ehrhardt et al., 1985; Money,
1987) and a somewhat masculine pattern of cerebral lateralization (Hines &
Shipley, 1984), we expected that homosexual women would outperform
heterosexual women on spatial tasks. More generally, however, we explored the
possibility that there might be a difference in spatial ability between heterosexual
and homosexual women comparable to the apparent difference in spatial ability
that is reported to exist between heterosexual and homosexual men. (102)
Article 5: It was hypothesized that HT [heterosexual] men would obtain the highest
scores on tests of spatial ability. HT women and gay men were expected to
outperform the HT men on the lexical-decision task. Finally, based on
psychosexual differentiation theory, lesbians were predicted to produce more
male-tvpical spatial and verbal scores - though this prediction is at odds with the
limited experimental data available on lesbians’ performance. (94)
Discussion of Brain/Cognition group
Both articles on brain-function and cognition studies contain references to
masculinization in the statements from their introductory sections. Specifically, as
support for the stated expectations of the data. Article 4 refers to evidence of
“‘masculinizing’ hormones” as a factor in the development of “lesbian or bisexual
orientation,” a label that associates a sex and gender with “hormones” despite the fact
that hormones are not inherently sexed nor gendered (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Spanier
1995b; van den Wijngaard 1997). In this example, by gendering hormones the
subsequent atypical behavior—lesbian or bisexual orientation—is made to appear
inherently gendered as well.
The “masculine pattern of cerebral lateralization ”refers to both a reported
outcome of exposure “prenatally to ‘masculinizing hormones ”and, indirectly, to the
expectation for the spatial performance of the lesbian women in the study being reported.
Thus there is an assumed, circumstantial link between the exposure to “masculinizing
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honnones,” lesbian or bisexual orientation, and “masculine” spatial ability (which is
being associated with cerebral lateralization). As this link forms the premise of the study,
any differences found can only be interpreted within the framework of “masculinization.”
Article 6 achieves a similar linkage by labeling a certain range of spatial ability as “maletypical,” and predicting lesbians will score in that range. In both cases, it is clear that the
explanatory framework is reliant upon the assumption of sexual desire for women as
being “masculine.”
Neuroendocrine group: Articles 6-10
Article 6:
We predicted that (1) homosexual women would show a greater prevalence of
left-hand preference than the general population, the proposed mechanism being
exposure to higher-than-normal levels of prenatal masculinizing hormones, and
(2) homosexual men also would show a greater prevalence of left-hand
preference, the proposed mechanism being exposure to lower-than-normal levels
of prenatal masculinizing hormones. (71)
Article 7:
Geschwind and Galaburda (1985b) have indicated that the study of handedness in
homosexuals is worthwhile, since intrauterine testosterone may play a role in both
sexuality and handedness. ...The focus of the present study is to test Geschwind
and Galaburda’s hypothesis (1985a,1985b) that both sexual orientation and
handedness may share a common hormonal substrate by (a) comparing the
handedness distribution between heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals and (b)
examining whether sexual orientation predicts handedness. (702-703)
Article 8:
The present study is novel insofar as it employs motor tasks that reliably
demonstrate sex differences in opposite directions... To the degree that physical
and experiential differences can be ruled out as the major sources of variation in
motor performance, such variation may yield information about the development
of biological mechanisms which mediate human motor performance and may also
help elucidate any biological component to sexual orientation. (397)
Article 9:
In men and women in the general population, some of the largest somatic sex
differences occur for certain basic physical development variables, such as height,
weight, and onset of puberty, with men, on average, being taller, heavier (even for
their height), and older at the onset of puberty than women (Underwood & and
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Van Wyk, 1992). Thus, evidence that gay men and lesbians score in the direction
shifted toward the pattern of the omsosite sex on height, weight, and onset of
puberty may provide additional support for the biological approach to sexual
orientation development. Research has supported such patterns in gay men (e.g.
Blanchard & Bogaert, 1996; Bogaert & Blanchard 1996), but less research exists
on these variables in lesbians. This is the focus of the present paper. (115)
Article 10:
We recently reported that CEOAEs [click-evoked otoacoustic emissions] are
weaker in homosexual and bisexual females than in heterosexual females
(McFadden and Pasanen, 1998). That is, the strength of the CEOAEs in
nonheterosexual females was intermediate to that in heterosexual females and
heterosexual males. ... Here we report that the SOAEs [spontaneous otoacoustic
emissions] of those same basic pattern as did their CEOAEs. ... This additional
evidence of functional differences in the cochleas of nonheterosexual females
bolsters the interpretation that their peripheral auditory systems have been
masculinized, possibly at the same stage of development when whatever brain
structures are responsible for sexual orientation also were masculinized.” (24032404)
Discussion of the Neuroendocrine group
The Neuroendocrine group is composed of articles that hypothesize relationships
between prenatal hormone effects and lesbian or bisexual orientations in women. Thus it
is almost (though not necessarily) by definition that they utilize the masculinization
hypothesis. This is not to say, however, that they cannot, or should not, be examined and
critiqued for the biases inherent to this explanatory fimnework and the limitations it
places on lines of inquiry and interpretation.
In fact, it is the case that all the articles in the Neuroendocrine group contain
references to masculinization, directly or indirectly, in their introductory sections. Article
6 proposes overexposure to “masculinizing hormones” as the cause for the predicted
result, which is that lesbian women would demonstrate a higher prevalence of left-hand
preference than the general population. It is the presumption of a link between androgens
and increased left-handedness that provides the basis for this expectation, thus any
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findings of a higher than usual prevalence of left-handedness in the lesbian sample can
only be interpreted as tentative proof of their masculinization. Article 7 contains
essentially the exact same proposition, both based on the masculinization hypothesis.
In Article 8, the reference to the assumption of masculinization is subtler but still
present. By examining “motor tasks that reliably demonstrate sex differences in opposite
directions" to test for differences in the sample groups (of lesbian and heterosexual
women), the implicit hypothesis is that differences between “the sexes” (women and men
of unstated sexual orientation) will provide a framework by which to evaluate any
differences seen between lesbian and heterosexual women. In other words, the
anticipated difference between lesbian and heterosexual women is hypothesized to be
similar to (an explainable by) the difference (known or thought to exist) between men and
women in general. Thus lesbian women are thought to be “masculinized,” or like men.
Article 9 makes use of the same “sex differences” framework as Article 8, but
goes on to explain more specifically what is meant. In this article, the features of “height,
weight, and onset of puberty” have been assigned a male-typical pattern and a femaletypical pattern. Lesbian women are hypothesized to score more closely to the male
pattern than do the heterosexual women. By relying on presumed sexually dimorphic
characteristics to explain anticipated differences between lesbian and heterosexual
women, the explanatory framework is thoroughly reliant on the assumption of lesbian
women as being biologically more “male” than heterosexual women.
Last, Article 10 (which does not state its expectations in the introduction, but
rather a brief description of findings), reports obtaining a pattern of otoacoustic emissions
results from lesbian and bisexual women that was “intermediate to that in heterosexual
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females and heterosexual males.” As discussed previously, it is the comparison of data
from lesbian and bisexual women to that from heterosexual men that demonstrates the
explanatory framework based on the masculinization hypothesis, hi this article, the
framework is directly explained, as the authors claim their results of masculinized
auditory systems (inferred from otoacoustic emissions data) provide support for the
hypothesis that “brain structures” have been masculinized in lesbian and bisexual
women. As with the other articles, the assumption of masculinization provides the
avenues of research inquiry and interpretation as being lesbian and bisexual women’s
assumed atypical level of “maleness.”
Discussion
In general, analysis of explanatory frameworks is done for one or both of two
slightly difrerent goals: to identify those based on faulty or inaccurate premises or
assumptions, as discussed by Spanier (1995a), and to identify those not obviously flawed
but infused with hegemonic biases that lead to conceptual limitations, as discussed by
Byne (1995). In a sense, these two goals reflect the difference between critiquing “bad
science” and “science as usual,” which, as discussed by Longino (1989), is not as clear a
distinction as one might think on the surface. Belatedly, according to Spanier (1995b):
While “bad” science (inaccurate or incomplete data; outright
fraud) can be more clearly distinguished from “good” science at
the level of construction of studies (such as choice of controls and
sample size), the framing of research questions within a paradigm
will be judged “good” or “bad” depending on factors other than those
which most scientists would find scientifically sound. Thus, the field
of sex[-]differences research is “science as usual.” But I would label
it “bad” science (within accepted notions of scientific method) in its
narrow assumptions about the causes of observed differences...
However, researchers within the field believe they are adhering
to scientific norms. (47)
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Thus, the cunent critique focuses on the “science as usual” aspect of the explanatory
firameworits, rather than attempting to identify the cases in which their premises are
clearly faulty, asserting that a focus narrowed by hegemonic bias creates research overly
limited in its ability to construct adequate questions, methods, and interpretations, hi
other words, to the extent that “science as usual” allows for hegemonic bias to inform its
explanatory frameworks, it is “bad science.” The “masculinization hypothesis” contains
such bias, as it assumes and reproduces a dominant ideal of connections among sex,
gender, and sexuality.
This analysis reveals that of the sample of 10 articles, seven (70%) utilize the
masculinization hypothesis in their explanatory frameworks. The three that do not are all
those that approach the subject of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations
in women from the field of behavioral genetics. While it cannot be said from this
analysis of the research questions, hypotheses, goals or expectations stated in the
introductory section of each article that these articles are completely free of any
assumption of masculinization, it can be said that the basic framework they use to
conceptualize the subject does not rely on the assumption of masculinization. Thus, the
behavioral genetics research analyzed here is not obviously structured by this form of
hegemonic bias nor are its questions, methods, and interpretations necessarily limited by
it.
The seven articles that do contain the masculinization hypothesis in their
explanatory frameworks depend upon the assumption of a “cross-sex,” “intersex,” or
“inverted” (as described by De Cecco and Parker 1995, Byne 1995, and Stein 1999,
respectively) biological origin of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. This
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assumption goes back at least as far as Krafft-Ebing’s 1886 publication o f Psychopathia
Sexualis (Terry 1999). It is based on an unproblematic acceptance of the “naturalness” of
heterosexual desire, seeing sexual desire for women as a distinctly male (and masculine)
trait.
This belief in turn depends on the assumption of two distinct sexes that lead to
two distinct genders; as stated by feminist theorist Judith Butler (1990): “The
heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the production of discrete and
asymmetrical oppositions between ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine,’ where these are
understood as expressive attributes of male’ and ‘female’” (17). The
“heterosexualization of desire” inherent in the masculinization hypothesis serves to shore
up the boundaries between males and females, men and women, and to contribute to the
belief in gender attributes as naturally following from sex.
For example, to test the question of lesbian and bisexual women’s
masculinization, distinctions between heterosexual men and women must be established
in order to have a basis for comparison. By establishing heterosexual men and women as
the reference groups, it is already assumed that only heterosexual men and women are
“properly” masculinized and feminized, respectively. Thus lesbians and bisexual women
are compared to standards of biological “masculinity ” and “femininity” from which they
are already excluded. In this way do the assumptions that underlie the masculinization
hypothesis create a limited view of what might constitute appropriate questions to ask
and methods by which to answer them.
An explanatory framework that relies on the masculinization hypothesis also
limits interpretations of data, in that any differences found can only be explained in
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reference to the possible biological “maleness” (masculinization) in lesbians and bisexual
women. The problem lies in the failure to acknowledge this limitation, when assertions
are made regarding such differences as if they reflect some inherent reality of the
subjects’ sexed or gendered status. It is only within this masculinization framework that
such assertions’ truth or falsity can be judged, as results—positive or negative—can only
serve to reinforce the framework from which they are produced. The necessity for
researchers to situate their findings contextually in this way is precisely what is called for
by some feminist epistemologists (Haraway 1991; Harding 1991,1993).
Thus the question of whether the explanatory frameworks of the sample articles
contain the masculinization hypothesis sheds light on the assumptions made by the
scientific researchers regarding sex, gender, sexuality, and their presumed
interconnections. The analysis reveals that the majority of the studies approach the
subject of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women from the
presumption of the sexes as distinct and heterosexuality as natural. These assumptions
structure what questions can be asked, the methods considered appropriate to answer
them, and the interpretations that appear to represent an absolute truth about the natures
of lesbian and bisexual women. Because of the types of assumptions built into the
masculinization hypothesis, assertions made by the researchers from these studies can
only reinforce hegemonic ideals of sex, gender, and sexuality.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115
Part ni: Critique of the Research Samples
Introduction
ht this section of the methodological critique, I examine the procedures used for
sampling subjects, and the research sample so constructed, in each of the 10 articles on
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. Babbie (1995) defines
sampling as “the process of selecting observations” (188). Sampling is employed when
studying each and every single element' (in this case, person) that one wishes to analyze
is not feasible, usually due to the unmanageably large size of the population,^ often
combined with the impossibility of accurately locating all of its members. Sampling is
typically done not only to obtain subjects, but to obtain subjects from whom findings can
be generalized to a larger group. The subjects in a study thus comprise the sample: “a
special subset of a population observed for purposes of making inferences about the
nature of the total population itself’ (Babbie 1995:226).
If researchers wish to draw conclusions about a larger population of people from
the data obtained from their study sample, they must construct a sample that is not very
different from the larger population in ways that are relevant to the study. Such a sample
can be called “representative” of the larger group. Babbie (1995) states that “a sample
will be representative of the population from which it is selected if the aggregate
characteristics of the sample closely approximate those same aggregate characteristics in
the population” (192). If representativeness is not achieved, findings of the study cannot

' Element: “that unit about which information is collected and that provides the basis of
analysis” (Babbie 1995:193).
^ Population: “the theoretically specified aggregation of study elements” (Babbie
1995:193).
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be considered accurately generalizable to any group beyond that actually studied (Bouma
and Atkinson 1995).
Because the sample studied can impact the results obtained, construction of the
research sample is extremely important. Consequently, when one analyzes the
meaningfulness of research results for larger populations, considering the sample and
how it was constructed are of tremendous significance. Examination of the study sample
is a component of many of the feminist and other critical analyses of scientific research
that inform the current project (for example, Bleier 1984; Byne 1995; Doell 1995;
Fausto-Sterling 1992; Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999).
hr her discussion of the elements of scientific research studies that should be
carefully examined when making judgments about the validity of results, Spanier (1995a)
writes the following;
Research results can be similarly faulty when a study is poorly
set up, with improper or too few controls, with an inadequate sample
size, with a nonrepresentative or nonrandom sample, hr this case,
the methods and experimental design are often inadequate for
scientific validity. (59-60)
As discussed previously, the importance of analyzing such methodological limitations
extends beyond just pointing out examples of “bad science.” If the analysis were
conducted solely for this reason, it might serve only to support the traditional ideals of
science, such as objectivity and value-neutrality, by suggesting they could be achieved if
the methodological flaws were eliminated (Harding 1986; Laslett et al. 1996; Longino
1990). Rather, the critique of the limitations of the samples used in research on origins of
lesbian and bisexual orientations in women is also done to reveal the assumptions and
values of the researchers and scientific communities regarding such orientations. As
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suggested by Byne (1995), De Cecco and Parker (1995), Spanier (1995a), and Stein
(1999), we can uncover such assumptions and values by examining the cases in which
flawed research is conducted, accepted, and published. Doell (1995) provides an
example of how examining methodological flaws can initiate such questioning, as she
writes;
What then are we to make of this recent demonstration of differences
in the size of one hypothalamic nucleus between homosexual and
heterosexual men [in LeVay, 1991]? Surely the answer is; Not much.
The study is a small one, involving only 19 homosexual and 16
heterosexual subjects, and with such a degree of variation among
both groups as to suggest immediately the need for many more
subjects before a real size difference could be demonstrated. This,
coupled with some uncertainty as to the sexual preference of some
of the subjects in the study, leaves me rather surprised both that it
was published at all, at so premature a stage of the research, and
that it has been so widely accepted by some of the scientific
community. (349-350)
There are several different factors of importance in the construction of research
samples in studies of sexual orientation. They include the process by which subjects are
selected for inclusion in the study, the definitions and categorizations of sexual
orientation groupings in the sample, the size of the research sample, and the composition
of the sample in terms of characteristics relevant to sexual orientation (Allen 1997;
McGuire 1995; Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999). Each of these aspects is examined in this
research. The analysis is divided into three sections; 1) issues related to the selection of
the sample; 2) issues of the categorization of subjects in the sample; and 3) issues
relevant to the composition of the sample, including size. Each of the three issues is
introduced with an explanation of the rationale for analysis, the analysis procedure,
description of results, and interpretation and discussion.
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Recruitment of the Samples
The first aspect of the research samples to be analyzed is that of the selection, or
recruitment, of subjects to participate in the studies. The recruitment process is important
because it contributes greatly to determining whether and in what ways the actual study
samples differ from the populations under consideration. These determinations occur at
two main, inter related stages of the recruitment process: first, defining the study
population; and second, deciding how participation in the study is to be solicited. While
these two issues depend upon one another to some extent, they also can each result in
distinct ways in which the research sample might differ from the entire population under
consideration.
The first issue to consider is the “study population,” defined by Babbie (1995) as
“the aggregation of elements from which the sample is selected” (194). The study
population is a difrerent entity from the whole population under consideration when the
entire population is not being sampled in a study. Very often, sampling all members of a
given population is not feasible due to factors such as size and difficulty in locating all
members. Study populations may be limited by characteristics that facilitate the ease of
the sampling process, such as limiting to one geographical region (Babbie 1995). While it
is expected that some members of the population being studied will be necessarily
excluded from participation by establishing a study population, such potential exclusions
must still be examined to see if meaningful characteristics are over- or under-emphasized
by the nature of the study population.
Second, one must consider the methods chosen to inform members of the study
population about the study and solicit their participation. This step can result in
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differences between the eventual sample and not only the population as a whole, but the
study population itself. For example, if the study population is limited to one geographic
region and population members in that region are sought solely through newspaper
advertisements, the procedure may result in over-representing those members of the study
population who are literate or have higher educational levels than average. While some
over- and under-representations may not affect the data obtained, the effects of the
recruitment procedures must be examined when considering the generalizability of the
results.
To the extent that the study population consists of people who are meaningfully
different from the whole population, or that the recruiting methods themselves result in
meaningful differences between those who respond and those who do not, the selection of
subjects can result in limited or flawed research results. Importantly, the researchers’
decisions about sampling procedures and subsequent assertions of applicability to larger
populations of results obtained from their samples can reveal how the researchers
conceptualize the topic of study. Examining how the researchers go about selecting
subjects and generalizing findings obtained from their samples suggests what is, for
example, considered important or relevant about the topic and what is not. Thus by
analyzing sample selection decisions and their effects, it is possible to uncover
researchers’ assumptions and beliefs about the populations and characteristics being
studied.
Previous analyses have demonstrated ways in which studies of sexual orientation
in particular are afrected by subject selection issues. The marginalized and stigmatized
nature of homosexual and bisexual orientations produces problems specific to sampling
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diffîcult-to-locate and -access populations. As a result, samples used in research on
lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LOB) subjects are typically selected in a nonsystematic
manner, which, while necessary, can be a source of error.
Allen (1997) notes that historical studies of gay men and lesbians tended to use
“samples taken from institutionalized populations (prisons, homes for delinquents,
hospitals) or from psychiatrists’ private practice” - groups likely to difrer in important
ways from gay men and lesbians in general (1996:256). Nowadays, LGB subjects are
often recruited from the membership of LGB organizations or the readership of LGB
publications. Because lists of such members or readers are typically kept private,
announcements are usually placed where it is hoped they will be read.
Recruiting subjects through LGB organizations and publications could be
considered a form of “purposive sampling,” which is considered appropriate “to select
members of a difficult-to-reach, specialized population” (Neuman 1994:198). While
allowable because it might be extremely difficult or impossible to locate sufficient
numbers of subjects otherwise, it is still true that when using such a sampling technique
“the researcher never knows whether the cases selected represent the population”
(Neuman 1998:198).
For example, while an improvement over sampling LGB subjects from
institutionalized populations, those who are reachable through organizations and
publications may also have characteristics that make them different from larger
populations of LGB persons. McGuire (1995) states that “homosexual subjects are often
recruited through gay and lesbian publications even though the readers of such
publications are not representative of the entire homosexual population ” (120).
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Depending upon the cultural makeup of the location of the study population and other
factors, those who participate in organizations or read publications may tend toward a
different race, ethnicity, or class background than those who do not.
Also, those who participate in organizations, and to a slightly lesser extent those
who read LGB publications, are more likely to be “out” and active in their LGB
communities than those who do not. At the very least, they are more likely to have
acknowledged their same-sex feelings to themselves, and feel positive enough about them
to seek out LGB communities. It cannot be known how such people may differ from
those who do not take part in LGB organizations or read publications, but some
importance can be inferred from the potential for difrerence in their feelings about and
experience of their sexuality.
Behavior-genetics studies in particular tend to have additional difficulties because
they often require the participation of at least one family member of the subject. Allen
(256) states that “[h]uman behavior genetics has been plagued by problems of selecting
representative samples of the population for genetic studies” (256). Unless the family
member’s participation can be obtained without revealing the nature of the study, the
subject almost certainly must be “out ”about their sexual orientation to that family
member. McGuire (1995) states: “In family smdies, one might recruit a subject but then
fail to obtain the cooperation of other family members. Family members that agree to
participate might be very different from those who do not” (120).
Besides potential difrerences in the family members, the nature of family studies
can produce a very self-selected subject group. Knowing that a family member’s
participation will be necessary may be enough to deter many LGB subjects. Those who
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are aware of having another LGB family member may be more likely to participate. In
studies of twins, the self-selection may be even more of a factor. Twin studies have been
charged with such bias in that it is thought to be “very likely that twins showing striking
differences will be the most likely to refuse participation” (McGuire 1995:120).
Belatedly, the means of recruiting LGB subjects may result in significant
differences between those who agree to participate and those who decline. For example,
when LGB organizations and pubUcations are used to recruit subjects, typically
announcements or advertisements are posted, to which people may respond or not. Allen
notes that subjects responding to recruiting advertisements “may represent a particularly
outgoing or flamboyant personality type whose behavior, or perception of their own
behavior, may be quite atypical of the population as a whole” (1997:256).
The announcement of recruitment of subjects for a biological study of sexual
orientation may itself result in differential rates of participation between those who feel
very strongly—positively or negatively—about the issue. As with readers versus
nonreaders of LGB publications, those who feel strongly about the biology of sexual
orientation may have put more efrort into conceptualizing and understanding their own
sexuality, which may result in a meaningful difference from those who have not. Clearly,
it is not possible to ascertain the characteristics of those who choose not to participate,
since they may never be identified.
All of these issues in sample selection may impact the applicability of results
obtained for populations beyond the group actually studied, or those with the same
characteristics as the sample group. Because of the importance of these issues, the
selection of the research sample must be carefully evaluated in order to make a judgment
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about the ineaningfulness of findings. In addition to exposing potential limitations on
scientific claims about origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women,
examination of sampling limitations is done to reveal assumptions and beliefs of the
researchers and scientific communities. The analysis conducted in this study is discussed
next.
Method
The analysis of the selection of subjects in the 10 articles on origins of lesbian and
bisexual orientations in women is conducted following the examples of other feminist
and critical analyses of sexual orientation research (Allen 1997; Byne 1995; De Cecco
and Parker 1995; McGuire 1995; Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999). The examination is
initiated by locating the section of each article that discusses the sample selection
procedures. This description almost always occurs in the beginning of the “Method”
section of scientific articles. The statements from the articles that contain this
information are selected out for analysis and included below, separated according to the
article groupings discussed previously (the Genetic group, the Brain/Cognition group,
and the Neuroendocrine group). This division is utilized in order to organize the data
more clearly, and to discern any difrerences in sample selection procedures across the
difrerent scientific approaches to the topic.
The description of the sampling procedure is then read closely and critically in
order to answer the following question: “What are the recruiting methods, and what
characteristics of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women might they tend to over- and
under-represent?” Characteristics considered in this analysis are those discussed above,
for example, whether potential subjects are more likely to be “out” or to have LGB
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family members (Allen 1997; McGuire 1995; Spanier 1995a). Other meaningful
characteristics of the samples affected by the recruiting process including race and/or
ethnicity, age, social class, geographic region, and educational levels, as well as their
implications, are discussed in the “Sample composition” section of this chapter.
My interpretations from the information in the articles of the answers to these
questions are presented in the “Discussion” sections for each article grouping (the
Genetic group, the Brain/Cognition group, and the Neuroendocrine group). Informed by
the theoretical framework of feminist standpoint epistemologies as well as findings from
previous critiques, I discuss potential limitations incurred by the sample recruiting
procedures and how they might influence findings. Finally, to conclude this section of
the chapter I discuss the assumptions upon which the recruiting procedures depend and
their significance for the research project as a whole.
Results
Genetic group: Articles 1.2 and 3
Article 1:
Notices were placed in several local and national ‘gay’ periodicals requesting
homosexual men and lesbians who were twins to contact us. Little information
was given in the notice about the study, except to stress that we wanted to contact
all such men or women, regardless of whether they considered that their co-twin
was also of homosexual orientation. Each subject who contacted us was posted a
questionnaire ... Due to the sensitive nature of our inquiries we did not attempt to
seek confirmatory information from co-twins. (408)
Article 2:
Probands were recruited through advertisements placed in lesbian-oriented
publications in several cities across the United States: Chicago, Dl; Dallas,
Houston, Austin, and San Antonio, Tex; Boston, Mass; and Los Angeles, Calif.
The advertisements specified that desired subjects were lesbian or bisexual
women at least 18 years old with either (1) female cotwins or (2) adoptive or
genetically unrelated sisters. (The adoptive sister component of the study was
added after approximately one third of the twin data were collected.) The
advertisements also stated: “We hope you will call regardless of the sexual
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orientation of your twin or adoptive sister.” No mention was made of the
possibility of participation of co-twins or adoptive sisters. Potential subjects were
instructed to call the laboratory, where they were asked clarifying questions. An
additional criterion for the adoptive sister component was assessed at this point.
Both probands and their adoptive sisters must have been younger than 3 years
when they entered the common rearing environment. (217-218)

Article 3:
Announcements seeking participants for the study were distributed to local
homophile organizations and social groups and to Women’s Studies programs at
universities within the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. The announcements
stated that the study was on “sexuality in women” but not that it was focused on
sexual orientation. The homophile groups were targeted to obtain lesbian
probands, whereas the Women’s Studies programs were chosen to recruit a
sampling of heterosexual subjects. Bisexual participants were found in both
groups. (409)
Discussion of Genetic group
The population sampled in studies 1 and 2 consisted of lesbians who most likely
either read gay and/or lesbian publications themselves, or were referred to the study by
someone they knew who read the ad. hi study 3, the lesbian population sampled consists
of those who participate in gay and/or lesbian organizations or groups, or have contact
with someone who does who could refer them to the study. The lesbian populations
sampled in these studies thus have the characteristics of being self-acknowledged
lesbians and having contact with gay and/or lesbian publications or, in the case of study
3, participating in gay and/or lesbian organizations. The aspect of acknowledgment of
lesbian orientation introduces a potentially meaningful characteristic to this sampled
population that may distinguish them from women who may have lesbian feelings but
have not asserted a lesbian identity, hi addition it is more likely (though not necessarily
so) that these women are to some extent “out” in order to have been reached by these
means and to be willing to participate in such a study, which could also represent a
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meaningful difference from those lesbians who are more secretive about their sexual
orientations. This issue is addressed in the discussion section of study 2, which will be
discussed shortly.
For studies 1 and 2 the sample population is also specifically of those lesbians
who have sisters, which does not represent a difference known to be meaningful to
distinguishing them from those who do not have sisters. Thus that aspect of the
population is not known to introduce limitations to the sample. However, a limitation
may have been introduced in terms of participation, as potential subjects may have opted
not to respond to the ad because of the knowledge that they would have to provide
information about their sisters, or fears that their sisters’ participation might also be
needed for the study. (For studies 2 and 3, subjects’ sisters were contacted for
information for the study, but only if the subject agreed to that.)
For gay and lesbian subjects, the fear of having their sexual orientation revealed
to their families by the study, or the delicate nature of the subject within families even if
their sexual orientation is known, is enough potentially to keep many subjects from
participating. Thus the subjects who do choose to participate in such a study may be
more likely to have a lesbian or bisexual sister, because potential subjects would be more
likely to feel comfortable participating in a study involving a sister if that sister is also
lesbian or bisexual. At the least, it might be expected that this method of selecting
subjects might be more likely to filter out potential subjects whose families are
uncomfortable with the subject’s sexual orientation. This issue is a form of
“ascertainment bias,” which is produced by the use of nonsystematic sampling methods.
A most severely limiting type of ascertainment bias occurs when the study attracts those
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subjects “who fit [the] hypothesis and deter those who might weaken it” (Zicklin
1997:384).
hi study 2, measures were taken to reduce some forms of ascertainment bias. The
researchers state the following: “The advertisements also stated: ‘We hope you will call
regardless of the sexual orientation of your twin or adoptive sister.’ No mention was
made of the possibility of the participation of co-twins or adoptive sisters” (218). These
efforts have face validity in terms of reducing some of the ascertainment bias related to
the family issues just discussed, but it is not known how effective they really are. In their
concluding section the researchers discussed forms of ascertainment bias present in their
study and their statistical tests for possible effects at length; this will be discussed in the
section of this study on “Interpretations and Conclusions.” The ascertainments biases
present in study 2 are a limitation on the generalizability of the findings.
Study 3 also acknowledged ascertainment bias during the discussion of the
results. The researchers point out that “[a]scertainment is a particular problem when
studying marginalized or secretive populations such as lesbians or bisexuals, making it
virtually impossible to obtain a truly random sample” (416). They go on to limit their
findings’ applicability to “the particular cohort that we studied” (416). The issue of
acknowledgement of potential sample limitations on findings will be discussed further in
the analysis of the studies’ interpretations of results.
Interestingly, researchers in study 3 also brought up the issue of ascertainment
bias as it relates to heterosexual subjects, suggesting that in studies of sexual orientation,
it is likely that some heterosexual subjects will have some degree of same-sex attraction
(cite that). As the other two studies did not seek out a sample of heterosexual subjects
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independently from their lesbian and bisexual subjects, this issue would not have arisen.
It is questionable whether studies of sexual orientation would in fact draw heterosexual
subjects with any acknowledged feelings of same-sex attraction, as study 3 researchers
suggest, or instead deter such subjects, for fears of confronting such feelings. The data in
study 3 would indicate the former, as two-thirds of their heterosexual subjects indicated
having “ever been romantically or sexually attracted to a female,” but this is almost
certainly a partial consequence of the way in which heterosexual subjects were obtained.
(Heterosexual subjects were recruited from Women’s Studies programs in the hopes of
finding heterosexual women “comfortable discussing sexual and gender-related issues,” a
population also likely to be more aware of and comfortable discussing any same-sex
feelings they may have experienced.) The issue of heterosexual subject ascertainment
bias is, as the researchers state, “rarely addressed ”although it could pose at least as much
of a problem as ascertainment bias of homosexual subjects. Because of this issue,
comparisons between lesbian and heterosexual subjects are potentially limited by the
biased ascertainment of both study groups.
Brain/cognition srouo: Articles 4 and 5
Article 4:
Subjects were recruited to participate in a broad research investigation of the
psychobiology of gender and sexual orientation. In response to newspaper and
poster advertisements, as well as referrals from friends and previous volunteers,
interested persons contacted the laboratory for further information and to arrange
for participation. These persons were then scheduled to visit the laboratory,
where they were informed of the purpose of the study and gave informed consent.
(102)
Article 5:
Heterosexual men (20) and women (20) were primarily volunteer undergraduate
and graduate students solicited through university bulletin board notices and word
of mouth. Gay men (20) and lesbians (20) were solicited through bulletin board
notices posted at university homophilic organizations, electronic bulletin board
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notices, a university booth at the local annual Gay Pride festival, and word of
mouth. Six of the undergraduate subjects participated in order to receive course
credit. Due to limited research funds only a subset of the recruitment media
advertised an honorarium of $10 for participation. Subjects recruited through
those media (10 HT and 17 HM) received the $10. Others participated without
monetary compensation. Participants were not selected based on ethnicity;
however, only native-English speakers were invited to participate. The sample
was primarily Caucasian. Subjects were informed that they would be
participating in a research project examining how the left brain and right brain
process verbal and spatial information. The research hypotheses to be tested were
not revealed. (94-95)
Discussion of Brain/Cognition group
Article 4 reported that subjects were recruited in part through “newspaper and
poster advertisements,” without specifying what type of newspaper (local, national, LGBoriented or not, etc.) or where the posters where placed (university campus only, LGBoriented sites, etc). This lack of specificity makes it difficult to examine the strengths
and weaknesses of the recruiting procedures or their potential effects on the samples and
findings obtained. Such a lack of specificity is detrimental to any evaluation of the
research and makes it difficult to consider the conclusions reliable.
Assuming tentatively that the “newspaper and poster advertisements” were placed
in general, non-LGB-specific sites, then the sample selection procedure could possibly
reduce the bias toward persons who participate actively in LGB organizations or read
publications aimed specifically at LGB populations. By specifying in the announcement
that the study concerned sexual orientation, however, there may be some degree of self
selection among both lesbian and heterosexual potential subjects: among the lesbians,
those who are to some extent “out,” and among the heterosexuals, those who feel
comfortable discussing their sexual orientation. Stein (1999) writes:
In general, there might be various social factors that afreet who
participates in a study, which in turn skews a study’s results. People
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who identify as gay men, lesbians, or bisexuals and take part in such
studies belong to a subset of nonheterosexuals who are conscious of
their own sexual desires for people of the same sex-gender and who
are willing to describe these desires to researchers. In particular, many
studies that are supposed to study gay men and/or lesbians in contrast to
heterosexuals are in fact studies of some subset of out-of-the-closet gay
men and lesbians. As such, the results of the studies may apply only to
a distinct subset of gay men and lesbians. (194)
hi study 5, the selection of primarily “out” lesbians is exacerbated by sampling
from LGB organizations and forums. The potential bias in selection of heterosexual
subjects, however, is reduced by the lack of overt mention of the study’s interest in
sexual orientation. Both sample selection processes produced primarily or exclusively
subjects who were university students at the school where the research was conducted.
Recruiting subjects on one’s own campus is common, yet efrectively limits the sample
population to university students. Of social science research. Babbie (1995) notes: “In
relation to the norm of generalizability in science, it is clear that this tendency represents
a potential defect in social science research. Most simply put, college undergraduates are
not typical of the public at large” (237). University students tend to differ from the
general population on variables of median age, socioeconomic status, and race. While
this will be discussed further in the section on the composition of the samples, it is worth
noting here that the sample selection process in many of these studies is conducted on a
population that is already difrerent from the general population on some potentially
important variables.
Neuroendocrine group: Articles 6-10
Article 6:
Subjects were recruited from the membership of a local homophile organization.
Seventy-four homosexual men and women volunteered to participate. The
criterion for inclusion in the study was that the subjects rated their sexual
experience in both behavior and imagery as primarily homosexual... (71)
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Article 7:
Two groups comprised the sources from which participants were drawn: (a)
heterosexual QIET) parent members of the national support group. Parents and
Friends of Lesbians and Gays (FFLAG), and their gay/lesbian/bisexual (GLB)
and HET children; and, (b) self-identified GLB university students who attend
their school’s GLB support/social group and their HET parents and siblings. ...
Adopted and foster children were also excluded. Participants were volunteers,
remained anonymous, and were unaware of the nature of the study. (70S)
Article 8:
All subjects were paid undergraduate volunteers recruited through campus
newspaper and poster advertisements. Subjects who applied to participate were
tested until samples reached the following sizes: 20 heterosexual males, 20
heterosexual females, 20 homosexual males, and 18 homosexual females. (397398)
Article 9:
From 1938 to 1963,17,502 case histories were recorded by the Kinsey Institute
for Sex Research using the interview schedule devised by Alfred C. Kinsey
(Gebhard & Johnson, 1979). These data are currently stored in several files. The
files containing adult white and nonwhite females with no convictions for felonies
or misdemeanours (other than traffic violations) comprise 5,954 cases—
... 478 cases could not be classified as either heterosexual or homosexual. Of the
remaining 5,476 cases, 275 were classified as homosexual (lesbian) and 5,201
were classified as heterosexual. (117)
Article 10^:
Subjects were recruited by contacting local gay organizations, by advertising in
gay publications, in the university newspaper, and on public bulletin boards, as
well as by word of mouth. All a& stipulated that subjects would be paid $30 for
about 2 h of work. Potential subjects were informed in advance about the essence
of the experiment and that there would be a required questionnaire containing
items about the subject’s sexual experiences and orientation, among other topics.
(2710)^

^ Article 10 reported very little about sampling procedures, instead referring readers to a
previous report for that discussion. The article containing the sample information
(McFadden and Pasanen, 1998) was written by the same researchers and reported
different data gathered on the same subjects, apparently within the same research session.
That article was included in the original sample of 35 from which the subsample of 10
was constructed. For these reasons, the decision was made for this project to use that
information as if it had in fact been presented in article 10.
* Page number is from 1998 article.
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Discussion of the Neuroendocrine group
The varied means of selecting subjects demonstrated in these articles lend
themselves to different strengths and weaknesses. The majority of these articles
(numbers 6,7, and 10) selected lesbian and bisexual women subjects through LGBoriented forums, a sample population that likely differs in some ways from lesbians and
bisexual women in general, many of whom may choose not (or not have the opportunity)
to participate in LGB organizations or read LGB publications. Recruiting from a more
general population, such as was done in article 8, may reduce this bias, but is often either
not done or supplemented by recruiting through LGB-oriented forums because of the
difficulties in obtaining a sufficient number of lesbian and bisexual women subjects.
Also, recruiting subjects using more generalized means is not assured to eliminate
the bias toward more “out” lesbian and bisexual subjects, because the potential subjects
are typically still alerted to the focus on sexual orientation by the text of the
announcement or advertisement used. As noted earlier, this also may create bias in the
sample of heterosexual subjects, toward those with a greater degree of comfort with
discussing their sexual orientation. It is to some extent presumable as well that this is the
case for the study (9) that utilized Kinsey Institute data - that due to the nature of the
BCinsey research, the population sampled by the researchers was biased toward those
more comfortable with discussing sexuality, although the very large sample size may
offset this issue. Last, three of these five studies (7, 8, and 10) specifically mention
sampling from university populations, of which some potential limitations have already
been discussed.
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Discussion
In studying di£BcuIt-to-ieach populations like lesbian and bisexual women, it is
accepted procedure to sample non-randomly (Babbie 1995; Neuman 1994). However,
employing non-random sampling procedures can place limits on the degree to which the
research samples are representative of the larger populations about which the researchers
wish to make claims. Researchers must thus “attempt to assess the effects of non-random
recruitment and report how they limit the generalizability of results” (McGuire
1995:121).
In addition, the kinds of decisions made and strategies employed by researchers in
the process of constructing non-random samples can provide insights into what
characteristics the researchers consider more and less important about the topic they are
studying (De Cecco and Parker 1995; Stein 1999). For the current study, such insights
are important in that they help reveal the researchers’ assumptions and beliefs about
lesbian and bisexual orientations. These assumptions and beliefs have implications for
the findings from the overall scientific study of biological origins of sexual orientations.
The articles analyzed utilize many of the same types of sample recruiting
strategies. One such strategy is to target university populations, tending effectively to
limit the sample populations mainly to undergraduate students. While implications of
utilizing undergraduate students will be discussed in more detail in the “Sample
composition” section of this chapter, some issues related to the recruitment of
participants from undergraduate populations are addressed here.
Of the seven studies that recruited heterosexual subjects, four (57.14%) described
having reached them through at least one method directed at university populations (such
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as campus newspapers and bulletin boards). Five of the ten studies (50.00%) recruited
lesbian (and sometimes bisexual) subjects utilizing at least one method directed at
university populations. As discussed earlier, while undergraduate students are often
studied because of convenience of access, they are not generally considered truly
representative of the general population, in part because of overrepresentation of specific
categories of race, social class, and age.
The wide use of sample populations largely made up of undergraduate students in
the studies analyzed here suggests that the researchers do not believe the differences
between the students and larger populations diminish significantly the generalizability of
results obtained. Thus one can infer that researchers may assume that social differences
of race, class, and age are not of great importance to the development of one’s sexual
orientation. Some work in feminist standpoint theories calls this assumption into
question, suggesting that the ways in which one experiences a particular social identity
are intertwined with one’s other identifications, and are then different depending on one’s
social positionality (Collins 1990,1997; Harding 1997).
Another frequent strategy employed by researchers in order to obtain sufficient
numbers of lesbian and bisexual women subjects is to recruit from the memberships of
local and/or national lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) organizations, or by advertising in
local and/or national LGB publications (Allen 1997). Five of the ten studies (50.00%)
specifically discussed recruiting from LGB organizations as at least one of their
recruitment methods, and four of the ten (40.00%) described having made use of
advertisements in LGB paper publications or internet bulletin boards.
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Some of the potential limitations on generalizability that may result from these
recruiting strategies are discussed above and need not be repeated here. Rather, at this
point I will discuss some of the possible assumptions and beliefs of the researchers
regarding sexuality that inform decisions to use such sampling methods.
Using these recruiting methods results in samples of lesbian and bisexual subjects
who self-identify as lesbian or bisexual, who read LGB publications and/or participate in
LGB organizations, and who are willing to volunteer their participation in a study of
lesbian and bisexual orientations. For researchers to claim that results obtained can be
generalized to larger populations, they must assume or believe that their samples of
subjects are not meaningfully different from the larger populations of whom they are
meant to be representative.
It is not known whether or in what ways those who come to self-identify as
lesbian or bisexual are meaningfully different from those women who may have samesex sexual feelings, but choose not to identify as lesbian or bisexual, or from those who
may have same-sex sexual feelings, but, for psychosocial or other reasons, never
acknowledge their existence. However, the deeply-stigmatized nature of lesbian and
bisexual orientations in our culture must give rise to such questions in studying lesbian
and bisexual populations. The continued use of recruiting methods that do not attempt to
address the potential significance of these issues suggests that the researchers have either
not considered or have dismissed the potential importance of such issues.
Relatedly, many researchers do not evaluate the impact of utilizing subjects who
are “out” enough to be reached by recruiting strategies directed at LGB populations, as
well as those who actively volunteer to participate in a study in which their sexual
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orientation is a focus of investigation. Also, in the behavior genetics studies, potential
subjects had likely self-selected to some extent to result in samples that either were “out”
to family and/or that had a lesbian, gay, or bisexual family member. When researchers
fail to acknowledge or to examine seriously the possibility that any results obtained are
applicable only to a very limited subset or lesbian and bisexual women, it suggests that
they believe this is not the case. As with the issue of recruiting from undergraduate
populations, this reveals an underlying assumption that sexual orientation is not
meaningfully impacted by social and psychological factors.
hi many of the studies analyzed here, the sample recruitment methods suggest that
the researchers do not consider seriously the potential social or psychological factors
affecting sexual orientation to be of significance to the actual focus of investigation. One
can infer from this that the researchers, while claiming to be testing for a biological origin
to lesbian and bisexual orientations, already assume that which they are studying is solely
or primarily determined by genetic and/or biological factors. This presumption has been
revealed to exist in other, similar research studies such as those of LeVay (1991) and
Hamer et al. (1993) (see De Cecco and Parker 1995; Stein 1999).
In their analysis. De Cecco and Parker (1995) point out that the assumption in
prior research studies of sexual orientation as “bequeathed by nature” had effects on how
subjects were selected: “The belief that homosexuality inheres in the body led the
biological investigators to be cavalier in the identification and selection of subjects since
one ‘specimen’ was essentially equal to all others” (De Cecco and Parker 1995:10). Thus
the assumption of essentialism creates a false belief in universality of expression of the
trait of sexual orientation, suggesting that social or psychological differences between the
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homosexual subjects studied and the larger populations are not detrimental to
generalizability.
Similarly, the current analysis suggests that the belief that lesbian and bisexual
orientations are biologically determined is what underlies the failure to consider seriously
the limitations imposed by the sample recruitment procedures. By impacting the subject
selection and subsequent assertions of generalizability, the assumption of lesbian and
bisexual orientations as essential traits has implications for the validity of the results
obtained in the research studies.
Stein (1999) explains that “in order to establish essentialism, a study cannot
unquestionably assume essentialism” (205). In other words, the studies that start by
assuming natural sexual orientation categories of heterosexual, lesbian, and bisexual and
then studying them for differences from one another cannot then prove that there is (or is
not) a “natural” basis for these groupings. Thus the implications of the assumption of
essentialism for the research studies analyzed here include a fundamental invalidation of
evidence for or against the research hypotheses.

Division of the Samples into Sexual
Orientation Categories
The second aspect of the research samples in the 10 articles on biological origins
of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women to be analyzed is that of the procedures
used to assign subjects to sexual orientation categories for purposes of comparison in the
study. The methods of assigning subjects to sexual orientation categories in research that
compares data from samples of subjects distinguished by different sexual orientations are

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138
clearly of extreme importance. If subjects are assigned to different categories of sexual
orientation in ways that are inconsistent or inaccurate, the worth of any findings obtained
is called into question, hi addition, the procedures used by the researchers to divide their
sample into sexual orientation categories can provide insights into what the researchers
assume and believe to be true about sexuality.
Dividing the sample into categories according to sexual orientation that can then
be compared to one another requires designating criteria to determine into which category
each subject fits best. At the heart of this issue is the way in which researchers define
that which they are studying: sexual orientation, as well as its presumed categories—
heterosexual, bisexual, and homosexual (or lesbian). Good research methodology
requires clear definitions of the constructs (in this case, sexual orientation categories)
being studied (Neuman 1994). These criteria should be reliable—capable of classifying
subjects dependably the same way each time that the criteria are applied—and valid, or
an accurate measure of the construct in question (Neuman 1994). It is when these
standards are met that we can have some sense that findings reflect an empirical reality—
though perhaps not the only reality.
To this end, scholars have critiqued the ways in which other studies similar to
those analyzed here have assigned their subjects to sexual orientation categories, claiming
that at the very least, the criteria are often poorly defined and implemented; moreover, the
criteria for assigning sexual orientations do not adequately capture human sexuality. Of
the former charge, Stein (1999) writes:
It is crucial for scientific research on sexual orientation to carefully
define its object of study in order to divide people into sexual
orientations in a reasonable fashion and in ways that do not skew
its results. A study of sexual orientation must start with some
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(at least implicit) definition of sexual orientation; who will count
as a homosexual or a heterosexual? (195)
If the definitions of sexual orientation categories and how people are to be assigned to
them are not clear, reliability is called into question, in that it cannot be certain that
sexual orientation is being evaluated in the same way for each subject. If the researchers
are determining the subject placements, unclear definitions or poor implementation
means that the same subject could be assigned to a different category by different raters
or upon repeated ratings.
Criteria for assigning subjects to sexual orientation categories must be not only
well defined, but also must depend upon good evidence that reflects the person’s “real”
sexual orientation, ff this evidence is questionable, validity of results will be poor. This
is the case for LeVay’s 1991 study of gay men. Spanier (1995a) critiques this study on
the basis that sexual orientation categories were assigned in such a way as to make
findings almost meaningless:
Assumptions built into the categories (heterosexual men, homosexual
men, presumably heterosexual women) LeVay chose for comparison
raise fimdamental problems with respect to the experimental design of
this research. ... Equally problematic is LeVay’s temerity in classifying
both men and women, as heterosexual simply because they were not
otherwise identified. ... This in itself should have disqualified the
article from publication, since the study purports to compare three
categories, assignment to which was suspect for the majority of
subjects. (63-64)
LeVay’s subjects were deceased, and he determined to which sexual orientation
category they would be assigned based on their documented medical histories. Patients
who had self-identified as homosexual were classified as such, including one patient who
had identified as bisexual. Patients who had not identified their sexual orientation were
assigned to the heterosexual category, on the basis of the “numerical preponderance of
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heterosexual men in the population” (Spanier 1995a:64). In this case, validity is
questionable because of the great potential for inaccuracy in the categorizing of subjects
as heterosexual on the basis of such limited information. From this example, the
importance of valid categorizations for drawing meaningful conclusions from data is
made clear.
Beyond such issues of flawed methodology is the charge that researchers are not
adequately nor accurately capturing subjects’ full “sexual orientations. ” There are at
least two facets to this claim. First is that the way in which people experience their
sexual orientation at the time a study is conducted is not necessarily indicative of their
lifelong sexual orientation, and does not necessarily mean exactly the same thing for all
people. This issue also calls the validity of the measurement criteria into question, as if
people’s sexual orientations are changeable over the life course, or if people are defining
their experiences differently from one another, the assignments to sexual orientation
categories are suspect (Allen 1997).
The second facet to the issue of inaccurate representations of subjects’ sexual
orientations concerns the unquestioning acceptance of the idea that sexuality is truly
defined by the categories of “heterosexual,” “homosexual,” and “bisexual.” The studies
of biological origins of sexual orientations often do not address the possibility that the
categories themselves are artificial and indistinct, much less that the sex- and genderbased categories may not reflect anything inherent about sexuality at all. Allen (1997)
writes:
Behind much of this work appears to lie an essentialist or typological
view of behaviors as fixed and objectively defined entities, ignoring
the wide variability in any behavior both within and between human
societies ... Homosexual, like heterosexual, behavior falls across a
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wide spectrum of responses, making it impossible to claim that something
called “homosexualify’ exists in the abstract. The problem of grouping
what may be a variety of behaviors under one name is what neurobiologist
Steven Rose (1995) has called “artificial conglomeration." (255)
Stein (1999) points out, for example, that the assumption of the validity of the
categories is made in LeVay’s 1991 study:
However, LeVay starts from the assumption that people can be sorted
into heterosexuals and homosexuals, so his study cannot establish
essentialism about sexual orientation. I am not claiming that it is
impossible to do a neuroanatomical study that would provide support
for essentialism about sexual orientation. For this to happen, evidence
for the existence of natural human kinds must emerge from the
empirical results. (206)
In other words, if researchers want to capture essential characteristics related to
sexual orientation, they should start by examining how people’s sexuality is defined and
distinguished empirically, rather than beginning with assumed, pre-set categories and
setting up measures such that people will fit into them. This is not so simple as asking
people to self-categorize, because our cultural ideas about sex, gender, and sexuality have
already helped ensure that most people will see their sexual orientation in these terms.
Also, although people are encouraged to define their own sexuality in sex- and genderoriented terms, this does not mean that everyone interprets feelings, behaviors, and
experiences in the same way. Asking people to self-categorize for purposes of dividing
the sample into sexual orientation groups, then, in fact creates even less certainty about
how the categories are defined and what is actually being studied (Allen 1997; Stein
1999). According to Allen:
The choice of categorizing oneself as either heterosexual or homosexual
is thus socially contrived, artificial, and, from a biological and genetic
point of view, meaningless. With a self-rating process as the means of
identifying phenotypes, the artificiality of the definition is magnified
manyfold. (1997:255)
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All these issues, including researchers’ acceptance of the established categories of
sexual orientation, their failure to acknowledge the fluidity of sexual orientation over the
life course, and their lack of recognition of the varied social influences that might cause
people to interpret similar types of sexual feelings and experiences very differently,
suggest that the assumption of the essential nature of sexual orientation categories is
already present at the beginning of studies designed to test this hypothesis. As stated by
De Cecco and Parker (1995):
Only if one presupposes that sexual preference is biologically
mandated could one believe that a single label or number, even
if self-applied, could adequately represent the range, variation, and
nuance of an individuals’ sexual expression and experience over a
lifetime. (11)
The idea that essentialism of sexual orientation categories is a starting assumption of
these research studies has implications, as suggested above by Stein, for the
meaningfulness of results obtained.
Defining sexual orientations and classifying the research samples into different
groups is extraordinarily complex and has far-reaching implications for the way a study’s
results may be interpreted. Because sexual orientation is that which is being “explained"
in the scientific articles in the current study, it is essential to know how the various
researchers are defining different sexual orientations and placing subjects into the various
categories. In addition, the method of categorizing the samples in terms of sexual
orientation provides insights into researchers’ assumptions about the topic of study, an
understanding of which is helpful to evaluating the research project as a whole.
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Method
The analysis of the categorization of sexual orientations in the research samples in
the 10 articles on origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women is conducted
following the examples of other feminist and critical analyses of sexual orientation
research (Allen 1997; Byne 1995; De Cecco and Parker 1995; McGuire 1995; Spanier
1995a; Stein 1999). The examination is initiated by locating the section of each article
that discusses the sexual orientation categorization procedures for the research sample.
This description almost always occurs in the “Method" section of scientific articles. The
statements from the articles that contain this information are selected out for analysis and
included below, separated according to the article groupings discussed previously
(Genetic group, the Brain/Cognition group, and the Neuroendocrine group). This
division is utilized in order to organize the data more clearly, and to discern any
differences in sample selection procedures across the three scientific approaches to
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women.
The description of the procedure for categorizing subjects’ sexual orientations is
then read closely and critically in order to answer the following question: “What are the
criteria for deciding in what sexual orientation categories subjects are to be placed, and
what limitations related to reliability and validity might result from them?" Aspects of
reliability and validity considered in this analysis are those discussed above including, for
example, the consistency of the criteria applied and the accuracy and adequacy with
which they capture subjects’ sexualities. These issues have implications for what aspects
of sexuality might tend to be over- and under-represented by the research, as well as the
meaningfulness of the findings.
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Ihfonned by the theoretical framework of feminist standpoint epistemologies as
well as findings from previous critiques, I discuss potential limitations incurred by the
sexual orientation categorization procedures and how they might influence findings
(presented in the “Discussion” sections for each of the three article groupings). Finally,
to conclude this section of the chapter I discuss the assumptions upon which the
categorization procedures depend and their significance for the research project as a
whole.
Results
Genetic group: Article numbers 1.2 and 3
Article 1:
Notices were placed in several local and national ‘gay’ periodicals requesting
homosexual men and lesbians who were twins to contact u s .... Each subject who
contacted us was posted a questionnaire on the following:...
(c) sexual orientation and sexual behaviour of the respondent, and where known,
that of the co-twin ...
Forty-five identified themselves as primarily homosexual and one as bisexual...
(408)
Article 2:
Of the probands, 126 (85.7%) described themselves as “lesbian/homosexual” and
21 (14.3%) described themselves as “bisexual.” Kinsey ratings were obtained for
adult fantasy and behavior, combined
The mean (±SD) Kinsey rating, 4.8
(±1.2), indicated a fairly high level of homosexual orientation for the sample as a
whole, but individual Kinsey ratings ranged from as low as 1 to as high as 6.
Because the Kinsey ratings reflected overall adult behavior and fantasy, a woman
might give herself a low rating because she had assumed a homosexual identity
later in life. Indeed, this accounted for most of the probands with relatively low
Kinsey scores (<3). However, three probands with low Kinsey scores admitted to
relatively low levels of homosexual feelings, although they all considered
themselves bisexual. (218)
Article 3:
Sexual orientation was assessed by self-report using the 7-point Kinsey scale ...
The probands rated themselves on four individually administered scales: selfidentification, sexual/romantic attraction, sexual/romantic fantasy, and sexual
behavior. The four scores were averaged to yield a composite Kinsey self-rating
as follows. Probands with averages <0.5 were designated Kinsey 0; 0.5-1.49,
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Kinsey 1; 1.5-2.49, Kinsey 2; 2.5-3.49, Kinsey 3; 3.5-4.49, Kinsey 4; 4.5-5.49,
Kinsey 5; and 5.5-5.0, Kinsey 6. A total of 25 probands declined to rate
themselves on one or more of the attraction, fantasy, or behavior scales. For these
cases an average of the available self-ratings was used.
Discussion of Genetic eroup
Somewhat different methods of constmcting categories of sexual orientation were
used in these studies of possible genetic influence on sexual orientation. Specifically, in
the first study subjects classified themselves as lesbian or bisexual, with no measure of
what those identifications meant; in the second, subjects self-classified as either lesbian
or bisexual, but measures were also taken to establish Kinsey ratings for the subjects; in
the third, Kinsey ratings were established in order for the researcher to place subjects in a
category of either heterosexual, lesbian or bisexual. Thus the first two studies were
similar in placing subjects in dichotomous categories (lesbian or bisexual) based solely
on the subject’s own identification, while study 3 placed subjects in a category informed
by their responses to questions measured on the Kinsey scale. In addition the categories
were constructed differently in terms of usage for analysis among the three studies, in
that the first two, while allowing subjects to classify themselves as bisexual, later
collapsed that category into the category of lesbian for analysis purposes. The third study
conducted analyses using all three categories originally established.
Four problems are apparent with the categorization of sexual orientation in these
studies. First, the definitions of the categories are inconsistent across the studies.
Without such consistency, meaningful comparisons cannot be made. For example, in
study 1, it would appear that the working definition of a lesbian or a bisexual woman is
someone who identifies herself as such. While there is certainly merit to this definition in
terms of women’s sexual agency, for issues such as behaviors, attractions, and fantasies
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(the items typically measured utilizing Kinsey scales) there is not necessarily any
consistency of definition within or across categories. The Kinsey-scale results from
study 2 actually provide evidence of this inconsistency, as it is noted that some subjects
who identified as lesbian scored below 3 on their Kinsey rating, which in study 3 would
have placed them into the bisexual or heterosexual categories, depending on how far
below 3 the score was. Also study 2 notes that there were scores as low as 1 for women
who identified as bisexual. These women would have been classified as heterosexuals in
study 3.
This relates to a second problem with the category construction: the arbitrariness
of the cut-off points used to construct sexual orientation categories in study 3. The
researchers combined self-reported Kinsey ratings on four different measures related to
sexual orientation, as described earlier. This composite score was then placed into a
classification scheme as follows: “Probands with averages <0.5 were designated Kinsey
0; 0.5-1.49, Kinsey 1; 1.5-2.49, Kinsey 2; 2.5-3.49, Kinsey 3; 3.5-4.49, Kinsey 4; 4.55.49, Kinsey 5; and 5.5-6.0, Kinsey 6” (409). Then classifications of heterosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual were attached to ranges of Kinsey scores as described earlier.
Therefore, a subject scoring as little as one-hundredth of a point different from another
subject could be placed into a different category, depending on the proximity of each to
one of the cut-off points.
For example, of the sample of 358 probands, 55 were rated a 1 (heterosexual) or a
2 (bisexual), 34 and 21 subjects in each category respectively; 119 were rated a 4
(bisexual) or a 5 (lesbian), 33 and 86 subjects respectively. Thus 174 probands (48.6% of
the sample) were placed into sexual orientation categories by scoring fractions of a point
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away from a different category entirely. A probable effect of this arbitrary cut-off is
reported by the researchers when they note that 67.7% of their “heterosexual” women
subjects reported having “ever experienced a romantic or sexual attraction to a female”
(412). Similarly, 45.3% of the “lesbian” subjects reported having “ever experienced a
romantic or sexual attraction to a male” (412). At the very least, this issue could be
thought to primarily affect those women who fell very close to one of these cut-off
points; at the most, it could cast doubt on the meaningfulness of the distinctions between
sexual orientation categories at all. Either way, the significance bears upon the
meaningfulness of the categories as established and the analyses performed on them.
In addition the issue has relevance for the way these results are interpreted and compared
to results from other studies, as discussed previously.
The third problem with the categorization of sexual orientation in these studies
relates to the issue of collapsing categories for analytic convenience. The first two
studies ran analyses in which bisexual subjects were counted as if they had identified as
lesbian. Particularly given the fact that, as discussed earlier, some bisexual subjects in
study 2 had Kinsey scores that would have rated them heterosexual, performing analyses
in which bisexual subjects are counted as lesbian has the potential to make the results of
those analyses meaningless. In addition, results of studies in which bisexual subjects are
counted as lesbian (such as studies 1 and 2) should not be compared to results of studies
in which bisexual subjects were counted separately (such as study 3). There is little
consistency in the reporting of results from these studies of potential genetic
contributions of what is being compared to what in terms of categories of sexual
orientation.
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One final problem is addressed to some extent but not sufficiently: the issue of
changing sexual orientation identifications over the adult life course. In genetic-influence
studies, the problem is two-fold because this issue must be addressed for not only the
subject, but also for the family member or members whose sexual orientations are being
classified and used as data, in cases in which the family members themselves are not
contacted, information regarding possible changes over the life course is likely to be
unknown to the subject and thus not taken into consideration. Study 1 was the weakest in
this regard, as this issue was not addressed in discernable way for either subjects or their
twins, k study 2 the Kinsey rating asking for information on subjects’ overall adult
identifications could help ameliorate the issue of change, but the ratings were not used in
the categorization. Also in regard to their sisters, subjects were apparently asked only for
their current sexual orientation identification, and although many of the sisters responded
for themselves, they too were categorized according to current identification.
Study 3 also appears to have classified by current sexual orientation both for
subjects and their family members. Subjects in this study were asked to rate the sexual
orientations of many family members, not just sisters (all “first-, second- and third-degree
relatives over the age of 18 years”, excluding grandparents), and very few were contacted
(13% of subjects were able to get one family member to participate) to confirm the
information. Thus it is very possible that the subjects were unaware of changes in their
family members’ sexual orientation identifications over their adult lives. Also in this
study 175 (76.8% of the sample) was contacted 12-18 months later to see if changes had
occurred, which brings in some longitudinal aspect even if it doesn’t address overall
change possibilities. The researchers report that “the sexual orientation of the women in
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this sample, for the period of time studied, was quite stable” (411). Yet in 12-18 months,
19.8% of the 175 subjects re-contacted had changed Kinsey rating: “most moved by only
one Kinsey self-rating and no one changed by more than two. Although all Kinsey
categories showed some movement, Kinsey 2 and Kinsey 4 exhibited the greatest
variability, whereas Kinsey 6 was the most stable” (411). It is noted that bisexuals
accounted for “slightly over one-half of the probands whose Kinsey self-rating changed”,
and that the majority of them changed only to a different rating still within the bisexual
range. Still these changes over 1 to 1

years hardly seem trivial, and lead one to wonder

about how to interpret the results if continued changes were to be seen over succeeding
years.
Brain/Cognition group: Articles 4 and 5
Article 4:
... a person-to-person interview was conducted by a trained experimenter who
inquired about past and current sexual behaviors and attitudes. The method
employed utilized the semistructured interview instrument and technique of
Meyer-Bahlburg and Ehihardt (Sexual Experiences, Behaviors, and Attitudes
Survey - Adult, 1983 version) and lasted approximately 1 h for each subject. In
addition, the subjects completed several questionnaires regarding psychosexual
milestones, sexual history, attitudes, and behavior, as well as demographic
information.
As a result of information obtained in the questionnaires and interview, the
subjects were categorized regarding their lifelong sexual orientation using the socalled Kinsey rating scale ... Only data from persons with either exclusve (sic)
lifelong (since puberty) heterosexual or exclusive lifelong homosexual histories
are reported here. (102)
Article 5:
Sexual orientation was assessed by a Sexual Orientation Scale (SOS) adapted
from Klein et al. (1985). Participants rated themselves on a Kinsey-type scale (17) for Sexual Attraction, Sexual Thoughts and Fantasies, Sexual Behavior, and
Sexual Identity. Participants were included in the HT group if they had averaged
scores of either 1 or 2 on the SOS and in the HM group if they had averaged
scores from 5 to 7. Six participants scoring in the bisexual range (3-4) were
excluded from this sample. (95-96)
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Discussion of Brain/Cognition Group
The two studies differed in how they categorized sexual orientation in the
following three ways: first, in study 4 the researchers rated subjects according to their
responses using a Kinsey scale, while in study 5 the subjects located themselves along the
Kinsey scale to answer the items; second, the categorization in study 4 considered
changes in sexual orientation over the adult life course, while the categorization system in
study 5 did not; and third, the items used to elicit responses regarding sexual orientation
were not the same across the two studies. Thus as in the genetic-influence studies,
inconsistencies that may limit comparisons of results are seen. For example, in study 5
scores ranging from 5-7 (which presumably should correspond at least somewhat to
Kinsey’s 4-6) are classified as homosexual, which almost certainly creates a different
definition of that category from that used in study 4 (“exclusive lifelong homosexual
histories”).
This issue relates to another potential categorization problem: that of the
exclusion of the middle range of scores in both studies. While in two of the genetic
studies bisexual women were analyzed as if they had identified as lesbian, in these
studies bisexuals are not included at all. This exclusion is limiting in two ways: first, it
arbitrarily fails to analyze some people who may actually identify as being heterosexual
or homosexual. As noted in studies 2 and 3, people’s self-identifications do not always
mesh perfectly with the way researchers would classify them by Kinsey ratings. Thus the
results are limited in application to a subset of both heterosexual women and lesbians.
Second, the practice of excluding bisexuals constructs a dichotomy of sexual orientation
that does not exist in “real life,” as evidenced by the report of potential subjects being
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turned away from participation because of bisexual scores. This categorization of sexual
orientation paints a falsely oppositional picture, making any differences found in the data
appear more significant than they may be in the actual population.
It is perhaps interesting to note that at least in study 5, some of the “middle range"
toward the homosexual end of the scale may have actually been included into the lesbian
category. The researcher states that subjects were placed into the heterosexual category if
they scored 1 to 2, and into the homosexual category if they scored from 5-7. Thus while
the boundaries that define these numbers are not known, it appears that the homosexual
classification may have been allowed a slightly more flexible definition than the
heterosexual one, possibly accounting for some of the more “homosexually-oriented” of
the bisexuals. If this researcher’s “5” corresponds to others’ “4” (because his modified
Kinsey scale is numbered 1-7 instead of the typically-used 0-6), then subjects others
would have classified as bisexual were counted as homosexual. However, the exact
degree to which this researcher’s classification scheme matches with the Kinsey rankings
is not known. The potential effects of this apparent discrepancy in defining the
heterosexual category and the lesbian one are not immediately apparent, but one can
speculate that they may serve a similar function as the collapsing of the bisexual and
lesbian categories discussed previously; that is, constructing a dichotomy of
heterosexual/homosexual orientations that includes a wider range of possibilities for
“homosexuality, ” but is a false dichotomy nonetheless.
Neuroendocrine group: Articles 6-10
Article 6:
Subjects were recruited from the membership of a local homophile
organization. Seventy-four homosexual men and women volunteered to
participate. The criterion for inclusion in the study was that the subjects rated
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their sexual experience in both behavior and imagery as primarily homosexual,
defined here by a score of 5 or 6 on the Kinsey scale (Kinsey et cd., 1948) and by
a clear pattern of homosexual response on the Sexual Orientation Method
questiotmaire (Sambrooks & MacCuUoch, 1973). Four subjects (two male, two
female) with bisexual preference were excluded. (71)
Article 7:
All participants were asked their sexual orientation; homosexual, bisexual, or
heterosexual. (705)
Article 8:
Subjects made a self-declaration of their sexual orientation and completed the
Kinsey scales (Kinsey et al., 1948) which rank sexuality from 0 (exclusively
heterosexual) to 6 (exclusively homosexual). The Kinsey scales were completed
privately and sealed in envelopes that were not opened until the experiment was
completed. Only those homosexual subjects scoring 3.5/6 or higher on the Kinsey
scales (both fantasy and experience) were included in the study (1 male and 2
females were excluded based on this criterion). All heterosexual subjects scored
either 0 or 1. (398)
Article 9:
Sexual orientation was classified according to the following criteria. Women
were classified as homosexual if they reported ‘extensive’ homosexual
experience, defined by Gebhard & Johnson (1979) as more than 20 female sexual
pariners or more than 50 homosexual experiences (with one or more partners).
Women were classified as heterosexual if they met two criteria: (1), they reported
either no’ or rare’ homosexual experience, the latter defined by Gebhard &
Johnson (1979) as 1 female sexual pariner or 1-5 homosexual experiences, and
(2) they did not respond that they experienced much’ or ‘some’ sexual arousal to
questions about sexual arousal f^ m seeing or thinking about other females.
Using these rather stringent criteria, 478 cases could not be classified as either
heterosexual or homosexual. Of the remaining 5,476 cases, 275 were classified as
homosexual (lesbian) and 5,201 were classified as heterosexual. (117)
Article 10^:
Sexual orientation was determined by consistency of response on several
questionnaire items. One item asked directly whether the person was
heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual. Two others were the Kinsey items on
^ Article 10 reported very little about sampling procedures, instead referring readers to a
previous report for that discussion. The article containing the sample information
(McFadden and Pasanen, 1998) was written by the same researchers and reported
different data gathered on the same subjects, apparently within the same research session.
That article was included in the original sample of 35 from which the subsample of 10
was constructed. For these reasons, the decision was made for this project to use that
information as if it had in fact been presented in article 10.
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sexual fantasies and experiences modeled on lef. 31. [Kinsey et al., 1948] The
rare uncertainties about classification were resolved by consulting additional
items asked about ongoing or previous relationships. All decisions about
subjects’ sexual orientation were made in ignorance of the subjects’ emissions
data. (2710)^
Discussion of Neuroendocrine Group
There is wide variation among these studies in the construction of categories of
sexual orientation for analysis purposes. The issue of inconsistency, discussed for the
Genetic and Brain/Cognition groups, applies to this group as well. Subjects are classified
differently in every study, and it cannot be presumed that they would be placed in the
same category of sexual orientation across studies.
Subject self-identification appears to have been used for at least part of the
categorization criteria in most of these studies, the exception being study 9 and possibly
study 6, although the latter is unclear. In only one study (7) was self-identification used
as the sole categorization criterion. In studies 8 and 10, self-identification was
supplemented by further questions, although of the two, only study 8 excluded subjects
who had (apparently) self-identified as lesbian, because their Kinsey scores fell below the
criterion level of 3.5. In study 10 bisexuals were included as a separate category.
Besides self-classification, the other widely-used categorization method in these studies
is the researchers’ evaluation of subjects’ responses to questions about current and/or
overall adult sexual behaviors, feelings, and fantasies. The questions, time periods
covered, and rating methods are standardized within studies, but not across them. Thus
the sexual orientation groups are relatively consistently defined within each study, but
comparisons of results from different studies are questionable.

Page number is from 1998 article.
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As a categorization method, self-classification allows for little in the way of
standardization of category definitions, as it is not known if, for example, one “lesbian”
necessarily has any similar characteristics to another, other than choosing to identify
oneself as lesbian. Given this unknown factor, there can be no certainty regarding the
consistency of definition in terms of the concepts usually used to classify sexual
orientation, such as behaviors, feelings, and fantasies. However, allowing for self
definition ensures participants are placed in the categories with which they themselves
most closely identify, allowing for a different kind of consistency (and validity) of
category definitions. Thus comparisons made across studies using self-definition as the
categorization criterion may be useful, but must limit their findings and comparisons to
the population of “self-defined lesbians,” and the same holds true for heterosexual and
bisexuals. The question of how to categorize those who do not self-define in any of those
three categories remains unanswered in this scenario.
Issues discussed in regard to the Genetic and Brain/Cognition groups regarding
the collapsing of bisexuals into the category of lesbian or the exclusion of them altogether
hold true here for some, but not all, of these studies. Specifically, studies 6, 8, and 9
make decisions to exclude certain potential subjects based on their failure to meet criteria
for categorization as heterosexual or lesbian. Interestingly, studies 8 and 9 potentially do
both - excluding and collapsing of bisexuals - in different ways. Study 8 excludes two
women from the “homosexual” category who scored below 3.5 on their Kinsey ratings,
thus a dichotomy of “0-1” heterosexuals and “3.5-6” homosexuals was established.
However, widening the range for the lesbian group down to 3.5 effectively included some
women who could have been classified as bisexual (most often 2-4 is considered the
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range of bisexuality). As in study 5 (discussed in the Brain/Cognition group), this
categorization scheme widens the range of possibilities for the lesbian definition but not
the heterosexual one, with implications that are as yet undetermined, other than the
construction of a falsely dichotomous sample.
k study 9 bisexuals are also both excluded and potentially collapsed mto the
lesbian category, but in slightly different ways from how that is achieved in study 8. k
this study, the responses of women whose case histories were included in the Kinsey
kstitute’s database were examined for compatibility with several criteria established to
define heterosexual and lesbian samples. Although the researcher classified the women
dichotomously, excluding 478 women who did not fit the heterosexual or lesbian criteria,
a careful readmg of the inclusion criteria (reported earlier) reveals that bisexuals were not
necessarily excluded; rather, they may have been included and classified as (most likely)
“homosexual.” This is because the criteria do not evaluate the women’s attraction or
behavior regarding any category other than “other females.” By these criteria it is
unknown how many male sexual partners the women in either classification had or the
degree of their potential attraction to men; the “homosexual women” could in fact be
bisexual and still fit the stated criteria, and the “heterosexual” women could be asexual.
Thus the criteria for categorizing sexual orientation in this study create additional
limitations on how the data can be interpreted or compared to results firom other studies,
because only the degree of sexual experience with, and/or attraction to, other women was
evaluated.
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Discussion
Two general problems arise from the way in which sexual orientation is
categorized in the scientific studies of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women: those related to reliability and to vaUdity. Issues of reliability
refer to whether the categorization scheme is consistent in classifying subjects; validity,
whether the categorization schemes classify subjects “correctly.”
hi the studies analyzed here, perhaps the most important reliability issue is not
related to consistency of categorization within a particular study, but across all of them.
First, researchers tend to utilize different categorization methods in each study, which
makes comparisons of results between studies difficult. If the same person might placed
in different sexual orientation categories in different studies, the distinction between the
categories themselves is called into question. As shown above, the different criteria
employed for assignment to sexual orientation categories make it very possible for a
subject to be classified difierently by different researchers.
The element of interpretation inherent in the social (and socially-defined) nature
of sexuality is one of the most significant hindrances to reliability within each study.
When subjects self-rate or self-classify, there is little assurance that the various subjects'
definitions of the categories are consistent. Having researchers assign subjects to
categories based on their responses to questions about their sexuality assumes that not
only are subjects’ interpretations of questions and ratings consistent, but that the
application of assignment criteria are as well, yet it “has the advantage of insuring that
roughly the same definitions of the various sexual orientations are being applied to all
subjects” (Stein 1999:224). In addition, changes over the life course in one’s
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understandings and interpretations of one’s own sexuality (even in the absence of any
change in self-categorization) call longitudinal reliability into question.
The validity of the distinctions between the sexual orientation categories is also
limited to the extent that the categorization procedures may result in inaccurate labeling.
An issue of particular interest here is the way in which bisexual subjects are handled by
the researchers. For example, in some studies, they are collapsed into the category
“lesbian” for analysis purposes, while in other studies the rating criteria for the “lesbian”
category effectively include some women who are bisexual, and in yet other cases
bisexual women are excluded from the study entirely. These difrerences suggest that the
“lesbian” group in particular might contain bisexual women in some cases and not in
others, creating an issue of validity for the “lesbian” label.
Besides potential inaccuracies in the categorizing of subjects, validity is limited
by the assumption of the “reality” of the two or three distinguishable sexual orientation
classifications in the first place. Because there is no reason to think that the way we have
defined sexual orientation categories corresponds to anything that exists “in nature,” it is
possible that the labels are at best a biased and inadequate way of capturing subjects’
“actual” sexualities. To the extent that the measures and criteria result in categorizations
based on a limited subset of the range of human sexuality, there is extremely limited
validity to the categories as representing different “types” of people.
The limitations of the assignment of subjects to sexual orientation categories in
these studies impact the meaningfulness and applicability of the results obtained. It is
questionable because of problems of the validity of the categories whether the results
obtained from a sample of “lesbian” subjects can be said to be applicable to lesbian
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women in general. Also, data from one study should not be uncritically compared to data
from another, as the variations in categorization criteria make ostensibly similar subject
groups (such as of lesbian women) potentially quite different.
In addition, the methods of assigning subjects to sexual orientation categories, as
well as the limitations of those procedures, point to the assumptions made by the
researchers regarding the nature of their topic. Assumptions are a necessary part of
undertaking any research program and thus are not inherently problematic; the issue is
whai assumptions are made and how they structure the research questions, methods,
findings and interpretations (Stein 1999). Stein points out that when a study of the
biology of sexual orientation accepts dominant cultural views of sexual orientation as
basically binary and based on “the sex-gender of the people to whom a person is
attracted,” (196) as do all those analyzed here, it indicates that it is
significantly limited insofar as it assumes a simplistic—and perhaps
mistaken—picture of what a sexual orientation is. That most people
in our culture see sexual orientation simplistically does not provide
an argument for using such a simplistic account to do science. (196)
In her critique of the work of LeVay (1991), Spanier (1995a) notes that LeVay
defended his decision to simplify sexuality in this maimer because “simplification is
sometimes needed to make scientific progress” (63). She rightfully points out that this is
not “fact” but belief, and in fact “is one of the key value judgments he makes that affect
his willingness to stretch the boundaries of valid science” (63). Thus LeVay's decisions
about what assumptions about sexual orientation to allow in his work were based
themselves on culturally-influenced beliefs. In this way the shape of the entire project is
molded by the researcher’s assumptions and beliefs, and evaluating its findings requires
understanding those influences.
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Di summary, it can be argued that the sexual orientation categorization procedures
used in the studies analyzed here, as with the sample recruitment procedures, reveal the
assumption of the sexual orientation categories—heterosexual, homosexual/lesbian, and
sometimes bisexual—as natural divisions of human sexuality. Issues such as the lack of
standardization of who “counts” as heterosexual, bisexual, and lesbian (combined with
the comparison of results across studies as if the study groups were the same), the
acceptance of self-classifications, and the lack of serious consideration to changes over
the life course indicate a deterministic view of sexual orientation as being a fixed
identity. In addition, the acceptance of sexual orientation as basically binary and based
solely upon the sex/gender object of one’s sexual feelings and behaviors suggests a
simplistic, culturally-influenced basis of assumption for the research projects. The
problematic conceptualization of such a critical component of this research—the
measurement of the sexual orientation variable—seriously limits how results may be
interpreted and what conclusions the researchers may reliably draw.

Composition of the Samples
The third and final aspect of the sample critique focuses on the composition of the
samples: their size and their representativeness in terms of demographic variables
including age, race and/or ethnicity, social class (or socioeconomic status), education
levels, and geographic region. Samples that are small in size or that are not
representative in terms of these important demographic variables of the population being
studied are limited in terms of to whom the findings may be considered applicable.
Bouma and Atkinson (1995) state: “Only if the sample studied can be shown to represent
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a larger population can the results of a study of the sample be taken to give reliable
information about the larger population,

the sample studied is not representative, the

conclusions drawn from the research must be limited to the sample studied” (138). Thus
sample compositions must be examined in order to be able to evaluate the findings of a
research study.
Examining research samples is a common feature of evaluations of scientific
research studies because of the importance of sample size and makeup to the eventual
results obtained. My readings of feminist and other critical analyses of scientific research
suggest that samples are typically read for problems with the ways in which they were
selected (discussed in a previous section), limitations due to small size or lack of controls,
and possible limitations incurred by using samples with specific characteristics that make
their results unlikely to reflect the diversity of the larger populations (see, for example,
Byne 1995; McGuire 1995; Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999) Spanier, for example, notes that
a study “with improper or too few controls, with an inadequate sample size, with a
nonrepresentative or nonrandom sample” indicates poor design, which may be
“inadequate for scientific validity” (59-60).
Because none of the studies included in this analysis are true probability studies,
determining an appropriate sample size for representativeness is not a precise matter.
Still, the size of the sample is of importance because it afiects the calculations of
statistical significance of results obtained (McGuire 1995). The smaller the sample size,
the smaller is the possibility that differences seen between the two comparison groups
reflect an actual difference between those groups in the larger population. In other
words, with a small sample, the results from just a few subjects can change the outcome
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of the comparisons. This is especially true when the differences expected between
groups are small to begin with (Schutt 1996). Thus sample sizes are important even
when the samples are not trying to be representative in the probabilistic sense.
Similarly, sample composition in terms of different social identities is important
because they may have an effect on the aspect of identity being examined (lesbian and
bisexual orientations). A sample that contains little diversity on such variables may
produce results that are specific to those with the characteristics over-represented in the
sample. Regarding socially-based differences, Allen (1997) states the following: “In any
behavior as complex and socially sensitive as homosexuality, cultural and geographic
differences undoubtedly are important in diagnosing the phenotype, especially by a selfrating method” (255). In other words, the definition of the “phenotype” (expression) of
lesbian or bisexual orientation can be expected to vary with differences in cultural
influences. Of Hamer’s 1993 genetic study, Allen notes the “sample included 92%
Caucasian non-Hispanic, 4% African-Americans, 3% Hispanic, and 1% Asian subjects,”
and asserts the following:
While the small number of non-Caucasian subjects may not have
significantly influenced the results, the fact that cultural differences
were not factored in suggests the degree to which the authors tend
to view sexual orientation as a single, abstract, phenotypic behavior,
the same wherever it is found. (1997:255)
Thus the importance, or lack thereof, that researchers place on methodological issues
such as size and diversity in the sample, can reveal something about what they assume to
be true of the “behavior” being studied. De Cecco and Parker note this as well, saying of
another study that “[t]he belief that homosexuality inheres in the body led the biological
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investigators to be cavalier in the identification and selection of subjects since one
‘specimen’ was essentially equal to all others ” (1995:10).
The analysis of the compositions of the samples used in the ten scientific studies
of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations is conducted, then, not only to
evaluate the validity and applicability of findings; in addition, it also provides insights
into the framework of assumptions and beliefs that inform and shape the project as a
whole.
Method
The analysis of the composition of the research samples in the 10 articles on
origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women is conducted following the
examples of other feminist and critical analyses of sexual orientation research (Allen
1997; Byne 1995; De Cecco and Parker 1995; McGuire 1995; Spanier 1995a; Stein 1999;
Zicklin 1997). The examination is initiated by locating the section of each article that
discusses the size and characteristics of the research samples. This description almost
always occurs in the “Method ”section of scientific articles. The statements from the
articles that contain this information are selected out for analysis and included below,
separated according to the article groupings discussed previously (the Genetic group, the
Brain/Cognition group, and the Neuroendocrine group). This division is utilized in order
to organize the data more clearly, and to discern any differences in sample composition
issues across the different scientific approaches to the topic.
The descriptions of the sample size and composition are then read closely and
critically in order to answer the following question: “What are the sizes and demographic
characteristics of the research samples, and what limitations might they present in terms
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of validity and generalizability of results?” My discussion of the answers to these
questions based on the information from the articles is presented in the “Discussion”
sections for each article grouping (the Genetic group, the Brain/Cognition group, and the
Neuroendocrine group). Finally, to conclude this section of the chapter I discuss the
assumptions and beliefs of the researchers regarding lesbian and bisexual orientations in
women, as suggested by the characteristics of their research samples, and their
significance for the research project as a whole.
Results
Genetic group: Articles 1.2 and 3
Article 1:
Notices were placed in several local and national ‘gay’ periodicals requesting
homosexual men and lesbians who were twins to contact us. ... Forty-eight
people responded to our notices, of whom 46 returned completed questionnaires.
Our respondents were predominantly young men (38 males, 8 females; mean age
31.8 (s.d. 9.25) years, range 18-60) of middle to higher social class. Forty-five
identified themselves as primarily homosexual and one as bisexual, 42 were
single and four had been married at some time. (408)
Article 2:
Probands were recruited through advertisements placed in lesbian-oriented
publications in several cities across the United States: Chicago, HI; Dallas,
Houston, Austin, and San Antonio, Tex; Boston, Mass; and Los Angeles, Calif.
... This procedure resulted in 147 proband interviews: 115 probands with female
twins and 32 probands with adoptive sisters. Descriptive characteristics of the
sample are included in Table 1. Probands ranged in age fiom 19 to 57 years, with
a mean age of 31.3 years. [Table 1 reveals that of the 147 probands, 126 (85.7%)
were homosexual, 21 (14.3%) were bisexual, and the mean Kinsey rating was 4.8
(±1.2).] 217-218)
Article 3:
Announcements seeking participants for the study were distributed to local
homophile organizations and social groups and to Women’s Studies programs at
universities within the Washington, D C., metropolitan area. ...
This recruiting strategy resulted in a population consisting of 358 female
probands over the age of 18 years__
The participants were white non-Hispanic (84.6%), Hispanic (7.3%), African
American (3.9%), Asian (3.4%), and Middle-Eastern (0.8%), with a mean (± SD)
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family annual income of $46,000 ± $21,000, and a mean (± SD) educational level
of 15.0 ± 2.8 years. Probands ranged in age from 18 to 68 years, with a mean
(±SD) age of 31.4 ± 8.7 years. (409)
Table I shows the distribution of the subject population according to composite
Kinsey score and the average age for each of the three groups. [Table I reveals
that there were 62 heterosexual women subjects with a mean age of 31.4 (+- 9.7)
years; 114 bisexual women with a mean age of 28.1 (+- 9.4) years; and 182
lesbian women with a mean age of 33.2 (+- 7.3) years.]
Discussion of Genetic group
In Article 1, the sample of lesbians (8) is very small, and while some demographic
data are reported (mean age, predominant social class), they are not separated out for the
samples of gay men and lesbians. A predominantly white, middle- to upper-class sample
is reported, with a wide age range. Geographic region of participants is not reported but
recruiting strategies targeted “local and national” publications (the study was conducted
in England). Limitations on applicability and vahdity based on a sample of this size
should be expected to be quite serious.
Article 2 reports a better sample size, with 147 probands, of whom 126 are lesbian
and 21 are bisexual. The age range is fairly wide, but other variables are not reported.
From the location of the recruiting advertisements it can be inferred that subjects came
from various large cities (or their surrounding areas) in the U.S. Concerns about issues of
race or ethnicity and social class with respect to the findings must be considered, as this
information is not available.
The researchers in article 3 report the most detailed information about their
sample. In terms of age, their sample is similar to that of study 2 in reflecting a wide
range of ages and a mean of about 31 years for the sample as a whole. Study 3 also
demonstrates improvement in racial representation over previous studies of sexuality (i.e.
Hamer, et a/.1993, cf Allen 1997), although races other than white are still
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underrepresented. As the sample was gathered solely in the Washington, D.C. area, it
must be considered that this sample may represent subjects from large urban areas.
Average income suggests a high representation of middle-class subjects. The size of the
sample, including the representation of all three sexual orientation categories, suggests
Article 3 is the best-tksigned of all the Genetic studies, with potentially the fewest
limitations on validity and applicability of results as imposed by the sample.
Brain/Coenition group: Articles 4 and 5
Article 4:
Only data from persons with either exclusve (sic) lifelong (since puberty)
heterosexual or exclusive lifelong homosexual histories are reported here.
Finally, attempts were made to match groups of subjects within gender for age,
educational level, and current and desired occupation (Table 1). [Table 1 reveals
that there were 15 heterosexual and 15 homosexual female subjects. The
heterosexual females had a mean age of 27.5 (± 1.1) years, with a range of 21-32
years; mean education in years was 14.9 (± 0.5), with a range of 12-18 years. The
homosexual females had a mean age of 26.7 years ( ± 1.5), with a range of 21-32
years; mean education in years was 14.9 (± 0.4) with a range of 12-19 years.]
(102-103)
Article 5:
Heterosexual men (20) and women (20) were primarily volunteer undergraduate
and graduate students solicited through university bulletin board notices and word
of mouth. Gay men (20) and lesbians (20) were solicited through bulletin board
notices posted at university homophilic organizations, electronic bulletin board
notices, a university booth at the local annual Gay Pride festival, and word of
mouth. ... Participants were not selected based on ethnicity; however, only
native-English speakers were invited to participate. The sample was primarily
Caucasian.... Subject variables are described in Table 1. [Table 1 reveals that the
lesbian subjects had a group mean SOS (Sexual Orientation Scale) score of 5.7
(SD 0.14), a mean age of 32.6 (SD 7.1), and a mean education level of 17.8 (SD
2.7). The heterosexual women had a group mean SOS score of 1.3 (SD 0.09), a
mean age of 24.5 (SD 5.4), and a mean education level of 16.4 (SD 3.1).] (94-95)
Discussion of Brain/Coenition group
Both these studies have small samples, with “15 heterosexual and 15 homosexual
female subjects” in Article 4 and 20 subjects from each of those categories in Article 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

166
Hi Article 4, demographic information (including race and class) is not reported except
for age, which revealed the sample to be predominantly young adults, and education
level, which when combined with the other information (age, matching for “desired
occupation”) suggests the sample may be primarily undergraduate students. Article 5
reports the sample to be mostly university students. Sampling from university students,
while common, brings with it certain limitations and potential limitations, which will be
discussed later in this section of the chapter.
Article 5 reports the sample to be “primarily Caucasian,” but does not give
details. In both studies, subjects are recruited locally only, which should be considered
when applying results to populations from different regions (the articles reveal the
research was conducted at North Dakota State University and the University of
Miimesota in Articles 4 and 5, respectively). Neither article studied bisexual subjects, so
results cannot be applied to bisexual populations. Perhaps the most important limitation
in both of these studies is the small sample size, which severely limits generalizability.
Neuroendocrine group: Articles 6-10
Article 6:
Subjects were recruited from the membership of a local homophile organization.
Seventy-four homosexual men and women volunteered to participate. The
criterion for inclusion in the study was that the subjects rated their sexual
experience in both behavior and imagery as primarily homosexual, defined here
by a score of 5 or 6 on the Kinsey scale (Kinsey et al., 1948) and by a clear
pattern of homosexual response on the Sexual Orientation Method questionnaire
(Sambrooks & MacCulloch, 1973). Four subjects (two male, two female) with
bisexual preference were excluded. Thus, the final sample consisted of 70
homosexuals (38 men: median age - 30 yr, min/max age 19/60 yr; 32 women:
median age = 26 yr, min/max age = 19/45 yr). (71)
Article 7:
One hundred forty-one completed, analyzable questionnaires were returned by
GLB persons (119 from those associated with PFLAG, 22 from college students).
Two hundred sixty completed, analyzable questionnaires were returned by HET
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persons (254 associated with PFLAG, 6 related to GLB college students)—
Demographic characteristics revealed that most participants were well-educated
White persons (Table 1). Of the HETs, 86.% had at least some college education,
while 93.5% of the GLBs had at least some college education. Nearly all of the
participants were White (96.5%). HETs were, not surprisingly, more likely to be
married or to have been married (95.4%) than were their GLB family members
(8.8%). Since most HETs were the parents of the GLBs, the HET group was also
older than the GLB group. Participants were represented from 30 states of diverse
geographical location: West/Pacific (22.9%); Plains/Mountains (7.5%); Midwest
(23.9%); South (17.8%); and East (27.9%). Nine of the 10 bisexual participants
were women. (706)
[Table 1 (p. 707) reveals that the heterosexual group contained 178 women
(68.5% of heterosexual group). The demographic data is not broken down by
gender. The heterosexual group had a mean age of 54.9 years (SD 10.9), with a
range of 20-84 years. The homosexual/bisexual group contained 56 women
(39.7% of homosexual/bisexual group). The mean age of the
homosexual/bisexual group was 30.0 years (SD 8.0), with a range of 17-58 years.]
Article 8:
All subjects were paid undergraduate volunteers recruited through campus
newspaper and poster advertisements. Subjects who applied to participate were
tested until samples reached the following sizes: 20 heterosexual males, 20
heterosexual females, 20 homosexual males, and 18 homosexual females. ...
Only those homosexual subjects scoring 3.5/6 or higher on the Kinsey scales
(both fantasy and experience) were included in the study (1 male and 2 females
were excluded based on this criterion).... Groups were matched for age and
program of study (5 heterosexual males and 4 homosexual females were excluded
based on these criteria). ... Table 1 contains the subjects’ (N = 94) sexual
. orientation, average Kinsey score (fantasy and experience), sex, and dextrality.
[Table 1 reveals that there were 20 heterosexual female subjects with an average
Kinsey score of 0.29 (SD 0. 30), and 12 homosexual female subjects with an
average Kinsey score of 4.13 (SD 0.61).] (397-398)
Article 9:
From 1938 to 1963,17,502 case histories were recorded by the Kinsey histitute
for Sex Research using the interview schedule devised by Alfred C. Kinsey
(Gebhard & Johnson, 1979). These data are currently stored in several files. The
files containing adult white and nonwhite females with no convictions for felonies
or misdemeanours (other than traffic violations) comprise 5,954 cases....
... 478 cases could not be classified as either heterosexual or homosexual. Of the
remaining 5,476 cases, 275 were classified as homosexual (lesbian) and 5,201
were classified as heterosexual....
The two groups were also assessed on a number of other demographic variables,
including age, year of birth, education level, and parental socioeconomic status.
... As shown in Table 1, age and year of birth differed between the two groups.
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Education also differed, but, as mentioned earlier, parental SES is a better index
than education of social class because many of the probands were still in school
when interviewed On this parental SES measure, the two groups did not differ
significantly.
(Table 1 reveals that the lesbian subjects had a mean age of 33.74 years (SD
10.01), a mean education level of 15.23 (SD 3.35), and a mean parental SES of
4.78 (SD 1.58). The heterosexual women had a mean age of 28.77 years (SD
11.05), a mean education level of 14.46 (SD 2.70), and a mean parental SES of
4.92 (SD 1.35).] (117-118) ^
Article 10*:
The average ages (and standard deviations) were 21.7 (2.4), 23.6 (5.3), 21.5 (2.1)
... for the female heterosexuals, homosexuals, and bisexuals .. .respectively.
(2710) ’
[The] overall number of subjects [was] 132, with the individual ATs being 46,24,
and 16 for the female heterosexuals, homosexuals, and bisexuals, respectively...
(2404)‘®
Discussion of Neuroendocrine eroun
hi Article 6, the lesbian sample is made up of 32 subjects of fairly young average
age. No heterosexual subjects were studied, and bisexual subjects were excluded from
participation. No other information is provided except that subjects were recruited
locally, which according to the article notes would be Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Thus
the sample size is relatively small, most demographic variables are unknown, and the
sample is geographically limited to one area.
^ The demographic measures were explained as follows: “Educational level could range
from 1 (1st grade or illiterate) to 20 (PhD, MD, LLX)). Parental socioeconomic status
(SES) refers to the financial status of the proband’s parents when she was 14 to 17 years
of age. It was coded on an eight-point scale from 1 (extreme poverty) to 8 (extreme
wealth). Parental SES is preferred to proband’s education as a measure of social class
because many of the probands were still in school (i.e., college and university) when
interviewed and their current educational level would not reflect their ultimate education
level” (117-118).
* As discussed previously, some information comes from McFadden and Pasanen, 1998.
^ Quotation and page number are from 1998 article.
10

Quotation and page number are from 1999 article.
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In contrast, the researchers in Article 7 report a great deal of demographic
information about their subjects, although most of it is not separated out by gender.
There were 47 lesbian and 9 bisexual women subjects for a total of 56 “non
heterosexual” women. Of the whole GLB sample, there was a fairly wide age range,
which was even wider for the heterosexual sample. Both groups were predominantly
white and well educated. Class information is not reported. Geographically the subjects
represented a diverse sampling of different regions of the US, with 30 states represented,
although because most subjects were obtained from chapters of Parents and Friends of
Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG), one might infer that urban areas are more highly
represented.
It is an interesting side note that Article 7 provides data on “Current relational
status,” reporting that “HETs were, not surprisingly, more likely to be married or to have
been married (95.4%) than were their GLB family members (8.8%)” (p. 706). Yet in
Table 1, it is stated that 41.2% of the GLB group reports being “Unmarried, cohabitating
with mate” (p. 707). It is not clear for what purpose the relational status data were
obtained, but describing the makeup of the GLB group in terms of married/unmarried
appears quite biased if those data are meant to encompass “relational status.”
In Article 8, the lesbian sample as analyzed consists of 12 women and the
heterosexual women sample, 20 subjects. While the Methods section initially mentions
having 20 lesbian subjects, a careful reading of the exclusions and the information in
Table I reveals that only 12 were actually studied. No other demographic information is
available other than that the subjects were undergraduate students who “were matched for
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age and program of study” with the other sample groups. Subjects were recruited locally
from the university population (University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario,
Canada). The small sample size composed entirely of undergraduate university students
suggests serious potential limitations on validity of findings and applicability to larger
populations.
Article 9 contains by far the largest sample as it utilizes case histories obtained
from a database of the Kinsey histitute. The analysis was conducted on 275 lesbian
women and 5,201 heterosexual women. Efforts were made to compare the two groups on
several demographic variables including age, education, and parental SES. Other
variable including race are not reported (except to say that the database is composed of
“white and nonwhite” women). A potential issue of limitation to consider is the cultural
effect of the time period in which the data were gathered, especially when comparing the
data to results obtained more currently. Although this analysis was published in 1998,
the case histories are reported to have been gathered from 1938-1963. Changes in
cultural attitudes toward homosexuality in the time since then make differences in
subjects’ interpretations and definitions of sexual feelings and behaviors likely.
The researchers in Article 10 reported very little information about the makeup of
their samples. Sample sizes of lesbian (N=24) and bisexual (iV=16) women were rather
small. Subjects were young, possibly resulting in part from at least one of the recruiting
methods targeting university populations. It can be presumed that subjects were all
recruited locally (Austin, Texas). No other demographic information is provided, making
it very difficult to evaluate representativeness beyond those characteristics already
mentioned.
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Discussion
What is interesting about the studies overall is at least as much what they do not
report about their samples as what they do. hi several cases, basic characteristics are
simply not reported or are reported incompletely. Table 2 contains information for each
article regarding whether demographic characteristics are reported (labeled “yes”), are
not reported (labeled “no”), or are reported to some extent, but are in some way not fully
explained (labeled incomplete). What the information in the table shows is that of the ten
articles, four reported race data, but two of those were very incomplete; nine reported age
data, with one doing so incompletely; three reported class data, with one doing so
incompletely; and five reported data regarding education levels of the sample.
Articles with incomplete reporting of race data are Article 5, which reports only
that the sample was “primarily Caucasian,” without numerical data or information about
other races, and Article 9, which reports only that subjects were “white and nonwhite.”
In Article 1, age information is described as incomplete because it is not broken down by
gender, and class data are incomplete in that it is reported only that the sample was of
“middle to higher social class,” without any numerical data or explanation of criteria.
Schutt (1996) notes that “evaluating the sample used in a study requires knowing
exactly what the elements and the population were” (153). Evaluating the adequacy of
the samples used in the studies analyzed here is hampered by not knowing what the
characteristics of lesbian and bisexual women “in general”—the population—are for
certain. If we assume that the basic demographic characteristics of lesbian and bisexual
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Table 2. Breakdown of articles’ reports of demographic information about their subjects
Race
Education
Class
Age
Article#
reported?
reported?
reported?
reported?
no
no
incomplete
incomplete
1
no
no
no
yes
2
yes
yes
yes
yes
3
no
yes
no
yes
4
incomplete
yes
no
yes
5
no
no
no
yes
6
yes
yes
no
7
yes
no
no
no
no
8
yes
yes
incomplete
9
yes
no
no
no
yes
10

women are similar to those of the population as a whole, then the samples can be
evaluated for the extent to which they are representative of the population at large. This
step is hindered by the lack of full reporting of demographic characteristics found in most
o f the articles. The characteristic most frequently reported is age (usually mean age and
age range), with 90% of the articles providing this information. Race information
(beyond the two very incomplete descriptions), in contrast, was provided by only 20% of
the studies.
The demographic data are important in particular to studies of sexual orientation
because, as noted previously in a quotation from Allen (1997), they represent social
identities that may bear upon how one comes to understand and experience highlystigmatized same-sex sexual feelings or behaviors, and the ways in which such feelings
or behaviors may (or may not) coalesce into a lesbian or bisexual “identity.” Babbie
(1996) notes that “[s]amples need not be representative in all respects; representativeness
is limited to those characteristics that are relevant to the substantive interests of the study,
though you may not know which are relevant” (192). One could argue that the limited

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

173
reporting of race, class, and to some extent, education data on the sample suggests that
the researchers do not consider those characteristics to be “relevant to the substantive
interests o f the study.” This suggests a quite limited conceptualization of how sexual
orientations develop.
Another issue for sample composition, raised previously in the “Sample
Recruitment” section of this chapter, is the widespread use of undergraduate students.
While exact counts of undergraduate subjects cannot be made, analysis of reported
recruiting measures demonstrates that 57.14% of studies containing a heterosexual
sample reported recruiting heterosexual subjects on their local campuses, and 50.0% of
the studies containing lesbian subjects recruited them on local campuses. Of socialscience research. Babbie (1996) writes:
It seems very likely that most social scientific laboratory experiments
are conducted with college undergraduates as subjects. Typically,
the experimenter asks students enrolled in his or her classes to
participate in experiments or advertises for subjects in a college
newspaper.... In relation to the norm of generalizability in science,
it is clear that this tendency represents a potential defect in social
science research. Most simply put, college undergraduates are not
typical of the public at large. (237)
Though the articles analyzed in this project are located in the realm of the natural
sciences, it can be argued that they are also social-science research. The sexual
orientations being studied, regardless of possible biological origin, are social identities
impacted by culture and by their intersections with other social identities. Thus concerns
about issues such as generalizability for this type of research are similar to the concerns
in social-science research.
Samples composed largely or exclusively of undergraduate students are likely to
over-represent specific categories of race, social class, and age relative to the general
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population. Thus these samples cannot truly be considered representative nor the results
obtained from them generalizable. PeAaps a more important concern than
generalizability with regard to undergraduate students is that of the effect of their mean
age on sexual orientation development. Allen (1997) notes that
human behaviors, including sexuality, can undergo significant
change in the course of a lifetime. A twenty-year-old and a fifryyear-old are likely to view their sexuality, including the nature of
their sexual attraction, quite differently. The fact that such changes
are often related to, or even directly influenced by, changing social
mores underscores the fluidity and variability of the human sexual
response. This fluidity means, among other things, that the age at
which someone’s sexuality is studied is critical to both interpreting
and classifying the behavior. (256)
Thus the typically young mean age in samples composed of undergraduate students may
be important for sexual orientation research in terms of an inability to consider changes
over the life course. Researchers must either note that the results obtained are primarily
reflective of people in their twenties, or risk assuming that sexual orientation is “set in
stone” from very early on. This assumption, as discussed in the previous section of this
chapter, places the research in the position of being unable to provide evidence in support
of the essential nature of sexual orientation.
The final issue to discuss is sample size. As noted earlier, there cannot be
mathematical calculation of appropriate sample size for purposes of representativeness,
because these articles are not using probability samples. That is not to say that sample
size is not important. The researchers’ determinations of whether their findings are
statistically significant are impacted by sample size. With small samples, relatively small
changes in the data obtained can sway statistical significance calculations. Also,
explanatory statistical models are affected by sample size; of behavior-genetics studies.
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McGuire (1995) notes: “Sample size is important not only for assigning standard errors to
estimates of traits (something seldom calculated) but also for determining the complexity
of the genetic model that one can test” (121). Thus the sample sizes used in the research
on lesbian and bisexual orientations in women are worth noting for generally assessing
potential validity of findings and interpretations.

Table 3. Size of sample groups for each article.
Article #
# of lesbian subjects # of bisexual
women subjects
1
8*
0*
2
126
21
3
182
114
4
15
0
5
20
0
6
32
0
7
45
9
8
12
0
9
275
0
10
24
16

# of heterosexual
women subjects
0
0
62
15
20
0
178
20
5,201
46

mention of whether that subject was a man or woman. Thus, there may have been 7
lesbians and 1 bisexual woman rather than 8 lesbians and no bisexual women, but this
cannot be determined from the article.

The sample sizes for women subjects included in the studies are listed in Table 3.
As discussed in the previous section of this chapter (on assignment to sexual orientation
categories), the numbers of subjects in each category in any given study should be
evaluated in light of potential problems with assigning those labels. For example, in
Article 9, databases from the Kinsey Institute were evaluated on the basis of criteria
implemented by the researcher to determine in which sexual orientation category to place
subjects. The limited focus of the criteria may have caused subjects to be placed in a
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category different from that which they would have chosen for themselves, and possibly
an inaccurate one.
As Table 3 shows, with the exception o f Article 3 (with 114 bisexual women),
samples of bisexual women were often excluded from analysis or else were so small as to
be extremely questionable. Results obtained for bisexual subjects, then, should be
considered very cautiously. For lesbian subjects. Article 9 had by far the largest sample,
having used a Kinsey Institute database, and two of the behavior-genetics studies
(Articles 2 and 3) had the other largest samples, with 126 and 182 respectively. The
remaining seven articles all used samples o f fewer than 50 subjects, with four of those
consisting o f 20 or fewer. While there is no “magic number,” these small sample sizes
suggest that results must be evaluated carefully. It is hard to imagine that samples so
small could produce meaningful information about lesbian women in general, particularly
given the extreme heterogeneity of the population of lesbian women. However, as will
be discussed in the section that follows, results from these studies are often interpreted as
if they are significant contributions to the body of knowledge regarding sexual
orientation, despite the limitations of sample size.
In conclusion, what is notable about the studies analyzed is that in large part,
samples tend to be relatively homogeneous in terms of demographic characteristics,
tending to be mostly white, of middle to upper-middle class, rather well-educated, and of
fairly young mean age. For many studies, however, not all these characteristics are
reported. Researchers tend to recruit frequently from university populations, despite the
nonrepresentative nature of typical undergraduates and the specific effect of young age
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on sexual orientation development issues. Sample sizes are frequently so small as to cast
serious doubt on the validity and applicability of results for lesbian and bisexual women.
The composition and size of the samples used by researchers, as well as the
interpretations they consider justifiable from their samples, provide insights into the
assumptions of researchers about the nature of sexual orientation. The fact that small,
relatively homogeneous, relatively young samples are used in sexual orientation research
suggests that researchers may consider “one ‘specimen’ [to be] essentially equal to all
others” (De Cecco and Parker 1995:10). The complexity of sexual orientation and its
intersections with other social identities should not be ignored in this research. At the
very least, researchers need to report more of the characteristics of their samples so that
they may be better evaluated. In some respects, the sample reporting in Articles 3, 7, and
9 can be possible models for other researchers regarding reporting of sample
characteristics.

Part IV: Critique of Interpretations of Data and
Conclusions Drawn
Introduction
The final element of the methodological critique in this project concerns the
researchers’ interpretations of the data and conclusions drawn about them in the 10
scientific articles on biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women.
The focus of this analysis is whether the conclusions drawn regarding biological origins
of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women are a) consistent with the limitations
imposed by the study sample, and b) interpreted in ways that are consistent with the
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evidence and not worded to appear more significant than the evidence supports. Both
these issues not only bear upon the validity of the scientific research itself, but also
provide insights into the assumptions and beliefs of the researchers and their scientific
communities.
In a field of scientific inquiry dominated by a certain paradigm of thought, as the
analysis of the explanatory frameworks of these articles suggests is this case here, it is not
only more likely that researchers may be careless in interpreting data in ways that support
their hypotheses, but also that such flawed interpretations and conclusions may be
published in scientific journals (Byne 1995; Spanier 1995a, 1995b). In addition, findings
supporting dominant or popular views about “human nature” may be more likely to be
picked up by major media outlets and achieve widespread acceptance (or at least public
awareness), even if some of the interpretations of data and conclusions drawn are flawed
(Bleier 1988b; Fausto-Sterling 1992b; Zicklin 1997).
In her critique of LeVay’s 1991 work, Spanier (1995a) points out “ways that
LeVay’s article incorporates judgments biased toward a biological-determinist
interpretation of sexual orientation and skewing his interpretations of his data” (67).
Spanier goes on to say:
LeVay simply joined other scientists in the not uncommon error
of overlooking the limitations of his research to push for an unjustified
conclusion. This case is a classic example of the search for some kind
of physical difference to account biologically for phenomena that result
from complex, multilayered sets of processes clearly influenced if not
structured by macro- and microculture. (67)
Biologically-deterministic science that attempts to account for complex human
phenomena such as sexual orientation is likely to run up against problems like
contradictions in data, data that do not clearly support the hypotheses, and severe
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limitations on how data may be interpreted and generalized. While some might argue
that these issues are indications that the research design is poorly equipped to explain
things like sexual orientation, “[f]or others, particularly those who accept the explanatory
framework of a whole field, the uncertainties are the price paid for investigating complex
or ill-understood phenomena” (Spanier 199Sa:66).
In other words, interpretations of data that are biased toward supporting the
dominant explanatory framework, despite the absence of solid, non-conflicting evidence
are not necessarily uncommon. Because such research may receive less scmtiny fiom
scientific peers (who are operating with the same explanatory paradigm), as discussed
previously, it is important for those concerned about the impact and ramifications of such
research to be able to challenge such scientific interpretations and conclusions. For
feminists and others concerned about biological determinism in explanations of gender
and sexuality, this means evaluating original scientific research to understand its findings,
claims, and limitations (Fausto-Sterling 1992a; Spanier 1995a).
My decision to analyze the articles’ interpretations and conclusions is informed
and inspired by the work of feminist biologists such as Ruth Bleier (1984,1988b), Anne
Fausto-Sterling (1992b, 2000), and Bonnie Spanier (1995a, 1995b). These scholars have
applied their scientific knowledge to evaluating the validity o f scientific claims in light of
actual findings and limitations imposed by their samples and experimental design. Also,
however, the decision to conduct the analysis, as well as its emphases, arise inductively
from initial readings of the texts. These initial readings suggested specific areas of
analysis in the interpretations and conclusions that I would likely not have thought of
outside of the context of reading the articles themselves.
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My analysis focuses on two issues, both of which have this inductive origin: first,
an examination of whether and in what ways the sample limitations are considered in the
interpretations and conclusions drawn from the data; and second, examination of Wiether
and in what ways presentations and interpretations of findings occur in ways that are
inconsistent with the available evidence—either the actual data obtained in the study
itself or evidence cited from other studies. Both the prior critiques conducted by feminist
scientists and my initial readings of the articles in my sample suggested to me that
analyzing for these two issues might provide insights into not only the validity of the
claims made in these articles but also the assumptions made by the researchers.
The first aspect of the analysis focuses on whether the limitations of the research
samples, discussed in the previous section of this chapter, are taken into consideration
when conclusions about the findings are being drawn. While using samples obtained
non-randomly is accepted practice for difficult-to-reach populations in particular,
researchers should be cautious in their interpretations of results obtained and in
generalizing from non-random samples (Babbie 1996). Results obtained from samples
that are small or that have characteristics that make them in some meaningful aspects
unlike the larger populations they are meant to represent cannot be assumed to be valid
for any group beyond the actual sample itself. Such results should not be used to
generalize research findings to the larger populations from which the samples were drawn
or to other populations. (Schutt 1996) Of behavior genetics studies of sexual orientation,
McGuire (1995) writes: “If a representative sample is not available, the behavior-genetic
researcher must attempt to assess the effects of non-random recruitment and report how
they limit the generalizability o f results” (121). In this section of the methodological
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critique, I examine v^ether the researchers considered the limitations of their samples in
interpreting results and drawing conclusions. The method for this analysis will be
discussed shortly.
The second aspect of this analysis focuses on whether the discussion and
interpretations of findings are consistent with the data that inform them. As Spanier
(1995a) explains:
Data can also be manipulated improperly and misrepresented. For
example, the effects of increasing dosages of a drug may be presented
numerically but not displayed on a graph, when graphing would show
a dose-response curve inconsistent with a study’s conclusions. In this
and other ways, the conclusions stated about the data can be wrong or
limited in ways not addressed by the author. Ofien the conclusions
summarized in the abstract are simplified or overstated and are not
supported by data buried in tables and diagrams. (60)
Fausto-Sterling (1992b) provides many examples of how scientists’ presentations
of data can be manipulated in ways that go beyond actual findings. For example, o f one
study of the relations among sex differences, IQ, and brain size, she notes:
They found a barely significant correlation between high IQ and
greater brain size but no significant sex differences. They do not
actually show most of their data, preferring to give their statistical
results and conclusions, so it is hard to second guess their analysis.
(1992b:227-228)
Aside from presenting data in ways that obscure actual findings, researchers may simply
make claims that their data do not support. Of a study of sex differences in the splenium
(a portion of the corpus callosum), Fausto-Sterling asserts that “they claimed there is a
sex difference in splenial surface area, but their own calculations showed it to be
statistically insignificant” (1992b:232). Awareness of such misrepresentations is clearly
o f great importance to evaluating the validity of scientific claims.
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Similarly, Spanier (1995b) notes that researchers may word interpretations in
ways that, while not making overtly false claims, are misleading with regard to actual
results. She notes the example of a summary statement in an article published in Science
that states that a role of prenatal hormones in sexual orientation and in sex differences in
cognition “has not been conclusively demonstrated,” which, according to Spanier,
“implies that a hormonal role in sexual orientation or cognition has been demonstrated,
but not conclusively, when it has not been demonstrated at alF (74, emphasis in
original). This type of wording allows for interpretations of results that go beyond actual
evidence and misleads readers into accepting the researchers’ poorly-supported
interpretations.
Also, in interpreting what their data might mean, researchers’ commitments to
their explanatory frameworks may blind them to the inconsistencies in their data or how
they fit with data from other studies. Spanier critiques LeVay for “selective use of data,”
pointing out that LeVay asserts his findings to be consistent with the work of Allen and
Gorski (1990), when in fact some of his data are discrepant with that previous study
(1995a). She also notes that in hypothesizing the links between the parts of the brain he
studied and sexual orientation, LeVay cites empirical findings that support his assertions,
but ignores studies that contradict them.
Such omissions suggest that researchers may make their findings appear more
significant than they actually are. Again, it is only by being aware that such
inconsistencies exist that one can make a fully-informed assessment of a study’s actual
contributions to the body of knowledge. In addition, as discussed previously,
researchers’ apparent blindness to inconsistencies between their data and their claims and
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interpretations, as well as the fact that studies with these flaws are published in scientific
journals, points to how “cultural values and beliefs that shape the predominating
explanatory fiameworks in science hold sway over scientific evidence” (Spanier
1995a:56).
To analyze the researchers’ interpretations, I compare the discussion and
interpretation of research findings with the actual reported data, where possible, to
determine if they are consistent. I also examine researchers’ use of other studies’
findings as evidentiary support, as suggested by the work of Spanier (1995a, 1995b). The
procedure for this analysis will be discussed shortly.
It should be noted that this section of the analysis will necessarily be much more
limited than the previous analyses that have informed it. The most thorough feminist
analyses o f interpretations and conclusions in scientific research studies have typically
been done by those working in the natural sciences, such as Bleier (1984,1988b), FaustoSterling (1992b, 2000), and Spanier (1995a, 1995b). Not only is my own scientific
training limited relative to these scholars, but the scope of my project covers several
different scientific fields and sub-fields, a detailed knowledge of all of which would not
be possible. In acknowledging my own limitations, I aim to construct an analysis that is
strong within its boundaries. This strength, I assert, comes fi’om conducting a consistent,
systematic analysis across all articles in the sample, and being accurate in my description
and examination of the elements in my analysis.
Method
My analysis of the articles’ interpretations and conclusions is composed of two
elements. First is the examination of the researchers’ own assessments of the impact of
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sample limitations when interpreting their data and drawing conclusions. This analysis is
initiated by locating the portions of the article in which the researchers interpret their data
and draw conclusions from them, typically the “Discussion” section. These portions of
the article are read for any mention, direct or indirect, of the impact of the study sample’s
limitations on the interpretations and conclusions of the research. Where such mention is
located, the statements are selected out and quoted below.
Such mention, or lack thereof, is then assessed for the extent to which all three
forms of sample limitation discussed in previous sections of this chapter —recruitment of
subjects, assignment to sexual orientation categories, and composition—are given
consideration by the researchers in interpreting their results and drawing conclusions.
The assessment of researchers’ consideration of sample limitations is then interpreted for
its effect on the evaluation of the validity of the interpretations and conclusions. In
addition, I discuss insights gleaned about researchers’ assumptions and beliefs regarding
sexual orientation fi’om the way in which sample limitations are handled in the
interpretations and conclusions.
The second element of this portion of my analysis is an examination of whether
the research findings are interpreted and conclusions drawn in ways that are consistent
with the data reported in the “Results” section, and with the other evidence cited. The
“Discussion” section of each article is read for claims made regarding findings, and those
claims are compared with the data presented in the “Results” section. Following the
examples set in work by Bleier (1984, 1988b), Fausto-Sterling (1992b, 2000), and
Spanier (1995a, 1995b), for example, as well as informed by my initial readings of the
articles, the interpretations and conclusions are then evaluated for the following issues: 1)
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interpretations based on statistically non-significant data as if they were significant, or
based on supporting data wliile ignoring contradictory findings; and 2) interpretations and
conclusions drawn that st%gest greater support from other studies than is warranted, often
through the use of vague or misleading language (Bleier 1984; Spanier 1995a, 1995b).
The results of reading for these two issues are presented below and assessed for
how they impact the evaluation o f the scientific validity of the study. In addition, I
discuss possible interpretations o f wiiat the presence of these forms of selective
interpretations of data may suggest about researchers’ assumptions and beliefs about their
topic of study.
Results: Analvsis of Researchers’ Acknowledgment
of Sample Limitations
Genetic group: Article 1.2. and 3
In study I, the two following statements are reported regarding limitations:
“There are important limitations to the study, however, since this was a self-selected
group examined by postal questionnaire and no confirmatory information was sought
from their co-twins;” and “This result occurred despite possible biases towards
concordance, such as homosexual probands exaggerating the chances that their twin
might also be homosexual, or those having a homosexual co-twin finding the research
more salient.” Thus ascertainment bias regarding the self-selection of the participants is
acknowledged, as is the issue o f how the co-twins’ sexual orientations were categorized.
Potential problems with the sexual orientation categorization of the participants
themselves are not addressed, nor are issues regarding the composition of the sample.
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Researchers in study 2 included an entire subsection on potential ascertainment
bias in their study in their concluding section (called “Comment”)- The following issues
are noted:
The primary threat to the validity of the central finding, that genetic factors may
play a role in the origin of female sexual orientation, is ascertainment bias.
Because probands were not obtained through systematic sampling, and
particularly given the evidently low probability o f ascertainment, it is possible
that patterns of volunteering yielded misleading results
Twin probands in the
present study were aware o f its focus on twins and, hence, might be expected to
consider their co-twins’ sexual orientation in deciding whether to participate....
One kind of ascertainment bias evident in our study was the overrepresentation of
MZ probands, who constituted approximately two thirds of our sample....
Another kind of ascertainment bias that occurred in the present study concerns the
fact that probands were recruited via advertisements in homophile publications.
(221)
In addition a later subsection on “Implications for the Causes of Sexual
Orientation” restates the concern:
Given the serious méthodologie concerns, particularly that of ascertainment bias,
the inconsistency of some past research, and the small number of related studies,
we urge that our results be evaluated cautiously. Although our results are highly
suggestive of nonzero heritability, they are not conclusive. (222)
Regarding the issue of twins self-selecting for concordance, the researchers
conducted analyses to test for “concordance-dependent bias,” and determined that it “was
not large” (221 ). However, the high rate of compliance of subjects granting permission
to contact their sisters (91.9% of living relatives), as well as the relatively high
questionnaire return rate from subjects’ sisters (89.7% o f questionnaires mailed), suggests
the probability of some self-selection on the basis of sibling relationship, although this in
itself may not be related to concordance. The other two ascertainment biases, those of
the high percentage of MZ probands and the process of recruiting through LGB
publications, are of unknown implication. Neither issue necessarily produces error, but
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in all likelihood probably reflects certain characteristics about the subjects in relation to
sexual orientation that differentiate them in some way from the lesbian population at
large. For both issues, the researchers suggest that it would be desirable for future studies
to find ways to reduce these forms of ascertainment bias. Thus for study 2, issues of
recruitment o f participants are well addressed in the discussion of interpretations and
conclusions. Issues of categorization of sexual orientation and sample composition are
not discussed.
In study 3, as in study 2, the researchers include a discussion of ascertainment
bias issues in their concluding section. They note:
Ascertainment is a particular problem when studying marginalized and secretive
populations such as lesbians or bisexuals, making it virtually impossible to obtain
a truly random sample. Thus, the data reported in this analysis do not necessarily
apply to all lesbian or bisexual women, but only to the particular cohort that we
studied. (416)
They also mention the problem of “ascertainment of heterosexual samples,” stating that it
can be expected that a number of heterosexual women volunteering for a study of sexual
orientation will “have some degree of same-sex orientation” (416). The researchers do
not directly address limitations of sexual orientation categorization, although it is
indirectly addressed in the discussion of the “stability of sexual orientation” component
of the study, in which subjects were recontacted 12-18 months after the initial study.
Researchers interpreted this data as demonstrating tentatively that there tends not to be
change in orientation between heterosexual and nonheterosexual identities, but that there
is some fluidity between bisexual and lesbian self-identifications. Issues of sample
composition are not addressed.
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Brain/Cognition group: Articles 4 and 5
In Article 4 the only issue related to the sample recruitment discussed is raised in
reference to the study’s failure replicate past findings of large differences between
heterosexual men and women on the “water jar test” and on the Everyday Spatial
Activities Test (ESAT). The authors state:
Hence, it is likely that some aspect of the procedures used to recruit subjects in
the present study (matching of vocational interest) resulted in the selection of
groups of heterosexual men and women that did not differ in their exposure to
‘real-world’ spatial activities or in their performance on the water jar task. (107)
This is relevant to the interpretation of the findings for lesbian subjects in that without a
finding of sex differences, the basis for labeling lesbians’ performance as being more like
that of heterosexual men and less like that of heterosexual women is absent. To this
point, the researchers note that “[ijnterpretation of the results of the water jar test is
complicated by our failure to observe a significant sex difference among heterosexuals”
(106). (The interpretations will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this
study.) Thus the selection of subjects is addressed in one aspect, but not in such a way
that acknowledges any limitations. Sexual orientation categorization and sample
composition are not addressed.
Similarly, in Article 5 the only sample-related issue noted is the failure to control
for menstrual cycle differences that may have caused the lack of findings of difference
between heterosexual and lesbian women. The researcher states:
Given that menstrual cycle was not controlled in the current study, it is possible
that differences between the female groups in menstrual-cycle phase may have
confounded the detection of group differences in the neuropsychologic tests.
Subsequent studies should collect menstrual phase data to safeguard against this
potential confound. (105)
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While it relates to the sample selection, this is really more of methodological issue, and
doesn’t address other important limitations of the sample.
Neuroendocrine Group: Articles 6-10
In study 6, no issues related to limitations of the sample are discussed in the
interpretations of the results. In contrast, in article 7 several potential sample-related
limitations are reported. The researcher notes the following:
The present study has several shortcomings. First, while larger than samples in
many previous reports ... the sample size in this study was small (N= 401).
Second, the sample - predominently (sic) White of mixed northern European
heritage, well-educated, voluntary, and whose familial homosexuality had been
disclosed to immediate family members - does not represent the true diversity of
populations of heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals in the United States.
Third, it is not known to what extent, if any, participants in this study were
forcibly “switched” as children into becoming right-handed.... Fourth, while
twins and persons who reported prior head injury (factors known to be associated
with nonright-handedness) were excluded from data analysis, this information
was not available from all participants.... Fifth, only a small number of bisexual
individuals participated (viz., nine females and one male). Therefore, until more
complete data are obtained, definitive conclusions about handedness distribution
and sexual orientation caimot be made.
Keeping the methodological shortcomings in mind, the findings suggest a
reduction of right shift in gay and lesbian populations. (710)
Thus the researcher notes recruitment issues (ascertainment bias) when he
mentions that the sample is comprised of those who volunteered and hav e disclosed their
sexual orientation to their families. Also acknowledged are some of the limitations of the
composition of the sample, including the size, lack of racial and educational-level
diversity, and the small number of bisexuals. Issues of the categorization of sexual
orientation, however, are not mentioned.
Unlike study 7, in study 8 the researchers do not acknowledge any sample-related
limitations with the exception o f a brief reference to the small sample size in the
discussion of the results of lesbians’ performance: “To our knowledge, this is the first

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190
evidence suggesting that lesbians may have a more male-typical ability for a spaciomotor
task, which in our small sample is not at the expense of female-typical superiority on
another fine motor task” (404).
In article 9, the opposite is noted: twice in the concluding section the researcher
notes the large size of his sample (the Kinsey Institute case histories). He writes: “In one
of the largest samples o f its kind in the world, lesbians were found to report being heavier
and taller than comparable heterosexual women” (118), and:
Given the size and resulting power inherent in the present sample, and the fact
that another study with adequate power (Bell et al., 1981) indicates no significant
difference between lesbian and heterosexual women on age of puberty measures
(e.g. age at menarche), it may not be premature to suggest that lesbians and
heterosexual women do not differ in age o f puberty onset. (119)
It may be pointed out, however, that the statistical power resulting from the very
large sample size (5,476) is primarily due to the number of heterosexual women (5,201)
and not the lesbian sample o f275 subjects. No other sample-related issues are discussed.
Likewise, no possible limitations of the sample are discussed in article 10.
Discussion
This analysis suggests that in the scientific articles studied, results are often
interpreted and conclusions drawn with very little consideration of the potential impact of
limitations caused by the sample recruitment, the categorization of sexual orientation in
study subjects, and the composition of sample in terms of factors that affect
representativeness. Specifically, five of the ten studies (Articles 4,5,6, 9, and 10) have
no real mention of any o f these sample-related potential limitations in the interpretations
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and drawing of conclusions regarding their results." Another study (Article 8) has an
extremely brief mention (“our small sample”) of the fact that only 12 lesbians were
analyzed.
Four of the studies (Articles 1,2, 3, and 7) discuss issues related to the selection
of subjects. Of these, only one (Article 3) specifically states that because of
ascertainment bias, the findings should not be considered generalizable beyond the actual
study group. In terms of article groups, it is interesting to note that all three of the
genetic-influence articles (1,2, and 3) discuss (or at least mention, in the case of Article
I) the potential influence of ascertaimnent bias on the interpretation of results,
comprising three of the four studies to do so at all in the sample. This apparent greater
awareness and willingness to acknowledge possible effects may be because ascertainment
bias is more of a problem for genetic influence studies than for other types of studies
(Allen 1997). Still, bias in the selection of subjects is present in other studies and the
reporting of it in the genetic research could represent a model for others. One
neuroendocrinological study (Article 7) also reports some ascertainment issues and is the
only non-genetic study to do so.
In addition. Article 7 was the only one of all 10 to address the potential limitations
of the sample composition - its non-representativeness in terms of race, education level,
and number of bisexuals. Many studies do not even report these demographic variables,
suggesting that they do not consider them of importance (as discussed in the previous
section). Representative samples in sexuality studies are important, need to be reported
' ' One of those (Article 4) mentioned an issue related to “procedures used to recruit
subjects” that was not a limiting factor; another (Article 5) mentioned the methodological
issue of the lack of menstrual-phase control among the female subjects. Neither issue
relates to the discussion in the current study.
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and where necessary, acknowledged as a potential cause of non-generalizability. Article
7 demonstrates that this can be done within the context of a scientific article.
Last, none of the studies directly addresses the issue of limitations in the way
subjects’ sexual orientations were categorized in the research. Article 1 mentions the
potential for error caused by accepting subjects’ questionnaire responses regarding their
co-twins’ sexual orientations without obtaining confirming information, but does not
address the subjects’ own sexual orientations. Study 3 indirectly addresses the issue of
changing sexual orientation self-categorizations over the life course by conducting
follow-up interviews with approximately half the original subjects 12-18 months after the
original study, concluding that the subjects’ sexual orientations were “quite stable” (411).
Yet as the researchers themselves point out, “reassessment 12-18 months after the initial
interview can hardly be considered a longitudinal study” (416).
The ways in which subjects’ sexual orientations are ascertained and categorized
create important questions of any findings and interpretations, as discussed in the
previous section of this chapter, so it is necessary for the researchers to address these
issues in a more substantial way. The limited way in which this is done in these studies
may be indicative of the assumption that sampling limitations do not affect the
“phenotype” under study.
Results: Analvsis of Inconsistencv and Selectivitv
in Interpretations and Conclusions
Genetic Group: Articles 1.2. and 3
In Article 1,38 gay men and 8 lesbians who had a twin were studied for
concordance of sexual orientation in twin pairs. The researchers report:
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To our knowledge, this group of homosexual men and women who are members
of twin pairs is the largest reported to date. There are important limitations to the
study, however, since this was a self-selected group examined by postal
questionnaire and no confirmatory information was sought from their co-twins.
Nevertheless, there are two principal findings. First, the discordance for sexual
orientation in both monozygotic and dizygotic pairs is striking and confirms that
genetic factors are insufficient explanation of the development of sexual
orientation. This result occurred despite possible biases towards concordance,
such as homosexual probands exaggerating the chances that their twin might also
be homosexual, or those having a homosexual co-twin finding the research more
salient....
How do these findings inform future research into the origins of sexual
orientation? It is clear that our current genetic and psychological theories are
untenable. The co-twins of men and women who identify themselves as
homosexual appear to have a potential for a range of sexual expression. (409)
What is most noticeable in this article is the failure to discuss interpretations relative to
men and women distinctly. In fact, in this article, the data are not reported separately, so
interpretations cannot even be made separately post hoc. There is no way to know if the
data for the female subjects support the researchers’ interpretations. However, given that
only eight of the subjects are women, strong statements about findings such as those in
the passage just quoted are as yet unwarranted.
In study 2, no evidence of inconsistency is noted using the criteria discussed.
Researchers suggested caution in interpreting their results. For example, they wrote;
Given the serious méthodologie concerns, particularly that of ascertainment bias,
the inconsistency of some past research, and the small number of related studies,
we urge that our results be evaluated cautiously. Although our results are highly
suggestive of nonzero heritability, they are not conclusive. This caveat applies
even more strongly to the parameter estimates, which are strongly dependent on
assumptions of unknown validity. Our results should be considered the first word
on this subject, rather than the last. We hope this study will inspire further, more
definitive studies in the area. (222)

The second of the study’s two findings is omitted here because it does not relate to
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women.
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Thus these researchers demonstrate the type of situatedness in terms o f assumptions that
has been suggested by feminist science scholars.
In article 3, no evidence of inconsistency is noted. The researchers point out that
their findings, because of ascertainment bias, “do not necessarily apply to all lesbian or
bisexual women, but only to the particular cohort that we studied" (416). Their
interpretation on the main issue examined is that “clear evidence o f a familial component
to female sexual orientation was obtained in our sample,” and they are careful not to
overstate the genetic possibility for this familial component: “Despite the evidence for
familial clustering of female sexual orientation, the source of this aggregation remains
enigmatic”(4l7).
Brain/Cognition Group: Articles 4 and 5
In Article 4, the researchers report the following: “The present comparison of
visuospatial performance among heterosexual and homosexual men and women reveals a
significant relationship between sexual orientation and spatial ability, although the
relationship is subtle and appears more prominent in men than women” (105). This
interpretation could be read as suggesting more to the findings than actually existed. By
making a interpretation ostensibly regarding “[t]he present comparison of visuospatial
performance,” it suggests all or at least some of the tests demonstrated a significant
findings. In actuality, for the lesbian group only one (the water jar test) of the four tests
conducted showed a statistically significant difference in performance fi^om heterosexual
women, and even there, the finding of difference was only for one o f the two
measurement criteria. While the researchers do state that the “relationship is subtle,”
they also imply that the very limited findings of difference in women may not be
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reflective of reality by saying that the relationship ‘^appears more prominent in men than
women” (emphasis added). This tentativeness is made more noticeable when compared
to the relatively ^parent certainty one clause earlier (“reveals a significant relationship
between sexual orientation and spatial ability”). The importance of this kind of
construction of a “tone” through language will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
In addition the researchers go on to interpret statistically nonsignificant results as
possible evidence that lesbians are “more female-like” than heterosexual women:
Furthermore, and contrary to an expectation that that homosexual women would
show ‘male-like’ performances, the scores of these women were either no
different or poorer than those of their heterosexual peers. This was also evident
on the self-report ESAT and geographical knowledge measures, where
homosexual women indicated less spatial ability, although the
differences were not statistically sigiificant. (106)
The researchers use the statistically nonsignificant data fi’om the latter two measures
(self-report ESAT and geographical knowledge) to bolster results from an earlier measure
that demonstrated results “poorer than those of their heterosexual peers” on one of two
measurement criteria by stating the poorer performance is “also evident” (emphasis
added) using the statistically nonsignificant data. By combining results in this way, both
are made to appear more meaningful than is warranted.
This suggestion of meaningfiilness is made use of when the researchers go on to
interpret these results as suggesting that “quite possibly, in terms of cognitive ability (the
present study) and aggressive behavioral characteristics (Gladue, unpublished
observations), lesbian women may represent the more “female” region of such
masculine-feminine continua” (106). In this quotation, the suggestion of meaningful
results from the current study is added to results from “unpublished observations” to
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draw a conclusion based on a combination of conflicting, nonsignificant, and unknown
(to readers) data.
In article 5, two statements of interpretation o f the findings relative to lesbian
subjects may reflect some inconsistency. First, the researcher reports the following:
“Over all the tests, gay men primarily scored in a female-direction compared to HT men
and lesbians scored in a male-direction compared to HT women. Though these trends are
not all significant, the consistency by which they occurred is noteworthy” (103). A
reading of the results reveals no measure on which lesbians performed in a manner
statistically significantly different from heterosexual women. By making an
interpretative statement that effectively combines the results from gay men and lesbians,
the researcher can state that “these trends are not all significant,” when in fact the only
statistically significant trends relevant to sexual orientation were for men. In addition,
the assertion of the “noteworthiness” of results that did not achieve statistical significance
because of their “consistency” could be considered misleading, as it is suggestive of the
potential importance of nonsignificant data.
The second possibly misleading statement regarding the lesbian subjects’
performance in Article 5 is the following: “Sex atypicality in lesbians’ performance was
much less pervasive than that seen in gay men. A nonsignificant trend towards maletypical performance was revealed in measures of MR ability. ” (104). In the first sentence
the assertion that “sex atypicality ... was much less pervasive than that seen in gay men”
(emphasis added) suggests that it was present, and possibly even pervasive, just less
pervasive than the results from the gay men, when in fact there were no statistically
significant “sex atypical” results. The second sentence notes this nonsignificance, yet
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still implies importance through tone by reporting the “nonsignificant trend” as having
been “revealed.”
Neuroendocrine Group: Articles 6-10
In study 6, one issue of inconsistency is noted. In the discussion, the researchers
report the following: “The results for women were as predicted: Homosexuals showed a
higher prevalence of left-hand preference than did the normative sample” (72). Statistical
significance is implied. However, in the reporting of the results, the following is
reported:
The proportion of homosexual women who showed non-CRH (22/32,69%) was
significantly greater than that of the general population (35%) (z = 3.55, p =
0.0005, two-tailed). If the most common definition of hand preference was
considered - hand used for writing - the female homosexuals showed only a trend
toward greater left-hand preference (6/32,19%) than in the general population
(10%) (z = 1.71, p = 0.09, two-tailed). (72)
Two slightly different terms are in use here: that of “non-CRH” (non-consistently righthanded), defined by “left-hand preference for at least one of the 12 tasks [evaluated],
regardless of hand used for writing”; and “left-hand preference”, which the researchers
state is most commonly defined by the writing hand. In the results, the researchers note
that only non-CRH was statistically significant; left-hand preference in writing hand
demonstrated only a nonsignificant trend. Yet the interpretative statement asserts that
lesbians “showed a higher prevalence of left-hand preference,” not “non-CRH.” This
could be read as an inconsistency, by interpreting findings based on data that were not
statistically significant, or as misleading, by substituting “left-hand preference” for “nonCRH.”
In article 7, no evidence of inconsistency in interpretation is noted using the
criteria for this study. In study 8, however, there are three related interpretative
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statements of interest First is the following: “Men and women also demonstrated a
sexual orientation-dependent difference; gay males threw less accurately and lesbians
tended to throw more accurately than their heterosexual counterparts” (403). The
researcher reports that lesbians “tended to throw more accurately” rather than (in the case
o f gay men ) “threw less accurately” (emphasis added) because the difference for
lesbians did not actually achieve statistical significance. Rather, it was a nonstatistically-significant trend. While it could be argued that in this difference of wording
the researchers are acknowledging that the difference is only a nonsignificant trend, in
later interpretative statements no such acknowledgment can be found; interpretation
continues on as if the difference were in fact significant. It should be noted at this point
that on the other of the two tests (a fine motor task), lesbians demonstrated no measurable
difference from heterosexual women at all. The next discussion of lesbians’ performance
states the following:
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence suggesting that lesbians may have a
more male-typical ability for a spaciomotor task, which in our small sample is not
at the expense of female-typical superiority on another fine motor task. Thus, the
motor task performance of lesbians does not seem to parallel that of heterosexual
men. Rather, like gay males, it appears to be a composite of some male-typical
and some female-typical abilities. (404)
At issue here is the labeling of lesbians’ performance on the throwing-accuracy
task as “male-typical.” A reading of the results section shows that lesbians’ performance
was in fact not statistically significantly different fi-om that of heterosexual men;
however, it also was not statistically significantly different from that of heterosexual
women: “Lesbians did not differ significantly from heterosexual men, and moreover,
trends appeared for lesbians to outperform both heterosexual women, r(30) = \.96,p <
0.06, and gay men, /(44) = 1.77, p < 0.09” (400, emphasis added). Therefore it is no
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more accurate to call the lesbian subjects’ performance “male-typical” than to call it
“female-typical” regarding the comparison to heterosexual men and heterosexual women.
In addition, the question is necessarily raised about the definition of “male-typical,” when
half the men—the gay men—averaged a worse performance than those of the lesbians.
Clearly “male-typical” in actuality means “heterosexual-male-typical,” althoi%h it is not
stated as such. The use of these types of analogies will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 5.
In the first sentence of the passage just quoted it is interesting to note the
placement of the phrase “in our small sample.” Its location introduces and sets the tone
for the clause regarding the test that showed no differences between lesbians and
heterosexual women, rather than the one that showed the trend toward such differences.
By this placement, the results showing no differences appear to be qualified or even
questionable because of the “small sample” (12 lesbian subjects), but the findings of
some differences do not appear to be qualified in the same way. Again, Chapter 5 will
discuss these language-use issues further.
The third interpretative statement concerning lesbians’ performance is the
following: “Homosexual women show enhanced extrapersonal motor performance that is
not at the expense o f intrapersonal motor skill...” (405). In this re-stating and
interpreting of the same findings noted above, what is noticeable is the lack of any
mention of the limiting factors that have at least been mentioned briefly before: the
statistical nonsignificance of the results, and the small sample size. Having set the stage
by minimizing the importance of those limiting factors in previous statements, the
researchers now draw this conclusion as if the two issues discussed were of no matter.
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While it may at first seem unimportant to point out when researchers are overstating their
results by using language in a way that subtly minimizes contradictions, in this example,
the end result - the drawing of conclusions based on a complete ignoring o f serious
limitations —demonstrates the importance of this type o f critique.
In Article 9, there are three potential issues of inconsistency present. The
following is reported:
In one of the largest samples of its kind in the world, lesbians were found to
report being heavier and taller than comparable heterosexual women. No
difference in onset of puberty was observed. Although previous studies are few in
number, and some lacked appropriate controls and/or had samples that were
relatively small, the height and weight differences have been found before. Thus,
some degree of generality should be attributed to these findings. These results,
then, add to a small body o f research indicating that homosexual women may
score in the male-typical direction on some sex-dimorphic somatic and cognitive
characteristics (e.g. Hall & Kimura, 1995; McCormick et al., 1990; Holtzen,
1994). (118)
The first issue of interpretation inconsistency that is never mentioned in the
discussion is that the subjects’ weights were recorded only in 10 lb. increments
(mentioned in Method section). The lesbians averaged a score of 13.16 and the
heterosexual women 12.57, where 12 = 120-129 lbs. and 13 = 130-139 lbs. There is no
way to tell firom the data where in those ranges the women’s weight actually fell
(assuming they were honest in their self-reporting of weight). For example, 129 lbs.
would be a score of 12, while 130 lbs. would be a 13. Thus the difference in weight
between lesbians and heterosexual women, already small, could in fact be practically
non-existent. The researcher does not raise this issue at all.
The second issue concerns the sentences in the passage quoted above in which the
researcher makes two claims that could be read as fimctioning to make the results of this
study seem more important than they may actually be. First, the importance of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

201
cuirent results is asserted due to their concordance with past, similar findings, despite the
note that there were important limitations to those past findings (“some lacked
appropriate controls and/or had samples that were relatively small”)- This serves to boost
the apparent significance of the current work (“some degree of generality should be
attributed to these findings”) by suggesting that it replicates similar findings. It could be
considered misleading to propose that several potentially flawed studies together produce
a body o f important knowledge. Second is the claim that the current results “add to a
small body o f research indicating that homosexual women may score in the male-typical
direction on some sex-dimorphic somatic and cognitive characteristics,” which makes a
facile connection between findings that are not necessarily related (“somatic and
cognitive characteristics”). Without any cognitive data, the results of this study do
nothing to add to results from cognitive studies, yet by lumping them together, not only
this work, but also the “small body of research,” is made to appear more significant.
The final issue in Article 9 concerns the researcher’s efforts in the interpretations
to offer alternative explanations to the conclusion of biological differences between
lesbians and heterosexual women by suggesting potential psychosocial explanations for
why taller height might result in lesbianism. He suggests two main possibilities: that
girls who are bigger might be less attractive to men, and that bigger girls might be more
apt to play sports, both potentially resulting in the development of same-sex attractions.
While critiquing these theories is beyond the scope of this discussion, it should be noted
that the height difference found in the sample was an average of 0.35 inches (averages:
lesbians = 64.62 inches, heterosexual women = 64.27 inches); and weight, while not
accurately ascertainable (as discussed previously), scored a 0.59 difference on a scale in
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10-lb. increments, suggesting that at most the average difference was 5.9 lbs. For the
differences to be so small, the lesbian and heterosexual women’s heights and weights
must have been largely overlapping. Thus, the interpretations o f how the differences in
height and weight might lead to a lesbian orientation could be considered inconsistent
with the actual data.
In Article 10, the no evidence of inconsistency is noted in the interpretations of
the data obtained in the study. However, the interpretations and conclusions go on to
assert mechanisms that might explain the results obtained. These interpretations suggest
the support of other evidence that is not warranted. The authors state that the “logic of
the argument is as follows:”
(1) For mammals, it is commonly believed that the default phenotype is female,
and the production of a male fetus requires exposure to high levels of androgens
during the second trimester of prenatal development (cf. Fitch et al., 1998).
(2) Among the many masculinizing effects of androgens on the body, brain, and
behavior of a male fetus is a change in the choice of sexual partner from the
default choice of male to that of female. The fact that homosexual females also
prefer females as sexual partners is in accord with the idea that some brain site(s)
responsible for sexual preference have been masculinized at some point in
development, perhaps prenatally. (2411)
At issue is part (2) o f this argument, which builds from part (1) as if there were an
unquestioned linkage, when in fact there is none. Part (1) is stated with a small degree of
tentativeness (“it is commonly believed”), and contains a citation for evidence to support
the assertion. In contrast, part (2) is stated with no such tentativeness (“[a]mong the
many masculinizing effects ... is a change in the choice of sexual partner”) and suggests
the support of the study cited immediately prior, when in fact there is no such evidence.
The construction of this set of interpretations could be considered a misleading use of
prior data.
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In addition, in the last sentence quoted above, the assertion is made that the
evidence fits the model that “some brain site(s) responsible for sexual preference have
been masculinized,” which combines two distinct unknowns; that there are sites in the
brain that control sexual preference/orientation, and that masculinization can cause
lesbian orientation. While the lack of evidence could be considered to be acknowledged
in the tentativeness o f “some brain site(s/’ (emphasis added), as noted in the previous
example, this tentativeness does not carry over into subsequent statements. The
researchers go on (in part 3 of the argument) to say:
Accordingly, the existence of OAEs that are displaced in the male direction in
homosexual and bisexual females suggests that the same processes that
masculinized whatever brain centers are responsible for sexual preference also
partially masculinized the cochleas of the nonheterosexual females. (2411-2412)
Thus despite not having evidence for “brain centers” in women that are
“responsible for sexual preference,” the researchers claim these centers exist, but that
what they are (e.g., “whatever brain centers”) has simply not yet been discovered. In
addition, in this argument, those centers have been masculinized in lesbians, and
somehow during that process, their cochleas were “partially masculinized” as well. The
area of research focus (that which is unknown and being studied) has been turned back to
the subjects’ cochleas, placing the other information (that masculinization causes lesbian
orientation, and that there are brain sites that determine sexual orientation) in the realm of
groundwork for the hypotheses regarding OAEs, as if those things are actually already
known or can simply be assumed to be true. Such suggestions of other evidence that
supports the researchers’ interpretations, when the “evidence” is actually only
speculation, are misleading.
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Discussion
These findings suggest that in the scientific study of biological origins of lesbian
and bisexual orientations in women, there are many cases of interpretations and
conclusions being constructed in ways that draw on selective or misleading uses of
evidence. In all but three o f the articles analyzed, examples are found of interpretations
drawing on statistically nonsignificant data, data fi*om other sample groups or firom other
measures, or interpretations written in ways that imply more support firom other evidence
than is actually warranted. In contrast, two o f the behavior-genetics studies (Articles 2
and 3) and one neuroendocrine study (Article 7) demonstrate examples of constructing
interpretations in ways that do not overstate the data.
The construction of interpretations and drawing o f conclusions fi’om the data in
scientific studies are of tremendous importance for several reasons. When scientific
research is picked up by news media or evaluated by those not in the natural sciences,
many times it is only the scientists’ interpretations that get reported, not the cumbersome
data (Fausto-Sterling 1992b; Spanier 1995a). Because of the highly-specialized nature of
scientific sub-fields, even natural scientists are ofien not well equipped to analyze data
firom areas outside of their own specialization or to know all of the relevant literature.
Of sex-differences research, Bleier (1988b) writes:
This field is fraught with unexamined or untested assumptions, with
inconclusive or contradictory findings and misleading interpretations
that become incorporated into belief systems called theories, and with
the reckless use of language designed to appeal to the news media and
a reading public highly susceptible to scientific pronouncements,
especially those that confirm common beliefs. (147)
Bleier’s assertions could easily apply to the study of biological origins of sexual
orientations as well, especially since many of the ideas overlap. The charges suggest that
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the socially-sensitive topic of biology’s role in sex differences and sexual orientation is
complicated further by the many problems in the research being conducted.
Yet as noted by Spanier (1995a), it is quite possible that many scientists do not
take issue with interpretations that may be skewed toward the dominant explanatory
paradigm, instead seeing “the uncertainties [as] the price paid for investigating complex
or ill-understood phenomena” (66). In this way, it can be said that the methodological
problems relating to flawed interpretations point to researchers’ assumptions about the
nature of scientific progress and that these assumptions influence the course of scientific
research itself.
Clearly the stakes are high in evaluating the validity of scientific interpretations of
data obtained relating to biological origins of sexual orientations. The fact that the
majority of the articles analyzed here contained some form of interpretations inconsistent
with data or with prior evidence suggests that continued, close monitoring of scientific
claims regarding biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women in
necessary.

Summary
My analysis consists of close readings of the scientific research articles on
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women in order to uncover
methodological limitations. These limitations in the scientific methodologies help point
to assumptions held by the researchers fi-om which the limitations might logically follow.
Evaluating the scientific claims made by researchers requires an understanding of the
background assumptions that inform the research, in terms of what the science can
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validly say about the topic. An understanding of methodological limitations also is
necessary to assess the reliability, validity, and generalizability of results.
My findings demonstrate that the body of research analyzed in this project
contains important limitations in its approaches to the topic, its sampling procedures, and
its interpretations o f data. First, the dominance of the masculinization hypothesis in the
explanatory frameworks of the research implies that researchers assume sexual
orientation to be biologically determined and related in an essential way to sex and
gender. The cultural and historical specificity of these views of sexual orientation
suggests limitations on interpreting the research findings outside of the context of those
assumptions.
Second, limitations in the sampling procedures also suggest that researchers view
sexual orientation as innate and not significantly affected by different experiences or
interpretations of either sexual orientation itself or other social identities. The sampling
procedures place serious limitations on to whom the results can be generalized. The
categorization procedures for sexual orientation in the samples additionally create some
reliability and validity problems.
Last, the interpretations of the data and conclusions are often drawn in a manner
that overstates the actual research findings. The researchers often do not mention the
limitations of their samples when interpreting findings and drawing conclusions, which
overstates the degree of generalizability of the findings, and in some cases overstates the
reliability and validity as well. Failure to consider sample limitations could indicate the
assumption of essentialism of sexual orientation, because it suggests the idea that even
limited samples are representative of everyone in a given sexual orientation category.
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Also, the significance of findings o f differences between heterosexual women and
lesbian and/or bisexual women is frequently exaggerated in various ways. This finding
provides insights into how the scientists may view the research field, as discussed by
Spanier (1995a). For example, it may suggest that researchers are predominantly
convinced that the masculinization hypothesis is correct, and thus consider even non
significant trends to be evidence in support of the explanatory framework.
In sum, my findings demonstrate some limitations of the scientific research
methodologies. These limitations affect various aspects of the validity, reliability, and
generalizability of the scientific research findings. In addition, they suggest background
assumptions held by the researchers, primarily that sexual orientation is a biologically
determined and essential characteristic, and that sexual orientation follows from sex and
gender in a specific way. Awareness of these assumptions is important contextual
information for evaluating the scientific claims.
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CHAPTERS

ANALYSIS OF THE SCIENTinC DISCOURSE
Introduction
hi this chapter I will present a discourse analysis of the underlying meanings
associated with women’s lesbian and bisexual orientations in the previously-constructed
sample of scientific articles. The goal is to uncover researchers’ ideological assumptions
embedded in the scientific discourses on lesbian and bisexual orientations and their
intersections with ideologies of gender, sexual orientation, and race. Previous critical
analyses of scientific discourse, such as those discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, suggest that
hegemonic ideologies infuse supposedly objective and value-neutral science in
increasingly latent ways (Harding 1986; Spanier 1995). Feminist science studies scholars
have argued that we need good, systematic methods to uncover the implicit meanings and
assumptions in science, because they often serve to maintain social inequalities (Longino
and Doell 1983; Harding 1986; Keller 1993; Spanier 1995b).
Analyses of scientific discourses are one way to bring cultural ideologies of
gender, race, class, and sexuality to light. Feminist science scholars have proposed the
importance of reading actual scientific texts, such as scholarly articles, to examine the
ways in which the scientific discourse reveals and perpetuates hegemonic biases
(Longino and Doell, 1983; Fausto-Sterling, 1991; Spanier, 1995a). As Harding notes:
In textual criticism, metaphors of gender politics in the writings of the
fathers of modem science, as well as in the claims made by the defenders
208
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of the scientific world view today, are no longer read as individual
idiosyncrasies or as irrelevant to the meanings science has for its
enthusiasts. Furthermore, the concern to define and maintain a series
of rigid dichotomies in science and epistemology no longer appears
to be a reflection of the progressive character of scientific inquiry;
rather, it is inextricably coimected with specifically masculine - and
perhaps uniquely Western and bourgeois - needs and desires.
(Harding 1986:23)
Thus in feminist science studies, discourse analysis (“textual criticism” in
Harding’s words) is a critical methodology used to expose the ways in which the
meanings science constructs are often borne of sexist, racist, classist, and heterosexist
standpoints. These standpoints are reproduced in the very language the scientists use to
investigate and describe the natural world. Spanier writes: “A feminist analysis of
scientific discourse is based on the theory that language can both create and reflect—and
thus perpetuate—gendered concepts that reproduce sexist, racist, and classist biases”
(1995b:44). The natural world thus described is not the only “reality,” but rather is one
“reality” as seen through the eyes of the socially privileged.
This current study utilizes these insights in order to uncover the ways in which
scientific knowledge about biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in
women is shaped by cultural ideologies concerning gender, sexual orientation, and race.
Because the focus of this analysis is a scientific discourse on lesbian and bisexual
women, issues related to sex, gender, sexuality, and their intersections are of clear
interest. Jacobus, Keller, and Shuttleworth (1990) describe similar work as
contesting the inevitability or naturalness of supposedly ‘scientific’
definitions of women’s bodies by showing how the discourses and
narratives of science not only construct but depend on the very
institution of gender which scientists claim to discover or observe.
(Jacobus, Keller, and Shuttleworth 1990:7)
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This analysis seeks to understand the ways in which the scientific discourse is infused at
all levels with culturally-specific constructions of gender and sexuality. An analysis of
race is conducted as well, because of the assertion of feminist standpoint epistemology
that gender and race intersect and mutually construct one another (Collins 1990).
The analysis itself takes the form of identifying and interpreting the usage of
language, concepts, and imagery related to sex, gender, sexual orientation, or race that
either recur or fit together with other, similar usage in order to form what 1 call “themes”
in the discourse. While the decision to analyze issues related to sex, gender, sexual
orientation, and race was made based on the feminist standpoint epistemology that
informs this project, the themes are generated inductively by reading the texts looking for
uses of these concepts. First, the articles are read with a focus on locating whether
terminology related to gender, sexual orientation, and race is in fact present in the texts,
and if so, what meanings can be inferred from the contexts of their use. Second, concepts
and their contexts are then subjected to additional, close readings in order to discern
explicit, implicit, denotative, and connotative meanings
Five themes emerged as a result of my critical reading of the sample articles.
They are: 1) the impreciseness of definitions given to key concepts related to sex, gender,
and sexuality; 2) the equivalence of “sexual orientation” and “homosexuality” in the
framing of the central issue, combined with a lack of actual investigation of heterosexual
identity; 3) the conflation of the concepts of sex, gender, and sexuality; 4) language
reflecting the understanding of lesbian and bisexual orientations as either a) somehow
problematic or b) deviant; and S) language related to race. The first four themes
represent recurring issues derived from the ways in which the concepts of gender and
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sexual orientation are used in the texts. The fifth theme, dealing with race in the texts, is
different in that it reveals a relative absence of such language.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: first, an explanation of the
discourse analysis procedure used in the project, including a brief explanation of the
similarities and differences between the two main scientific approaches within the
general discourse under study. Next, the five themes are interpreted and their
significance is discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ways in which
the themes intersect and interact within the discourse as a whole.

Explanation of the Methodology
hiformed by feminist standpoint epistemologies, this analysis seeks to understand
the ways in which ideological understandings of sex, gender, sexual orientation, and race
are constructed and reproduced in the scientific discourse on lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women from 1990-2000. To do so, I must first ascertain whether these
concepts are present in the discourse at all, and if so, how they are presented. By “how
they are presented,” I refer to the meanings given them in the discourse—explicitly or
implicitly, by denotation or by connotation. When not present in manifest form, these
meanings can be inferred from the contexts in which there is terminology related to sex,
gender, sexual orientation, and race.
The first step in the analysis is to determine what terminology is to be counted as
a use of a sex, gender, sexual orientation, or race concept. For this step, lists of words
and phrases are generated, with the option left open to include terminology encountered
in the texts that had not been anticipated, but that refers to gender, sexual orientation, or
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race. The initial readings look for terminology describing biological sex, such “male”
and “female”; gender concepts such as “masculine” and “feminine,” as well as gendered
pronouns; “sexual orientation” discussed in itself or by descriptive categories (including
heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, lesbian, and gay); and race, discussed as a concept in
itself, by categories (including ethnicity categories often used as “races,” such as
“African-American”), or by phrases related to how races are often thought to be
distinguished, such as “skin color.” The texts are read separately for each of the four
general concepts and coded by marking their occurrences (with different colors of
highlighter pen) so that they may be analyzed further within their textual context.
Once the various uses of the central concepts are identified, the analysis of their
contextual meanings begins. At this point, the grammatical positionings of the concepts
are noted and coded, including whether they are used as modifiers (such as adjectives) or
whether they are modified themselves (and if so, by what), whether they exist as the
subject or object of some action (and what action). From these uses and contexts,
meanings are interpreted. The rationale for this method comes from discourse analysis
literature; for example. Gee states the following:
Speakers and writers use these grammatical devices to shape their
texts ‘as i f they (the speakers and writers and the texts) had certain
‘goals’ and ‘purposes. ’ As listeners and receivers we ‘recover’ these
goals and purposes by paying attention to the uses to which these
grammatical devices are put. (Gee 1999:161)
This step in the analysis is to make conscious and explicit the latter step Gee mentions,
by “paying attention” in a systematic and methodical way.
From reading the different ways in which the four main concepts of analysis are
used, meanings are interpreted and patterns or themes emerge inductively from the texts.
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Once themes are identified, the contexts of the thematized uses of gender, sexual
orientation, and race concepts are subjected to close readings to interpret “goals and
purposes.” The analyses are discussed later in this chapter and focus on ideological
functions served by the meanings constructed for gender, sexual orientation, and race.
As a discourse analysis is only as good as the analyst who conducts it, I cannot
claim to have uncovered all of the important elements in these texts. What I argue is that
by focusing on the ways in which gender, sexual orientation, and race concepts are used
and the contexts surrounding these uses, I have uncovered some themes with significance
to this feminist science studies project. By employing a systematic method, I believe that
another researcher with similar conunitments could reproduce this analysis and find
similar themes, although that is not to say that we would necessarily find all the same
things or have the same things to say about them.
Another caveat concerns the scientific discourse studied. Because scientific fields
of study represented in the sample of articles are quite different (behavioral-genetics and
neuroendocrinology), it could be argued that the articles do not together construct a single
scientific discourse despite their cormnonalities. To address this caveat requires
elucidating the ways in which the seemingly different explanatory frameworks in the
genetic and biological studies actually work together.
Overlapping Arguments: Genetic and
Neuroendocrine Approaches
To avoid the criticism of having lumped together very different discourses, it is
important to show more specifically how it is that the approaches based on behavioral
genetics and neuroendocrine theories do in fact overlap. It can be shown that the studies
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seeking genetic influences tend to incorporate the neuroendocrine approach into their
theoretical framework. For example, in one genetic study, the following is stated:
The dearth of genetic data on females is unfortunate, as there is no strong reason
to expect that genetic findings for males will be similar to those for females. The
most influential biologic theories of sexual orientation posit that the development
of attraction to males results if relevant neural stmctures do not masculinize.
Thus, different processes are hypothesized for male and female homosexuality,
suggesting that if genetic factors contribute to female sexual orientation, they may
differ from those for male sexual orientation. (2:217)
In this passage, the authors hypothesize that the “genetic factors [that] contribute
to female sexual orientation" may operate by influencing the “masculinization,” or lack
thereof, of “relevant neural stmctures”. This “masculinization” is thought to result from
the release of androgens at certain periods in fetal development. In this article, then, it is
clear that genetic and neuroendocrine explanatory frameworks are not separate at all, but
rather represent attempts to explain different aspects of the same process. Another
example of this is the following:
The clearest evidence linking genetics and sexual orientation in a subset of
women comes from studies of female patients with congenital adrenal hyperplasia
(CAH), a group of enzymatic deficiencies in cortisol biosynthesis transmitted by
autosomal recessive genes. The most common form, accounting for 95% of the
cases, is a deficiency in 21-hydroxylase activity mediated by the cytochrome
P450c21 gene located within the human HLA major histocompatibility locus on
the short arm of chromosome 6. Insufficient cortisol production results in an
increased accumulation of androgens, causing a masculinization of the genitalia to
vaiying degrees. Influences on the developing brain are also believed to occur but
are not well understood. However, a ‘masculine’ pattern of gender-role behavior
has been reported ... [as have] higher rates of homosexual orientation, behavior
and fantasy couple with lower rates of heterosexual activity... These results
suggest that excess prenatal androgens can predispose some women toward the
development of a homosexual orientation. (3: 408)
Thus, the effort to find genetic factors in the development of lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women utilizes the neuroendocrine model as an explanation of how the
genetic factor may come to be expressed as a lesbian or bisexual phenotype. In these
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genetic studies, not surprisingly, the hypothesized “genetic factors” are conceptualized as
those that influence, if not create, the conditions in which “excess prenatal androgens”
occur. The genetics studies, then, are in the position of explaining an “earlier step” in the
same neuroendocrinological process thought to result in the development of lesbian or
bisexual orientations in women.
The studies utilizing a neuroendocrine approach often do not explicitly state the
genetic component, yet it is implicitly understood. The process of sexual differentiation
of sexual orientation thought to be altered by the introduction of “excess prenatal
androgens” is genetically triggered. For example, one article states:
The observation that neuroanatomy (Swaab and Hofinan, 1990; LeVay, 1991;
Allen and Gorski, 1992), neuroendocrine functioning (Gladue et cd., 1984; but see
also Hendricks et al., 1989), and some cognitive abilities (Sanders and RossField, 1986a; but see also Tuttle and Pillard, 1991) differ with respect to sexual
orientation may further support a neurohormonal theory of sexual orientation. A
genetic relationship has been demonstrated with sexual orientation (Hamer et al.,
1993) in at least some males. It is possible that genetic material is associated with
sexual orientation by introducing variation, directly or indirectly, to the early
hormonal environment. (8:396)
By understanding the ways in which these two frameworks are thought to work
together, it can be shown that they overlap and produce what can be considered a single
discourse on the scientific study of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations
in women. The genetic studies often use neuroendocrine theories to explain how the
hypothesized genetic influence comes to result in a lesbian or bisexual phenotype, and the
neuroendocrine studies make use of a genetically-influenced process of sexual
differentiation as a framework for explaining the process by which hormones can affect
sexual orientation outcomes.
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Logically, the neuroendocrine studies cannot be separated from those
hypothesizing genetic bases because they propose a prenatal, endogenous route by which
sexual orientation develops. In other words, there must be some genetic influence
creating “excess prenatal androgens” because no extemal cause is proposed. The genetic
studies, on the other hand, do not have to rely on a neuroendocrine model of sexual
orientation development. They could propose entirely different pathways by which a
genetic influence is exerted upon sexual orientation. Yet the hormonal paradigm so
dominates the current scientific discourse on origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations
in women that, as shown, genetics researchers often make use of this explanatory scheme
as well.
The neuroendocrine model also guides where the genetics researchers focus their
attention. For example, the belief in “overmasculinization” as the cause of lesbian and
bisexual orientations in women is exemplified by the fact that one behavioral genetics
study in this sample evaluates “childhood gender nonconformity” - “interest in
stereotypically masculine and feminine activities during childhood as well as childhood
gender identity (ie, comfort being a girl vs the desire to be a boy)” as a potential marker
of “genetic loading” for homosexuality (2:219). Thus despite differences in the scientific
field in which the research studies are conducted and in research focus, the discourse is
integrated by the common search for biological causes of lesbian and bisexual
orientations, and in large part by the dominant framework of explanation. The scientific
discourse is also woven together by several themes relevant to the construction of
meanings regarding lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, which are the subject of
the next section of this chapter.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217
Results: Themes in the Discourse
The results of the analysis of the scientific discourse are divided into five main
themes. The themes reflect similarities or recurrences seen in reading the texts for
meanings associated with the concepts of gender, sexual orientation, and race. They are
discussed separately, yet there are areas in which the themes overlap and intersect. The
ways in which they work together are elaborated upon in the discussion section that
concludes the chapter, after the five themes have each been discussed.

Theme 1: Impreciseness in Defining
Sexual Orientation Concepts
The first theme concerns the lack of specificity encountered in the definitions
applied to the central concepts relating to sexual orientation. I argue that despite the
contested, culturally-specific nature of “sexual orientation” and its categories, the
scientific articles tend not to specify or explain exactly what meanings the terms are
given for the purposes of the research. The concepts are left open to many potential
meanings, some of which are relevant to the actual experimental data and some of which
may not be. This lack of precision mns counter to what is expected of scientific research,
and suggests ideological functions of the scientific discourse.
Discussion of this issue is divided into two sections, reflecting the differences in
the two major parts of the articles in which the impreciseness is noted. The first part
focuses on the introductory section of the articles, and discusses how, from the beginning,
there is a lack of explicit definition combined with use of associations and equivalences
to create implicit definitions. In other words, the articles tend to introduce their central
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topic of sexual orientation without explicitly explaining how they are using the term,
instead leaving the reader to figure out what is meant from the contextual cues. The
second part focuses on the methods section of the articles, in which sexual orientation is
categorized for the purposes of creating groups of subjects. What is noted in this section
is an apparent assumption of natural categories of heterosexual, homosexual, and
bisexual, without defense or support, casting doubt on the value-neutrality of the
scientific discourse and on the validity of the project.
hitroducing the Concepts: What’s
the Matter Here?
Close readings of the introductory sections of the articles in the sample suggest
the relative absence of manifest, stated definitions of sexual orientation concepts. In
other words, concepts that are absolutely central to the scientific discourse, such as
“sexual orientation, ”“lesbian,” “bisexual,” and “heterosexual, ” are put forth in the texts
without explanation of the meanings being attributed to them. Because these concepts
are so central to the scientific project, and because their definitions are so complex and
contested in the current sociohistorical context, the way in which these concepts are
defined for use in this scientific discourse is of cmcial importance. Thus, the absence of
stated definitions has a great deal of significance, not only in terms of reproducing
heterosexual privilege, but also concerning the validity of the study. Specificity is
necessary to defining the subject of scientific research so that there is certainty regarding
“what is being compared to what,” as well as for comparing results across studies. As
Stein notes:
It is crucial for scientific research on sexual orientation to carefully
define its object of study in order to divide people into sexual
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orientations in a reasonable fashion and in ways that do not skew
its results. A study of sexual orientation must start with some
(at least implicit) definition of sexual orientation; who will count
as a homosexual or a heterosexual? (1999:195)
While the variables and concepts central to the research are typically explained or
defined when they are introduced, I have found that in this literature it is rare to have any
such manifest explanation or definition, hnplicit meanings, however, are constructed
throughout. These implicit meanings are created by associations in the language used in
discussing sexual orientation concepts, and by the positioning of the reader in terms of
assumptions necessary to make sense of the discussion. At the same time, the appearance
of intention in the use of implicit meanings and ideological understandings can be
avoided by the researchers; as Keller points out, “[t]he use of a term with established
colloquial meaning in a technical context permits the simultaneous transfer and denial of
its colloquial coimotations” (Keller 1992:121). The implicit meanings allow the
“standpoint” or the epistemology of the researchers to frame the discourse but to remain
invisible in the process.
The introductory paragraph of one article in the sample follows:
More than 50 years ago, Hirschfeld noted that both male and female
homosexuality appeared to be familial. Only recently, however, have researchers
rigorously begun to test Hirschfeld's observations and systematically explored the
nature of the familiality. Pillard and Weinrich found a significantly higher rate of
homosexuality among brothers of homosexual men than among brothers of
heterosexual men. Using a combination of twin and adoption methods, Bailey
and Pillard found evidence that male sexual orientation is moderately heritable.
Female homosexuality also appears to be familial. Pillard found 25% of sisters of
homosexual female probands to be homosexual (including bisexuals), compared
with 11% of the sisters of heterosexual female probands. Bailey and Benishay
found that, depending on the criterion, from 12% to 35% of sisters of homosexual
probands were homosexual compared with 2% to 14% of sisters of heterosexual
probands. Although familiality may arise from shared environmental as well as
genetic factors, these findings support the desirability of testing genetic
hypotheses directly. (2:217)
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From these opening lines, it can be discerned that the central topic is the
familiality of homosexuality. What is meant by “homosexuality” or “homosexual” is not
explained; however, several meanings are implicitly associated. For example, no results
of research into heterosexuality are cited, yet in the midst of a clear focus solely on
homosexuality, it is stated that “Bailey and Pillard found evidence that male sexual
orientation is moderately heritable.” This wording works together with the assumed
understanding that the heritability of heterosexuality is not in question—that it is
common sense—to produce an implicit equation of “sexual orientation” and
“homosexuality.” This issue will be discussed in more detail later, but for now it should
be noted that this equation sets the tone for later discussion, in which sexual orientation’s
basic interchangeability with homosexuality helps make the lack of study of
heterosexuality appear natural.
Another point is that while “homosexuality” is not manifestly defined in any way,
by citing as evidence cases in which it has been quantified in rates and percentages, it is
implicitly defined as something that can be accurately identified, distinguished, and
measured. This definition is certainly not without challenge, but dissension is avoided by
the absence of discussion.
A final issue that arises from the introductory paragraph cited above is the notion
that the category of “homosexual” is one that can encompass another - that of “bisexual”:
“Pillard found 25% of sisters of homosexual female probands to be homosexual
(including bisexuals)...”. With the category of “homosexual” being inclusive of
“bisexual,” it is established that these two are effectively the same thing. This
impreciseness reveals a carelessness that is supposedly not present in “good science.”
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Additionally, heterosexual identification is again naturalized, as the mark of same-sex
sexuality in bisexual subjects completely overrides the “normalcy” of their opposite-sex
sexuality. This issue also will be discussed in more depth later.
Another example of an introductory paragraph follows:
Recent neuropsychologic studies have been employed as a means of
understanding the etiology of sexual orientation. This approach supplements
neuroanatomic and neurophysiologic approaches which have examined
differences in brain structure and brain function between homosexual (HM) and
heterosexual (HT) individuals (e.g., LeVay ,1991; Reite et al., 1995). Some of
the neuropsychologic data suggest that the cognitive patterns of gay men differ
from those of HT men on measures that generally elicit sex differences (Gladue et
al., 1990; McCormick and Witelson, 1991; Sanders and Ross-Field, 1986).
However, at least two studies have failed to reveal effects of sexual orientation
(Gladue and Bailey, 1995; Tuttle and Pillard, 1991). Little is known about
cognitive abilities of lesbians, though the four published reports suggest that
lesbians do not differ significantly from HT women. (Gladue and Bailey, 1995;
Gladue et al., 1990; Hall and Kimura, 1993; Tuttle and Pillard, 1991). (5:91-92)
As in the previous example, neither sexual orientation nor its presumed categories
of heterosexual and homosexual are defined, yet implicitly, the “homosexual”
classification is established as that which is in need of explanation. Notable in this
example is the use of “gay men” and “lesbians” as interchangeable with “homosexual
individuals” without any explanation of this usage; it introduces an additional layer of
“colloquial meaning” as in the Keller quote above. The equivalent colloquial term for
heterosexuals - “straight” - is never used in this discourse. While none of the terms is
necessarily good or bad, the difference in their use suggests disparity across the groups
discussed.
In only one article in the sample was the introduction of the central concept of
“sexual orientation” accompanied by an explanation of its meaning. Interestingly, the
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explicit, parenthetical definition of the concept of sexual orientation was accompanied by
multiple implicit and analogous meanings:
Similar psychosocial and biological arguments have been advanced to account for
differences in psychosexual development; that is, differences in sexual orientation
(i.e., erotic partner preference) among men are considered to result from either
biological influences on brain organization and subsequent sexual behavior ... or
critical psychosocial childhood or early adolescent events. (4:101)
There are actually several levels of meaning construction occurring in this
example. To begin, there is an explicit analogy being made that refers to the discussion
in the preceding paragraph, which is the first paragraph in the article itself. It begins:
“Although controversial, gender differences in certain cognitive abilities have been
widely reported.” The “[s]imilar psychosocial and biological arguments” introduced in
relation to sexual orientation are placed in a context of likeness to such explanations for
“gender differences”. “Gender” is not defined, but appears to be meant to be
interchangeable with “sex,” as in the next sentence: “In general, adult males are reported
to have superior visuospatial abilities, whereas women outperform men on certain verbal
tasks” (4:101, emphasis added). No distinction is made between “males” and “men,”
terms which are often used to distinguish between biological sex and the social concept
of gender, respectively. Also the comparison of performance between women and men
makes clear what is not stated outright - that gender (or sex) is being used as a binary
construct. Understanding this implicit duality is necessary to make sense of what
meaning of “differences” is being applied to the concept of sexual orientation. Thus the
first mention of sexual orientation establishes that a) it is a category that is “like” gender,
a concept itself not specified but implicitly asserted to be binary and equivalent to “sex,”
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and b) that, as with gender, it is “differences” that have been examined and are of
interest, rather than similarities.
Next an analogy is made between “differences in psychosexual development” and
“differences in sexual orientation” by the use of the “that is” constmction. By creating
such an analogy, the reader is encouraged to see “differences in psychosexual
development” and “differences in sexual orientation” as being equivalent or
interchangeable. Equating psychosexual development and sexual orientation may be
seen as a strategy to naturalize the meanings of sexual orientation being constmcted. In
addition, the interest in “differences” is reiterated by repetition, as well as by the framing
of differences as something “to account for.” By the time the parenthetical definition of
sexual orientation is reached (“i.e., erotic pariner preference”), a framework of meaning
is already in place that contextualizes the manifest explanation.
Some of the articles give hints in their introductory sections as to how sexual
orientation concepts are being defined. Because scientific studies of reproductive
behaviors of laboratory animals (often rats) are the primary support for neuroendocrine
theories of origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations, several of the studies discuss
animal evidence in framing their research. From these discussions the researchers’
working definition of human sexual orientation can be gleaned to some extent. The
following is an example of introductory sentences in which animal reproductive
behaviors are subtly equated to human sexual orientation;
Geschwind and his associates (Galaburda, Corsiglia, & Rosen, 1987; Geschwind
and Behan, 1982,1984; Geschwind and Galaburda, 1985a, 1985b, 1987) have
theorized that prenatal hormones, especially testosterone, might affect four
seemingly unrelated phenomena: hemispheric specialization (viz., language
functions and handedness); immune functioning; learning (viz., reading); and
sexual orientation. Their speculations have generated much research. One line of
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inquiry has examined whether or not these four broad areas are directly related to
hormone levels in utero. Stereotypic female sexual behavior (lordosis), for
example, has been found to occur in male animals exposed to high levels of
intrauterine testosterone (Ward, 1984). (7:702)
Here, the context indicates that the researcher is equating “sexual orientation,” which is
not manifestly defined, with sexual behaviors of laboratory animals. The reader is
encouraged to make this association by the presentation of the animal evidence in a
context in which it is implied to support the theory regarding the effect of “hormone
levels in utero” on human sexual orientation. Additional examples follow:
The etiology of homosexuality is not known. Recently, the search for possible
biological factors has gained prominence, partly due to results of experimental
work of the last few decades which show that much of the sexual behavior of
nonhuman animals is driven by sex hormones (for review cf. Goy and McEwen,
1980). (6:69)
In this quotation, the “sexual behavior of nonhuman animals” is presented (not so subtly)
as evidence for “biological factors” - related to hormones - in the “etiology of
homosexuality.” hi so doing, the researchers bypass the need to demonstrate why this is
a valid comparison. This avoidance is facilitated by the lack of definition of, in this case,
“homosexuality.” The same article goes on, in the following paragraph, to assert a partial
definition: “Given that sexual orientation, typical or atypical, is a behavioral
phenomenon, it may be more fruitful to investigate the organ of behavior, the brain, with
respect to differences between homosexual and heterosexual people” (6:69). (There is, of
course, no question what the “typical” and the “atypical” sexual orientations being
referenced are, and which one is which - a topic that will be discussed later.) The
definition of sexual orientation as a “behavioral phenomenon” makes the equation with
animal sexual behavior appear consistent. Similarly:
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Differing honnonal environments in utero are associated with differing
neurohormonal functioning in adulthood. Animal studies have shown that
pre/perinatal hormone-mediated changes in the central nervous system lead to
behavioral changes. This was first observed with specific sexual behaviors:
Neonatally castrated rats mount estrous females less often, and exhibit lordosis in
response to a stud male rat more often, than do non-castrates (Goy and McEwen,
1980). Partner preference for same or opposite sex, as measured by the amount of
time a rat chooses to spend in the proximity of either a stud male or estrous
female, is affected by eariy sex hormone manipulation in both males and females
(Brand era/., 1991; Brand and Slob, 1991).
Similarly, in humans, both sexual and nonsexual behaviors are influenced by the
pre/perinatal hormone environment. Some clinical evidence suggests a
relationship between sexual orientation in women and the prenatal hormonal
milieu (Money et al., 1984; Dittmann et al., 1992). (8:396)
This article, while again not overtly defining the central sexual orientation concepts,
provides clues as to how they are being used, by discussing sexual behaviors of
laboratory rats and then constructing analogies to humans. The first suggested meaning
is that of “behavioral changes.” This helps to set up the framing of homosexuality as
“different from,” as the “changes” are implicitly changes from what would normally be
occurring. Next there is a subtle equation of rat sexual behavior (the choice to be “in the
proximity of either a stud male or estrous female”) with sexual orientation, by labeling
the operationalization of this behavior as “partner preference for the same or opposite
sex.” (Female rats choosing more time near an estrous female rather than a stud male rat
are, in this logic, lesbian rats.) This shift is mirrored in the human analogy, in which the
shift is from discussing “sexual and nonsexual behaviors” to “sexual orientation.” This is
similar to the previous quotation, in which sexual orientation was partially defined as a
“behavioral phenomenon.”
hr terms of analyzing these equations at the level of discourse, it should be noted
that the equation of reproductive behaviors of animals with human sexual orientation is
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made through subtle associations and the presentation of evidence as if it is understood to
be relevant hi this way, the equation does not have to be defended. The ideology put
forth is one of heterosexuality’s normality, as animal sexual behaviors are understood in
terms of a normal (reproductive)/ abnormal (nonreproductive) dichotomy. Yet
methodologically, the associations made between animal behaviors and human sexual
orientation are not supported. As feminist biologist Ruth Doell notes in her critique of
such equations:
But of course the insurmountable problem with this analogy is that
the mating behaviors of rats and the sexual behaviors of humans are
not homologous. The former are reflex-like and the latter are complex,
intentional behaviors mediated by higher (cortical) brain mechanisms
rather than by the reflex centers of the lower brain. (1995:349)
Put differently, Stein notes that a “person’s sexual orientation has to do with sexual
desires and dispositions, not simply his or her behavior” (1999:196). The failure to be
fully explicit about the equation of animal behaviors and human sexual orientation
facilitates and partially masks a sort of scientific dishonesty about the validity of the
theoretical framework.
In all of these examples, what is made visible by close reading is the lack of
specificity regarding the central issue under study, combined with implicit association,
equivalences and analogies that serve to further ideological understandings of sexual
orientation. A few, isolated cases of this lack of definition of sexual orientation and its
categories could be blamed on “bad science”—researchers failing to adhere to good
scientific procedure. What I have found, however, is that this lack is not a rare
occurrence but rather is standard practice. This suggests that the failure to define the
central concept is a defining characteristic of this scientific discourse. In other words, the
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discourse of the scientific study of biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations
in women is partially dependent upon vague definitions and implied associations.
The presence of an undefined “default sexuality”—heterosexuality—that is
accepted as normal means that not only does it escape scrutiny, but also that the
“abnormality” of that which is not heterosexual does not have to be proven, it merely has
to be different. A similarity is apparent to historical medical/scientific discourses
(discussed in Chapter 2) in which the “pathology” of lesbian and/or African-American
women’s intellects and bodies was defined as their perceived difference from
heterosexual, white women. The bodies of “normal” women were uiunarked while the
bodies of “abnormal” women were marked by evaluative descriptors (such as “large” or
“protruding”). In this case, heterosexuality is implicitly established as the norm,
undermining the scientific claim to value-neutrality.
Sexual Orientation Categorization and
“Natural Human Kinds”
The lack of explicit definitions of concepts related to sexual orientation has been
noted in other scientific studies of biological bases of homosexuality, by researchers such
as Stein (1999). He writes:
Scientific studies need to make their definitions of sexual orientation
explicit, and they need to provide a rationale for these definitions.
When assessing research in the emerging scientific program, one must
uncover the implicit definition of sexual orientation and ask whether it
is adequate. Since most of the biological studies of sexual orientation
do not spell out their definition of sexual orientation, one way to tease
out their definition is by looking at how they assign sexual orientations
to their subjects. (1999:196)
As Stein suggests, the meanings given to sexual orientation concepts can to some extent
be inferred from the part of the methods section in which researchers describe how they
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decided to place subjects into different sexual orientation categories. In operationalizing
the concepts into quantifiable measures, implicit definitions of sexual orientation
concepts are revealed. The context for defining categories of sexual orientation, then, is a
goal-oriented one. The goal is to create mutually exclusive identity categories to serve as
variables—ideally ones that are accurate in capturing the subjects’ “true” sexual
orientations. Key features of the definitions are those that can be empirically measured
and that are distinguishable from, and mutually exclusive of, one another.
This categorization of sexual orientations presents several problems. First is that
the modem, Westem-societal framework for conceptualizing sexual orientation—that it is
a category based on the sex or gender of a person and her or his desired parmer—is
utilized for categorization without any evidence for why this should be the case. There is
a range of factors used in the scientific articles to operationalize sexual orientation, as
every article operationalizes sexual orientation in a different manner. The possibilities in
this scientific discourse include combinations of sexual “attitudes,” “attraction,”
“behaviors,” “experiences,” “fantasies,” “feelings,” “identity,” “orientation,” and
“thoughts” - all presumably related to the sex and/or gender of another person (as the
researchers largely use variations on Kinsey ratings). In addition, it is not made clear in
the articles whether the subjects are given instruction as to “what counts” for all these
concepts used to operationalize sexuality. If it is left to each subject to interpret what, for
example, constitutes a “sexual experience” or a “sexual attraction”—or the division
between sexual and nonsexual—coherence of the sexual orientation categories is in
question.
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The following is the paiagr^h describing sexual orientation categorization for
one study:
Sexual orientation was assessed by a Sexual Orientation Scale (SOS) adapted
from Klein et al. (1985). Participants rated themselves on a Kinsey-type scale (17) for Sexual Attraction, Sexual Thoughts and Fantasies, Sexual Behavior, and
Sexual Identity. Participants were included in the HT [heterosexual] group if they
had averaged scores of either 1 or 2 on the SOS and in the HM [homosexual]
group if they had averaged scores from 5 to 7. Six participants scoring in the
bisexual range (3-4) were excluded from this sample. (5:95-96)
Thus the categorization is done either by how the subjects respond to questions about
their sexuality—questions based on choice of sexual partner—or, less commonly, by
having subjects self-categorize into one of the three (sometimes only two) approved
categories - heterosexual, homosexual, or (sometimes) bisexual. As an example of the
self-categorization approach, in one article the following was stated: “All participants
were asked their sexual orientation: homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual" (7:705). In
some cases, participants both self-categorized and were rated on a Kinsey-type scale; in
the examples that follow, the first article used subjects’ self-classifications (as did the
previous example quoted) no matter how “low ”the Kinsey rating, while the second used
“too low ” Kinsey ratings to exclude participants who had self-classified as homosexual:
Of the probands, 126 (85.7%) described themselves as ‘lesbian/homosexual’ and
21 (14.3%) described themselves as ‘bisexual.’ Kinsey ratings were obtained for
adult fantasy and behavior, combined. These scores range from 0 (both fantasy
and behavior completely heterosexual) to 6 (both fantasy and behavior completely
homosexual). The mean (± SD) Kinsey rating, 4.8 (± 1.2), indicated a fairly high
level of homosexual orientation for the sample as a whole, but individual Kinsey
ratings ranged from as low as 1 to as high as 6. (2:218)
and:
Subjects made a self-declaration of their sexual orientation and completed the
Kinsey scales (Kinsey et al., 1948) which rank sexuality from 0 (exclusively
heterosexual) to 6 (exclusively homosexual). The Kinsey scales were completed
privately and sealed in envelopes that were not opened until the experiment was
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completed. Only those homosexual subjects scoring 3.5/6 or higher on the Kinsey
scales (both fantasy and experience) were included in the study (1 male and 2
females were excluded based on this criterion). All heterosexual subjects scored
either 0 or 1. (8:398)
The articles analyzed for the most part present research results regarding
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women as if collected in a
systematic, objective matmer, producing a coherent and consistent body of evidence.
One obvious implication of this reading of the methods of sexual orientation
operationalization is that the failure to be fully explicit about definitions of sexual
orientation concepts creates different subject groups in each study. A “homosexual” in
one study is not necessarily a “homosexual” in another study. Methodologically, this
lack of specificity casts doubt on the meaningfulness of data obtained and comparisons of
data from different studies.
In addition, asking subjects to self-categorize does not equate to finding out their
“tme” sexual orientation. As Stein notes, the fact that “most people in our culture see
sexual orientation simplistically does not provide an argument for using such a simplistic
account of sexual orientation to do science” (1999:196). The categories of heterosexual,
homosexual, and bisexual are culturally and historically specific. While it is socially
meaningful to identify with one category and not another, that is no guarantee that these
particular categories are inscribed in biology. Thus subject self-categorization into two
or three pre-determined choices is a poor method of operationalizing sexual orientation
for the purposes of locating biological origins.
A final issue arising from the operationalization of sexual orientation concerns the
use of Kinsey scales or variations thereof. As already demonstrated, this is a common
practice in these scientific articles, done to create two or three mutually exclusive sexual
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orientation groups for study. Yet this practice contradicts the data that led Kinsey to
construct the scale in the first place, in two ways.
First, Kinsey “did not conceptualize homosexuality-heterosexuality as a way to
classify persons - only behaviors” (Mondimore 1996:87). hi his 1953 volume Sexual
Behavior in the Human Female, Kinsey writes: “It should again be pointed o u t... that it
is impossible to determine the number of individuals who are ‘homosexual’ or
‘heterosexual.’ It is only possible to determine how many persons belong, at any
particular time, to each of the classifications on a heterosexual-homosexual scale ”(cited
in Mondimore 1996:87). This scientific discourse is very much concerned with sexual
orientation categories as defining different types of people, established in part by the
equation of “behavior” and “orientation” or “identity” discussed previously.
Second, it is reported that Kinsey’s construction of the 0-6 scale was done in
response to his findings that discrete, mutually exclusive categories of sexuality did not
exist: “During the years that Kinsey and his associates were gathering their data, it had
become apparent that attempting to identify individuals as either ‘homosexual’ or
‘heterosexual’ was simply impossible ” (Mondimore 1996:84). In other words, BCinsey’s
findings led him to construct the continuum to reflect the idea that the majority of people
could not be clearly and unproblematically placed into two (or even three) mutuallyexclusive sexuality categories. Terry (1999) notes that the work of Kinsey and of
Henry’s Sex Variant study in the preceding decade had “obliterated the idea of a clear-cut
homosexual type, [and] effectively erased the possibility of such a thing as a distinctly
homosexual body” (1999:303). Yet not only are both of these notions revived in the
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cunent biological discourse, but Kinsey’s work is frequently used in the effort to prove
them true.
The results of this reading suggest that the construction of sexual orientation
categories in these scientific articles is conducted in ways that are imprecise, inconsistent,
and probably inaccurate. Sexuality is operationalized with indefinite terms such as
“sexual experiences” that have different meanings for difierent people, and the boundary
between the sexual and the nonsexual does not appear to be questioned. Discrete
categories are constructed using different criteria for membership across studies,
assuming mutual exclusivity and stability over the life course.
An underlying pattern appears to be the assumption of the existence of relatively
clear and unproblematic sexual orientation categories that are defined by the sex and/or
gender of one’s sexual object choice. This assumption is interrelated with the implicit
equations of animal reproductive behaviors with human sexual orientation, and of sexual
behaviors with “identities” or “orientations.” As discussed by Stein (1999), an
assumption of essential categories cannot be used to prove the essentialness of those
categories. Rather, “evidence for the existence of natural human kinds must emerge from
the empirical results” (1999:206). By allowing for two (or sometimes three) very specific
possibilities of sexual orientation identification, any other possible mode of sexual selfidentification is precluded. Also, the possibility that sexual desire may not represent an
“orientation” or an identity at all is precluded.
I argue that that the idea that sexuality is best described as an “orientation, ” and
that that orientation reflects an inherent identity, is granted the status of established fact
in this discourse, because it goes without discussion, definition or debate. With regard to
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gender, Judith Butler (1990) notes that our understandings of ourselves and others as
“being” a specific kind of person are founded on notions of stability and coherence that
are socially produced and reinforced. She asks:
To what extent do regulatory practices of gender formation and division
constitute identity, the internal coherence of the subject, indeed, the
self-identical status of the person? To what extent is ‘identity’ a normative
ideal rather than a descriptive feature of experience? And how do the
regulatory practices that govern gender also govern cultural intelligible
notions of identity? (1990:16-17)
The assumption that sexuality represents an identity, and that this identity is best
described by the categories of heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual, distorts the
scientific effort to describe “nature” in a marmer free of cultural bias. Methodologically
these practices reveal irresponsibility on the part of researchers and a willingness to “use
whatever evidence is available,” in Spanier’s (1991) words.

Theme 2: Equivalences and Absences in
the Discussion and Study of Sexual
Orientation, Homosexuality,
and Heterosexuality
The second theme is composed of two inter related issues: first, the apparent
equivalence of “sexual orientation” with “homosexuality,” and second, the absence of
discussion or study of heterosexuality. The two issues reinforce one another to form a
pattern in the discourse, through which, 1 argue, the normalization and naturalization of
heterosexuality is maintained.
The former issue refers to a pattern noted throughout much of the discourse,
which consists of the discussion of “sexual orientation” when close reading indicates that
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in fact what is meant is homosexuality. I will demonstrate why this appears to be the
case, and why it is significant. The second issue, heterosexuality’s relative absence, is
part of the first issue but also stands on its own. By this, I mean that the absence of real
discussion or study of heterosexuality is part of the evidence for my assertion that there is
a strategy of equivalence seen in the discussion of “sexual orientation” and
“homosexuality,” yet this is not its sole importance.
In these scientific texts, a strategy of equivalence can be seen in the discussions
regarding the central topic, specifically, “sexual orientation” and “homosexuality. ” By
this I mean simply that the discussion uses “sexual orientation” as if it were discursively
interchangeable with “homosexuality,” and tends to slip back and forth between the two.
This was ascertained through close readings of the contexts in which these phrases were
used. Since clearly the two terms are not generally considered equivalent, their use in
such a way requires attention.
Since one of the defining characteristics of this discourse and a criterion used to
establish the sample of articles was that the subject of the scientific research be on
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, it might be expected
that heterosexual identities, and “sexual orientation” more generally, might not be
necessarily well represented in the discourse. Yet a reading of the titles, abstracts, and
introductions of these articles reveals that many of them establish their research as being
on the topic of origins of “sexual orientation.” (The initial sampling process revealed
there to be no articles studying origins of heterosexual identity in women separate from
these kinds of studies in the time frame under investigation.) In fact a reading of the titles
shows that only two of the ten sample articles analyzed states “homosexuals” alone to be
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the topic of investigation. Thus it seems reasonable to expect that studies of biological
origins of “sexual orientation” would discuss a broader topic area than origins of
“homosexuality” alone.
In the studies whose topic is the origins of “sexual orientation,” heterosexual
subjects are in fact included in the research. Yet what becomes clear from close readings
of this research is that the heterosexual subjects are not under the same sort of
investigation as the lesbian and bisexual women. Rather, while this language is generally
absent from the discourse, I argue that the heterosexual subjects are included for the
purpose of serving as controls. Results obtained from them are used as standards by
which to evaluate results obtained from the lesbian and bisexual women. The purported
research topic—the origins of sexual orientation—is clearly in actuality the origins of
lesbian and bisexual orientations. The discussion of the topic as being “sexual
orientation,” then, can be considered a discursive equivalence of sexual orientation with
homosexuality. In addition, in many cases a “slippage” is evident in which the discussion
moves back and forth from discussing the topic as sexual orientation and as
homosexuality, which is also a mechanism of equivalence. Both of these have effects on
how the reader is positioned to interpret the study.
For example, in one article (titled “Heritable Factors Influence Sexual Orientation
in Women”) the following was stated: “The study reported herein has two broad goals:
first, to determine if there is a genetic contribution to female sexual orientation, and
second, to investigate the behavioral expression of this contribution” (2:217). A careful
reading of the study reveals that a “genetic contribution” to heterosexuality is not part of
the study, and the “behavioral expression” elements refers strictly to expressions thought

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

236
to be related to lesbian/bisexual orientations. The study very clearly is focused solely on
the possibility of a “genetic contribution” to lesbian and bisexual orientations in women,
not to “sexual orientation” more generally, despite the discussion of “female sexual
orientation” throughout (the two final subsections are titled “Implications for the Causes
of Sexual Orientation” and “Female vs Male Sexual Orientation,” respectively). The
final subsection on “sexual orientation” starts with the following:
Probands reported significantly more homosexual sisters than brothers, suggesting
that male and female homosexuality are at least somewhat independent
etiologically. Furthermore, because female homosexuality appears to be
substantially less common than male homosexuality, the relatively high frequency
of homosexuality among sisters compared with brothers is especially striking.
This findings supports the necessity of studying female homosexuality directly
rather than assuming that findings for males can be extended to females. (2:222223)
While bisexuality is mentioned briefly later in that subsection, heterosexuality never is.
Yet the subsection goes on to compare its results to a previous study of men and
concludes that “both male and female sexual orientation appeared to be influenced by
genetic factors” (2:223). A logical expectation of the conclusions about “sexual
orientation” would be that genetic influences on all categories of sexual orientation had
been studied, yet nowhere is this discussed. While homosexuality is analyzed in detail, in
terms such as “rates,” “base rate,” “proportions,” and “frequency,” heterosexuality is
evaluated only to the extent of establishing the subjects who are not of interest in
determining all of the above measures.
In other studies, data are obtained fmm heterosexual subjects, yet it becomes clear
that it is the similarities or differences of the lesbian and bisexual subjects from the
heterosexual ones that are under scrutiny. For example, the following passage is from the
discussion section of one article:
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For women, a different situation was found: although homosexual women erred
more on the water jar test, the peifonnance of these women on other tasks of
spatial ability did not significantly differ from those of their heterosexual female
peers. This is especially noteworthy since, to the best of our knowledge, this is
the first report of spatial ability assessment in closely match homosexual and
heterosexual women. Furthermore, and contrary to an expectation that
homosexual women would show ‘male-lilre’ performances, the scores of these
women were either no different or poorer than those of their heterosexual peers.
(4:106)
As suggested by the “expectation that homosexual women would show ‘male
like’ performances,” the majority of this research, as discussed in Chapter 4, is founded
on variations of prenatal hormone theories. Most commonly in these articles, the
hypothesis involves the idea that lesbian and bisexual women were to some extent
“masculinized” by prenatal hormones, causing their sexual orientation to be that more
expected of males. Following this logic, researchers look for other, supporting evidence
of the lesbian and bisexual women’s anatomical or physiological “masculinization” - in
the example above, that of spatial abilities. Spatial abilities more like those of “males”
(actually heterosexual men) than those of heterosexual women would constitute such
evidence.
What this demonstrates is that the data obtained fiom heterosexual subjects are
used only for control or comparison purposes. The only evidence these data can provide
are to support or fail to support the hypothesis regarding prenatal masculinization (or
conversely, to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis, as is more appropriate in
scientific methods). Thus, the only way this study can provide insight into the
“biological origins of sexual orientation ”is to provide evidence for or against prenatal
masculinization as the cause of lesbian and/or bisexual orientations in women. Only
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origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations are under consideration here, yet throughout
the article, the researchers refer to studying “sexual orientation.”
These examples demonstrate that in this discourse, while the central issue is the
biological origins of sexual orientation, it is actually only the biological origins of lesbian
and bisexual orientations that are examined. The use of “homosexuality” and “sexual
orientation” as if they were interchangeable, in this context, suggests that it is already
“imderstood” that heterosexuality is biologically based (as is the unstated assumption in
research based on prenatal hormonal theories). It also could be read as implying that
“sexual orientation” is only of concern as it relates to “homosexuality,” which would also
be consistent with the dominant framework, as it assumes the default status of
heterosexuality.
A related aspect of the relative absence of heterosexuality is that while
“heterosexuals,” “heterosexual men” and “heterosexual women” are present in the
discourse, for the most part “heterosexuality” is not. By this I mean that the word
“heterosexuality” is very rarely used; in contrast, “homosexuality” is used with some
frequency. This is consistent with the observation that while heterosexual subjects are
usually included, their sexual orientation is not what is being studied. A discursive
effect of this relative absence is heterosexuality’s erasure from consideration, question, or
challenge as a construct comparable to “homosexuality” or “bisexuality.” The absence of
the word both reveals and perpetuates a more pervasive conceptual absence from the
scientific discourse. In this way is the naturalization and normalization of heterosexuality
supported.
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Overall, this pattern works to frame the discourse in such a way as to perpetuate
ideological understandings in an implicit fashion. By suggesting that “sexual orientation"
is being “explained,” the true focus on explaining homosexuality is made covert
Heterosexuality’s status as “natural ”is assumed and thus reproduced. As stated by one
feminist theorist:
However, in order to make the workings of heterosexuality visible,
we have to be able to name it. Naming it tends to denaturalise it (the
power of the heterosexual imperative largely rests on its self-ascribed
‘natural’ status) and, in the words of Gill Durme, exposes the arbitrary
nature of gender-specific experiences and patterns of living’ (Dunne
1992:86), which the naturalisation of heterosexuality conceals.
(Wilton 1996:133)

Theme 3: Conflation of Sex, Gender, and Sexuality
fri reading for the meanings given to lesbian and bisexual orientations in the texts,
a theme of equivalence emerges among terms related to sexual orientation, gender, and
sex. Patterns in language use are revealed in which not only is sex equated with gender,
but both are discussed in ways that reveal the conceptual equivalence of normative
sex/gender with normative sexual orientation - that is, heterosexuality. I argue that the
conflation of sex, gender, and sexuality is infused throughout the discourse primarily
because the dominant explanatory framework relies upon the assumptions that sex is
binary and sexual desire for the “opposite sex” is biologically “natural.” In so doing,
lesbian and bisexual orientations in women are not only implicitly contrasted with a
normative sexual orientation, but they also are constructed as Other relative to what is
“normal” for “their” sex and gender. The examples to be discussed are the equivalence
of “masculine” with “male” and with “gynephilic,” and the equivalence of
“heterosexual women/females” with “women/females” in general.
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The Multiple Meanings of “Masculine”
Close reading for terms related to gender—masculinity and femininity—in
contexts of discussing lesbian and bisexual orientations in women reveals that the
concepts of “masculine” and “feminine” in this discourse are inseparable from concepts
of sex (“male’ and “female”). In addition, analysis of the contexts in which these
concepts are used reveals that sexual attraction to women (gynephilia) is conceptualized
as a male/masculine trait. These results from reading for gender concepts demonstrate
that sex, gender, and sexuality are completely intertwined, even equated, in this scientific
discourse.
To explain, the scientific explanatory framework is reliant on an understanding of
two differentiated sexes that have dualistic sets of characteristics defining their bodies,
personalities, and behaviors. A “man” is created as a result of a chromosomal XY fetus
being exposed to “high amounts” of “androgenic” or “masculinizing ”hormones
prenatally. The chromosomal XX female fetus is also exposed to androgens, but not in
sufficient quantities to “masculinize ”her, thus she develops into a female/woman. As a
result, their brains are different in certain ways, as are certain other somatic sites, as well
as some cognitive, personality, and behavioral attributes.
From this it can be seen that that which is “masculine ” (having been
masculinized) is also considered “male”—or in the case of a masculinized female, “male
like.” Thus “masculinity” in this discourse cannot be conceptualized apart from
“maleness,” demonstrating a lack of epistemological separation of sex and gender.
Similarly, femininity and femaleness are equated, though unlike “masculinization,” they
are rarely mentioned. The following quote from one of the articles demonstrates such an
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equation: “...quite possibly, in terms of cognitive ability (the present study) and
aggressive behavioral characteristics (Gladue, unpublished observations), lesbian women
may represent the more ‘female ’ region of such masculine-feminine continua” (4:106,
emphasis added).
Partly at issue in the underlying logic is the evidentiary basis for the sex
differences being asserted. Feminist science scholars have published many critiques of
the very existence of many such sex differences, or at least of their hypothesized
biological explanations.^ However, a critique of most of these issues is beyond the scope
of this project. Of concern to this analysis is the association of “masculinization” with
sexual orientation. The logic of this line of reasoning requires that one of the areas of
sexual dimorphism is, in fact, sexual orientation, with “masculinization” resulting in
sexual attraction to women (gynephilia). Lack of “masculinization,” such as what occurs
to a “normally” developing female, brings with it the “default” sexual attraction to men
(androphilia). It is explained as follows in one article:
The most influential biological theories of sexual orientation posit that the
development of attraction to females requires the masculinization of relevant
(hypothalamic) brain structures and that attraction to males results if relevant
neiual structures do not masculinize. (2:217)
Thus “masculinization,” or the process of androgen exposure triggered in the
chromosomal XY fetus that creates a “normally-functioning” male body out of the
“default” somatic status of female, is in this discourse imputed as the cause of sexual
attraction to women. Specifically, the masculinization process is thought to create a
“male brain,” and somewhere in this male brain is the site of gynephilia or
heterosexuality:

*For example, Bleier 1984,1988b; Fausto-Sterling 1992b.
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This additional evidence of functional differences in the cochleas of
nonheterosexual females bolsters the interpretation that their peripheral auditory
systems have been masculinized, possibly at the same stage of development when
whatever brain structures are responsible for sexual orientation also were
masculinized. (10:2403-2404)
From these examples it can be seen that the site in the brain in which sexual
orientation resides is not known (“relevant neural structures”; “whatever brain structures
are responsible for sexual orientation”). As mentioned, the hypothalamus is often
considered the most likely candidate to house this “sexual orientation structure” because
of its role in other sexual functions. Yet it is important to remember that the existence of
such a site—one that makes a “masculinized brain” gynephilic and a “female brain”
androphilic—is only speculation. The association of “masculinization” with brain
structures “relevant to” or “responsible for” sexual orientation not only serves to sex (and
gender) bodily sites that are not conclusively sexually dimorphic, but also, importantly, to
sex (and gender) sexuality itself. In this formulation, sexual attraction to women
(gynephilia) is inherently, naturally, and essentially a male and masculine characteristic.
The sexing/gendering of sexual desire betrays heteronormative roots. The
framework for evaluating “masculinization” of sexual desire, it is often suggested in the
discourse, comes from animal studies in which “masculinized” female rats or other
laboratory animals display “mounting” behaviors—the presumed sexual province of the
male rat, as it is from this position that a male rat engages in reproductive sexual
behavior. The “masculinization” framework, however, does not begin with animal
observations, but rather was transplanted to them. There is no reason to believe that
“mounting” is a definitively “male” behavior, unless reproduction is assumed to be the
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only purpose for sex. Thus a heterononnative expectation drives the “masculinization”
hypothesis even as it is applied to animal studies. As discussed by Zita (1998):
As in rat sex, a human heterosexual script - the mounting male animal
and the submissive female animal - is used as a reference point for
determining human sexual kinds. While in contemporary human life,
sexual orientation categories are based on sexual object choice rather
than style, the specter of humping females and males in anal surrender
to members of their own sex amplifies a scientific anomaly and
mammalian analog calling for explanation. Such a category of
deviance is apparently based on misplaced sex parts. (158-159)
The other evidence for asserting that biological masculinization results in
gynephilia comes from studies of women and girls with disordered conditions that cause
a prenatal overexposure to androgenic hormones. The following quotation demonstrates
this linkage:
Since women exposed to ‘masculinizing’ hormones are more likely to report
lesbian or bisexual orientation in adulthood (Ehrhardt et al., 1985; Money, 1987)
and a somewhat masculine pattern of cerebral lateralization (Hines & Shipley,
1984), we expected homosexual women would outperform heterosexual women
on spatial tasks. (4:102)
The studies of such women and girls have been critiqued by several scholars (Byne 1995;
Fausto-Sterling 1992; Longino 1990) on the basis of conceptual and methodological
limitations. I mention these studies in order to demonstrate the asserted evidence for the
sexing/gendering of sexuality. Girls and women exposed to “excess” amounts of
“masculinizing hormones” are to varying extents “masculinized” physically. Their
reported higher-than-average frequency of same-sex desire, is, then considered an effect
of masculinization on “whatever brain structures” create sexual orientation. Thus a
circular framework is applied in which evidence of sexed/gendered (masculine) sexual
desire is thought to support the hypothesis of biological masculinization as the cause of
this desire.
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From these examples it can be seen that “masculine,” in this scientific discourse,
has meanings that go beyond socially-constructed gender expectations. Because
hormones that help create an anatomical and physiological “male” are referred to as
“masculinizing,” and the bodily sites and processes that differ from what is expected of a
“female” are then called “masculine” or “masculinized,” it is nearly impossible to
separate sex from gender in this discourse. The key aspect is “what is expected”—for
most attributes, there is no simple opposition between that which is male and that which
is female; rather, arbitrary, socially-influenced boundaries are put in place that reflect
cultural expectations. Therefore, that which is called “masculine” or “masculinized” is
determined not by simple biological distinctions, but by a culturally gendered framework.
The fact that hypothesized “brain structures responsible for sexual orientation” are
considered “masculinized” in women who have same-sex attractions reveals an
equivalence of gender with sexual orientation—one in which masculinity equals
gynephilia, and femininity equals androphilia. The gendered conceptual framework used
to evaluate lesbian and bisexual women that underlies these discursive associations and
equivocations exposes the workings of hegemonic gender ideologies in this science.
Heterosexual Women Equated with
“Women” in General
The second example of the conflation of sex, gender, and sexuality in this
discourse concerns the apparent equivalence of heterosexual women (and “females”) with
women (and “females”) in general. I point out that the term “females” is a part of this
example because it is used interchangeably with “women” in this discourse, but for
simplicity I will refer only to “women” in the remainder of this discussion. This
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equivalence suggests a conceptual failure to distinguish between the gender category of
women and the combined gender/sexual orientation category of heterosexual women,
which serves to reproduce the heteronormative expectation of all women as “naturally”
heterosexual.
The equivalence of heterosexual women with all women is present
epistemologically in the very logic of the explanatory framework, but can also be
discerned from the ways in which language is used. I argue that conceptually, the
explanatory framework for determining biological origins to lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women is based on the presence of “sex differences” between women and
men in general, as distinct “sex” groups, in various physiological, cognitive, and
personality attributes. These “sex difrerences,” according to the explanatory logic, have
been established through previous research on groups of women and men. Research
studies are then often designed to compare data obtained from heterosexual and
homosexual subjects of both sexes such that intra-sex differences between heterosexual
and homosexual women are evaluated by the standard of the inter-sex differences
between heterosexual women and heterosexual men.
While these evaluations are often described as determining difrerences between
heterosexual and homosexual subjects, the logic of the design suggests that it is not
simply these difrerences that are of interest in and of themselves. Rather, heterosexual
subjects are used as substitutes for the women and men in general, for whom a standard
of “sex differences” has already been determined. As such, the data is already
“gendered” (and sexed) before it is even obtained, and “normally gendered” ranges
(comprised of the heterosexual groups) have been established. The data obtained from
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the lesbian (and occasionally bisexual) women are evaluated using this sexed/gendered
framework, and considered normally “female” if in line with the data obtained from the
heterosexual women. Using this sexed/gendered framework to evaluate differences of
sexual orientation reveals that sexual orientations are themselves conceptualized as
gendered (and sexed), with heterosexuality in women being appropriately
feminine/female and homosexuality being masculine/male. Thus heterosexual women are
conceptualized as being paradigmatic of, or equivalent to, all women (in substituting for
the “women” of the sex-differences studies).
Because of this conceptual equivalence, there are “slippages” in the language used
in describing the relevant subject groups. These slippages only appear strange, however,
if one doesn’t consider heterosexual women to be the paradigmatic representatives of
their sex. For example;
Interpretation of the water jar test is complicated by our failure to observe a
significant sex difference among heterosexuals. Heterosexual females averaged
6.0 (out of 8) problems correct, compared to 6.4 for heterosexual males. In an
earlier study in which subjects were not identified by sexual orientation, Beatty
and Duncan (in press) reported that females averaged 4.2 correct, versus 6.1 for
males. Thus, the discrepant results arise largely as a consequence of the much
better performance by females in the study. (4:106)
In this example, the performance of “heterosexual females” is compared to that of
“females” in a previous study with the clear expectation that the data should have been
very similar, as the difrerences in the results obtained between the two are described as
“discrepant.” In addition, the final sentence in this passage demonstrates the lack of
distinction even more clearly, as the “much better performance by females” (emphasis
added) refers to the performance of the heterosexual females.
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Similarly, the following example demonstrates a lack of specificity regarding
which “men and women” are being described, which reveals a conceptual equivalence;
“While one neural structure that differs between men and women is reportedly similar in
homosexual men and heterosexual women (LeVay, 1991), two others are not (Swaab and
Hofinan, 1990; Allen and Gorski, 1992)” (8;405). While it is not made obvious by the
structure of this sentence alone, in context it is clear that the “heterosexual women” are
equated to the women mentioned earlier, as the “homosexual men” are those being
evaluated for difference from the established norm of “sex difference.” If read outside
the lens of sex difrerences, the same sentence would be nonsensical.
Conceptually, the equivalence of heterosexual women with all women is implied
by the fact that results obtained from heterosexual women are considered representative
of the results of “women” in “sex differences” research, while lesbian and bisexual
women’s results are considered “Otheri’ to those of “their sex. ” In addition, the very fact
that the research is designed to utilize these supposed distinct “sex difrerences ”as an
explanatory scheme while predicting that lesbian and bisexual women’s scores will fall in
between those of heterosexual men and heterosexual women suggests that only
heterosexual women’s scores are considered to be “women’s” scores on the measures
being evaluated. If in fact lesbian and bisexual women’s scores do fall between those of
heterosexual men and women, and if they are still considered to be “women’s” scores,
then the supposed “sex difference” cannot truly exist in any distinct way.
For example, one article explains that “psychosexual differentiation theory would
predict that the intrasex difference would be more subtle than the intersex difference”
(5; 104). That lesbian and bisexual women might produce results that fall squarely within
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the realm of the supposed sex-diffeience gap is the predicted outcome within this
scientific discourse. Thus the epistemological structuring of the scientific discourse is
reliant upon the equivalence of heterosexual women with all women, revealing the
conflation of gender and sexuality. The resulting “deviant” status of lesbian and bisexual
women will be the subject of the following section of this chapter.

Theme 4: Lesbian and Bisexual Orientations as
Problematic or Deviant
A reading of the language used in discussing the scientific study of biological
origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women reveals, I argue, a
conceptualization of finding such origins as a problem to be solved, and the orientations
themselves as being deviant or abnormal. Both of these conceptualizations argue against
the scientific research as being objective or value-free, suggesting rather that the
discourse is one that serves to reproduce heteronormative ideals.
Recognizing that scientific and medical discourses view homosexual orientations
as deviant is not a novel observation. For example, it is discussed at length in Terry’s
(1999) historical study of such discourses in the US. She notes: “Though some
authorities dissented from the prevalent idea that homosexuality is a pathological
condition, even they agreed that this anomaly must be explained and accounted for”
(1999:8). The current study suggests that the view of lesbian and bisexual orientations as
“anomalous” is still fundamental to the scientific discourse of the 1990s, though less
overt. I will demonstrate some of the ways in which this view is achieved and
represented in the current scientific discourse.
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The “Problem” Model: Elusive.
Enigmatic Frinlnfries

The first part of this theme concerns the conceptualization of the research effort to
uncover evidence of biological bases of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. This
analysis suggests that the language used in describing this effort point to this scientific
discourse as being one of a “search”—of seeking out the answer to a mystery or problem.
While one might say that much of scientific research is presented in a similar manner, I
argue that this model both reveals and perpetuates the notion of the “object” of such
“searches” as problems, and that this “problematic” status deserves investigation. The
belief that science simply seeks to “understand” differences in an objective and value-free
way is an ideological belief that ignores the extent to which science and society construct
and give meaning to the “differences” science is explaining. This belief has served the
interests of powerful groups in society by justifying many forms of sexist, racist, classist
and heterosexist science.
Understanding how this model serves to reinforce heterosexist ideals requires an
understanding of the theme discussed previously—the equivalence of “sexual
orientation” and “homosexuality.” This equivalence very commonly intersects with the
problem model, requiring interpretations not only of each issue but also of the ways in
which they support one another. I argue that one way to interpret this intersection is that
saying “sexual orientation” when “homosexuality” is what is really meant allows for a
perpetuation of the ideology of science’s value-free quest for absolute truth, in that the
view of lesbian and bisexual orientations as specifically problematic is made covert.
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For example, in the following quote, it appears scientists are trying to understand
“female sexual orientation” in general: “Assuming, however, that our finding of
significant heritability is valid, an elaboration of the nature of the genetic variance could
be an important step to unraveling the origins of female sexual orientation” (2:222).
Prior readings of this section indicated that the context (for example, the “finding of
significant heritability”) reveals that only lesbian and bisexual “origins” are being spoken
of in this quote; therefore, it is only the origins of those orientations that are being
“unraveled.” This suggests that it is not “sexual orientation” that is considered so
problematic, but rather only certain kinds of sexual orientation, which reveals the power
imbalance.
In a similar example fiom another article, the following is stated: “Despite the
evidence for familial clustering of female sexual orientation, the source of this
aggregation remains enigmatic” (3:417). Again, since only “familial clustering” of
lesbian and bisexual orientations was studied, it is the aggregation of these orientations
that is the real “enigma” being discussed. Both the “unraveling” in the previous example
and the “enigmatic” nature of origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women
speak to the idea of something not understood. While it could be described as simply
true that variations in sexual orientation are not understood, because lesbian and bisexual
orientations are being examined in this discourse and heterosexuality assumed, it
becomes clear that what is truly mysterious and problematic are not all “variations”
equally, but variations fiom an implied norm, or deviations.
Belatedly, the conceptualization of the scientific research as a “search” for factors
“causing” lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, placed in the context of the
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absence of interest in finding what “causes” heterosexuality, reveals the assumption of
deviance. For example one article begins with the following statement; “Studies of
homosexuals who are twins has centred almost exclusively on a search for genetic
factors” (1:407). Di this quote, it is made plain that what is being referred to is the
“search” for causes of homosexuality. Often the discussions are firamed in terms of
progress toward the goal of this search, but never is it addressed why the search is being
conducted.
In addition, heterosexual orientations are never called upon to explain themselves
in the same way. Another example of an opening statement follows:
The etiology of homosexuality is not known. Recently, the search for possible
biological factors has gained prominence, partly due to results of experimental
work of the last few decades which show that much of the sexual behavior of
nonhuman animals is driven by sex hormones (for review cf. Goy and McEwen,
1980). (6:69)
As in the previous example, the significance of this “search” is not addressed, but
rather is assumed. In addition, this example combines the equation of sexual behaviors of
animals and human sexuality, as discussed in the first theme, with an unquestioned
“search,” and with the equation of “possible biological factors” and “etiology.” The
connotation of pathology or disease that accompanies “etiology” helps reinforce the
absence of any need to explain why there is a “search” happening at all.
The discussion of “causes” of lesbian and bisexual orientations in terms of
“etiologies” occurs several times in the texts analyzed. Webster’s Dictionary defines
“etiology” as “the cause assigned, as of a disease. ” While one might argue that this word
is without pathological connotation in purely scientific usage, as with previous examples
its location solely in the context of “homosexual” orientations reflects lesbians’ status as
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deviant in this discourse. In one article, the following is stated: “Probands reported
significantly more homosexual sisters than brothers, suggesting that male and female
homosexuality are at least somewhat independent etiologically” (2:222); and in another
“Several papers have addressed the question of whether the familialities of female and
male homosexuality are etiologically independent or overlapping, but the results and
interpretations are ambiguous” (3:408). It both these examples it can been that the
“etiology” of “female homosexuality” is not placed in a context of comparison or
discussion relative to an etiology of “female heterosexuality,” but rather “male
homosexuality.” One might interpret the use of “etiology” over “cause” or “origin” as a
further attempt to medicalize “homosexuality” and to naturalize the “search.”
“Deviance” Model: One of These Things Is
Not Like the Other
Close readings of the contexts in which lesbian and bisexual orientations are
discussed in these texts suggests that they are conceptualized as being “deviant.” The
evidence for this is reflected in the following ways: first, in the language associated with
explaining the mechanism of the hypothesized neuroendocrinological production of
lesbian and bisexual orientations; second, in the ways in which the opposition of
“typical/atypical” is applied; third, in the opposition of “heterosexual/nonheterosexual”;
and fourth, in the notion of and meanings given to “extreme lesbianism.” “Extreme” is
concept applied in the discourse that associates certain aspects of lesbian orientation with
pathology. I will discuss these four issues separately in the subsections that follow,
although I argue that they work together to reinforce the implicit idea of lesbian and
bisexual orientations as being deviant.
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The Neuroendocrine Model:
When Hormones Attack
The first indication in the language used in this scientific discourse that lesbian
and bisexual orientations are considered “deviant” comes in the descriptions of how
prenatal hormones are thought to influence sexual orientation. The explanation of the
hypothesized mechanism of hormonal production of lesbian and bisexual orientations
contrasts sharply with that for a heterosexual orientation in terms of creating discursively
marked and unmarked statuses. For heterosexuality, the description of the hypothesized
hormonal action is not marked with modifiers, while for lesbian and bisexual
orientations, the process is qualified by evaluative terms and phrases, such as “excess”,
“elevated”, and “high exposure” with respect to prenatal androgens.
Lesbians’ neuroendocrinological status is also frequently described as
“masculinized.” This description is based on a model in which it is asserted that
biological females are “naturally” attracted to males, and males are “naturally ” attracted
to females as one of the results of having been “masculinized.” Because fetuses start out
biologically “female” and are “masculinized” through exposure to androgenic hormones
to produce males, using this model requires no explanation of how women come to be
heterosexual— they are simply not masculinized." Thus the description of lesbians (and
bisexual women, where applicable) as masculinized represents a marked status that is
inherently “deviant.”
For example, one article concludes from its data that “[ojverall, it seems
parsimonious to assume that some structures in the brains and cochleas of homosexual
^ However, this discursive association of female development with “lack” or “absence” in
biology has been contested as well.
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and bisexual females were masculinized prenatally as a consequence of overexposure to
androgenic agents” (10:2412). Recognizing that all females are exposed to some level of
“androgenic agents,” the logic here requires that lesbian and bisexual women have
received an “overexposure.” The abnormality connoted by “overexposure” is associated
with the “abnormality” of women having sexual desires for and relations with other
women.
The same article goes on to hypothesize further regarding possible mechanisms
by which this overexposure might produce lesbian and bisexual orientations in women:
When contemplating possible mechanisms for the hormonal effects being
proposed, it may be tempting to imagine a developing female embryo, or its
mother, producing too much androgen (or converting too much testosterone to
estradiol) at some state in development, which masculinizes the fetus’ cochleas,
whatever brain centers are ultimately responsible for sexual preference, and
presumably other parts of the brain and body. As an alternative to higher
androgen concentrations per se, it is possible that certain brain sites in some
developing female embryos are, for some reason, hypersensitive to androgen at
some stage(s) in early development, and take up too much of it. (10:2412)
In this passage there are several examples of abnormality, both anatomical and
physiological, being asserted as possible causes for lesbian and bisexual orientations in
women. Phrases such as “too much testosterone”, “hypersensitive to androgen”, and
“take up too much of it” make clear that the presumed outcome - sexual desire for
women - is considered a state of deviance from what is normal. It can be inferred that
heterosexual women produce testosterone in appropriate amounts, are appropriately
sensitive to androgen, and take up just the right amount of it.
The logic of the theory that underlies almost all the research on origins of lesbian
and bisexual orientations in women assumes that sexual desire for women is not a
“natural” characteristic of biological females. There are, in this framework.
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“appropriately” masculinized females, the definition of which is (assuming no anatomical
“abnormalities”) solely based on their heterosexuality, and “inappropriately” or “overly”
masculinized females, so defined because of their lesbian or bisexual orientation. The
language used in describing the hormonal processes thought to produce lesbian and
bisexual orientations, then, is reflective of this conceptualization of deviance.
“Tvnical/Atvpical”
The presumed deviance of lesbian and bisexual women is also reflected in the
frequent opposition of “typical” and “atypical.” One feminist science scholar has
suggested that negative judgments about social groups which were previously more
manifest in scientific discourses, such as “abnormal,” are in more cunent science written
in less overtly negative terms, such as “atypical,” but carry the same associations (FaustoSterling 1992b). Typical and atypical are in this discourse most often used to describe
the degree to which research results obtained from lesbian and bisexual women match up
to those “typical” for either “females” or “males,” questioning the completeness of their
biological female status.
However, close readings of the contexts within which the judgments of “sextypical” occur reveals that the assumption of deviance is present before the comparison
occurs, in the meanings given to these terms, hi this discourse, the range of results
obtained from heterosexual women is called “female-typical,” and the range of results
obtained from heterosexual men is called “male-typical.” It is never mentioned whether
there are any heterosexual subjects who fall out of the range of “typical” for their sex,
suggesting that all results obtained from heterosexual subjects are defined as “sextypical.”
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Data from lesbian and bisexual women, then, are placed in comparison to this
range, which reveals that the very definition of “sex-typical” is all-inclusive of
heterosexual subjects while at the same time excluding all lesbian and bisexual women.
It should be noted too that the “male-typical” range really refers only to heterosexual
men, as gay men are similarly placed in comparison to both these ranges (female- and
male-typical) as well. Thus while these “typical” ranges really should be called the
“heterosexual female range” and the “heterosexual male range,” they are not. Lesbians
and bisexual women, in these comparisons, are by definition located outside the range of
what is defined as “sex-typical.”
Clearly, then, the use of these types of comparisons indicates that lesbian and
bisexual women are already conceptualized as being “deviant” from the “norm”
composed of heterosexual women, regardless of how they score. An example follows:
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence suggesting that lesbians may have a
more male-typical ability for a spatiomotor task, which in our small sample is not
at the expense of female-typical superiority on another fine motor task. Thus, the
motor task performance of lesbians does not seem to parallel that of heterosexual
men. Rather, like gay males, it appears to be a composite of some male-typical
and some female-typical abilities. (8:404)
It helps in reading this passage to be aware of the actual data to which the “more maletypical ability for a spatiomotor task” refer. The data for the motor task in question show
the performance of lesbians to be better (more “male-typical”) than that of heterosexual
women. However, they also show the performance of gay men to be worse than that of
lesbians. Thus, the only way to call the lesbians’ results “more male-typical” is if that
phrase refers to only heterosexual men. Similarly, “female-typical” in this example can
refer only to the heterosexual women.
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This issue is noted by Spanier (1995b) in her discussion of one researcher’s
gendered labeling of aspects of male Bighorn sheep interactions; “Here the sex/gender
paradigm of binary maleness and femaleness is superimposed by arbitrarily designating
differential behavior of males as male-like or female-like” (1995b:21). The same could
be said to be true of the supposedly sex-differentiated characteristics that are used in this
scientific discourse to label lesbians and bisexual women as “male-like” or “female-like.”
Characteristics that are not in fact sex-specific are nonetheless gendered, such that
exhibiting them marks one as “unlike” members of their sex. Clearly, aside from the
conceptualization of lesbians and bisexual women as deviant, this issue reveals a
thorough conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. This conflation will be
discussed in more detail in a later section of this chapter.
“Heterosexual/Nonheterosexual”
The construction of the dichotomy of “heterosexual/nonheterosexual” is used in
this scientific discourse in order to denote when bisexuals are being included in the
discussion, but not separated out from lesbians. The marker “non” points to that category
considered unusual, while the umnarked status is made clear. For example: “Replicating
the present study with a much larger sample will refute or confirm the within-family
handedness distribution difrerence found between heterosexual and non-heterosexual
men and women ” (7:711).
It is only when same-sex desire is conceptualized as a marker of deviance that it
makes sense to construct the dichotomy of “heterosexual/nonheterosexual.” If it were
simply a way to simplify the managing of data (by reducing three categories to two), one
might expect to also encounter the oppositions of “lesbian/nonlesbian,” or
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“homosexual/nonhomosexual.” Inverting the marked and unmarked statuses would
necessarily place bisexuals in the same grouping with the heterosexuals, hi this process,
the meaning of the mark of difference or Otherness would move from same-sex to
opposite-sex sexual orientation.
For example, one article reports the following findings;
The SOAEs [spontaneous otoacoustic emissions] of homosexual and bisexual
females were less numerous and less strong than those of heterosexual females,
and were intermediate to those of heterosexual females and heterosexual males.
This additional evidence of functional difference in the cochleas of
nonheterosexual females bolsters the interpretation that their peripheral auditory
systems have been masculinized, possibly at the same stage of development when
whatever brain structures are responsible for sexual orientation also were
masculinized. (10:2403-2404)
Bisexuality is equated with the “deviant” homosexuality in the creation of the
category “nonheterosexual,” rather than with heterosexuality in that dichotomous
construction. While one might argue that the heterosexual/nonheterosexual opposition
does not inherently construct either label as deviant, the location of the dividing line
suggests otherwise. Bisexuality, by definition being composed of both same-sex and
opposite-sex attractions, is marked in the dichotomy “heterosexual/nonheterosexual” only
by that which is not heterosexual. For the bisexuals studied above, regardless of how
much opposite-sex sexual attraction or behaviors they may have experienced, it is their
same-sex ones that indicate the “masculinization” of “whatever brain structures are
responsible for sexual orientation.”
Deconstructing the opposition of heterosexual/nonheterosexual reveals that even
in research that studies bisexual women but does not lump them into a “nonheterosexual”
category with lesbians, to the extent that they are still compared to heterosexual subjects,
the assumption of same-sex desire and/or behaviors as a mark of deviance still exists. In
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other words, while many studies exclude bisexual participants altogether, constructing a
false dichotomy of sexual orientation, the ones that include bisexuals treat their data as
belonging with the data from lesbians rather than that from heterosexual subjects. This
assumed coherence of groups that exhibit any amount of same-sex attraction or behavior,
along with their assumed divergence from the group that does not, is faulty reasoning
based on a view of any degree of (admitted) same-sex sexual orientation as being deviant.
Sometimes the use of this assumed dichotomy is pointed out, as in the following
quote from an article that included bisexual subjects: “However, for most of the
following analyses, we employed a dichotomous measure of sexual orientation:
heterosexual vs homosexual, with bisexuals being included in the homosexual group”
(2:219). Other times it is simply understood that they go together “Lesbian and bisexual
women also demonstrated a significantly different distribution compared to their HET
[heterosexual] counterparts in that they evidenced a greater degree of non-exclusive right
handedness” (7:707). hi a move that is not unusual in these studies, the latter article goes
on to erase the bisexual subjects completely: “Keeping the methodological shortcomings
in mind, the findings suggest a reduction of right shift in gay and lesbian populations”
(7:710).
Methodologically, the heterosexual/nonheterosexual (and heterosexual/
lesbian&bisexual) dichotomy reflects bias in the construction of subject categories for
comparison purposes that results in flawed experimental design. The categories can only
be seen as mutually exclusive if one considers a bisexual woman to be unlike a
heterosexual one, but like a lesbian woman. This understanding is based on a Culturally-
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influenced view of heterosexuality as normal, and anything deviating from it as
anomalous. Results obtained using these categories are thus of questionable meaning.
In a different context, the methodological implications of this issue are raised in
the same article quoted most recently above, hi the introductory section, the researcher
criticizes some other studies (including one in my sample) for having “compared
homosexual data to general population data, ...[which] violates a fundamental principle
of statistics (i.e., sampling from mutually exclusive populations)” (7:703). In other
words, because there are “homosexuals” in the general population, such samples would
not be mutually exclusive. In that case, the potential effect would be to reduce or even
eliminate findings of difference between the two samples. Yet when findings of
difference stand to be bolstered, issues of mutual exclusivity are commonly ignored.
“Extreme” Homosexualitv
Though it does not occur frequently, a noteworthy concept in some of the articles
is that of “extreme homosexuality.” Extremity of homosexuality in subjects is a concept
brought into the discourse to capture the idea that some people may express their
genetically- or biologically-influenced same-sex orientation in ways that can indicate the
presence of “stronger” such influences than are present in other people. It is associated
with “early onset” or “early precursors” of homosexuality as ways of evaluating the
“strength” of the factors producing homosexuality. 1 argue that the use of these concepts
reveals and perpetuates the implicit understanding of lesbian and bisexual orientations as
being deviant. Also, variations on this idea can be found in the discourse even when the
“extreme” terminology is not used.
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The following passage introduces the analysis of “early onset” and “extremity”:
Two broad sets of variables have been proposed as potential markers of genetic
diathesis in other domains, such as some forms of psychopathology: those related
to early onset and those indicating phenotypic extremity (in psychopathology,
severity). In the present study, measures indicating early onset of relevant
behavior included CGN [childhood gender nonconformity], the adolescent Kinsey
score, and the age of first homosexual feelings. Neither CGN nor age of first
homosexual feelings differed significantly between MZ [monozygotic] probands
fiom concordant pairs and MZ probands firom discordant pairs (P>.40 for all
comparisons). Measures indicating relatively extreme homosexuality included
the adult Kinsey score, the absence of positive sexual feelings for men, and the
self-designation of lesbian/homosexual as opposed to bisexual. (2:221)
Right away it can be seen that the context for considering the “variables” of early
onset and extremity is one manifestly associated with pathology. Even if the argument
can be made that these variables are used in research on “normal” conditions, the
researchers themselves use psychopathology as their example, serving to establish that as
the context. The terminology itself—markers of “early onset,” which is later equated
with “early precursors of adult homosexuality,” and “phenotypic extremity (in
psychopathology, severity)”—is filled with connotations of disease.
The deviant status of lesbian women is reinforced by the “measures indicating
relatively extreme homosexuality.” Like the separation of heterosexual/nonheterosexual
with the defining characteristic being same-sex sexual attractions or behaviors, in this
example, identifying as lesbian rather than bisexual marks one as an “extreme
homosexual.” Additional aspects of the definition of the “extreme homosexual” women
is the “absence of positive sexual feelings for men,” which is later recast as “degree of
current heterosexual feelings,” and the “adult Kinsey score,” the criterion for which is not
specified. Were this concept equally applied, it would mean that heterosexual women
would be judged on the basis of identifying as heterosexual rather than bisexual, on the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

262
“absence of positive feelings for women,” and on their Kinsey score—an evaluation that
would almost certainly result in the designation of nearly every heterosexual subject as
demonstrating “phenotypic extremity.” Typically, though, such “extreme heterosexuals”
are just considered “normal.”
The use of measures to indicate “early onset” and “extremity” relative to samesex sexual orientation is not discussed using that phrasing in any other article in this
sample. However, there are thematic similarities noted elsewhere. In another article
looking for genetic influences, “more stringent” criteria are implemented in a similar
maimer
We therefore asked if the rates of nonheterosexual relatives in our family
pedigrees would change if a more stringent criterion for nonheterosexuality were
applied. Thus a post hoc analysis was performed imposing the following two
additional requirements for probands in our selected sample to be considered
nonheterosexual. First, attraction to a female had to occur at < 14 years, the upper
level confidence limit determined for bisexuals in this study (see Table m, lb).
The second requirement was that attraction to a male, if present, must have
occurred within the same time frame or at a later age than first attraction to a
female. (3:415)
In this article, the context for the passage quoted is the discussion of results that
did not match predictions for how the familiality of “nonheterosexuality” “should” work.
Thus the application of “more stringent” criteria—which are only more stringent in the
sense of better revealing “early onset” of same-sex sexual orientation—is done in the
context of trying to get the data to better fit the hypothesis. Not surprisingly,
implementing criteria designed to detect “early onset” created a smaller sample of
subjects who “exhibit patterns” related to early onset, which the researchers defined as
being “consistent with sex-limited genetic factors”: “Thus by employing information
obtained firom the developmental analysis we were able putatively to identify a subset of
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probands in our nonheterosexual sample who exhibit patterns consistent with sex-limited
genetic factors contributing to their sexual orientation” (3:416).
The use of criteria to create specialized subsets is often done in the construction of
the research samples in these scientific articles, though it is not considered as such.
Rather, in the selection of subjects, criteria related to “extremity” or “early onset” are
often implemented in order to create mutually exclusive sample groups of heterosexuals
and homosexuals. For example, one article notes that “[o]nly data from persons with
either exclusive lifelong (since puberty) heterosexual or exclusive lifelong homosexual
histories [fantasy and behavior] are reported here” (4:102). As mentioned previously, the
effect of such criteria is to create a false dichotomy of sexual orientation and, as in the
previous example, simplify the data in a way that might give more satisfactory results. In
other words, the “extreme” subsets could be seen as an effort to “weed out” those who
are most likely to have experienced consciously a degree of choice regarding their samesex sexual orientation and who would be least likely to provide data that would support
the hypotheses.
In one article, the failure to find difrerences in the results of lesbian and
heterosexual women subjects similar to those found between gay and heterosexual men
leads the researcher to speculate on the existence of just such a “biological subset,” one
that is thought to represent a smaller proportion of lesbians than gay men:
Alternatively, the dissociation in patterns of sex atypicality in gay men and
lesbians may be related to a similar dissociation seen in patterns of childhood sex
atypicality. Gay men report (retrospectively) significantly higher rates of sex
atypicality in childhood than do lesbians (Bailey and Zucker, 1995). Additionally
in adulthood gay men show greater sex atypicality in gender role identity than do
lesbians (Gladue et al., 1990). Thus, it may be that the psychoendocrine theory of
psychosexual differentiation presented here applies to a smaller subset of lesbians
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than gay men and that alternative mechanisms are more important in the
development of female as opposed to male sexual orientation. (5:105)
What is seen in this example is that the ideas of “early onset” and “extremity”—
here posed in terms of “sex atypicality in childhood” and “sex atypicality in [adult]
gender role identity,” respectively—are being posited as effects of the “psychoendocrine
theory” of lesbian and gay orientations. Thus, the “strength” of the biological influence
on a person’s homosexuality is correlated to the degree to which they manifest not only
“exclusive” same-sex sexual orientation, but also childhood (and adult) gender
nonconformity, just as in the genetic article quoted initially. Deviance from gender roles
is tied to homosexuality, in this discourse, with a biological thread. Not only is the
deviant status of homosexuality reinforced by the concepts of “early onset” and
“extremity,” but so are “normal” gender roles for both children and adults.

Theme 5: Intersections with Race
The discourse analysis including reading for ways in which beliefs and
assumptions regarding essential racial differences were used to help construct the
scientific discourse. This included analyzing not only for manifest content, but also for
more latent imagery and metaphors. It is an assumption of this project that “race” is not a
meaningful biological distinction but rather is a historically- and culturally-based means
of social division on the basis of the belief in such essential differences. Also, the belief
in meaningful biological differences has historically been a means of perpetuating power
inequalities, and as such is ideological and pervades dominant social discourses in ways
that are often implicit rather than overt (see for example van Dijk, 1993).
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In addition, ideological beliefs about other differences, such as those of sex,
gender, and sexuality, often intersect in discourses with notions of race to reinforce one
another. Theories about this process have been developed by scholars such as sociologist
Patricia Hill Collins (1990,1999), and empirical research has previously demonstrated
such intersections at work in scientific discourses (including Somerville; 2(X)0; Gibson,
1997; Terry, 1995; Fausto-Sterling, 1995; and Stepan, 1993). Because this previous work
has shown that scientific discourses have in the past used assertions of biological
difference according to race and to sexual orientation in order to support the ideological
belief in the superiority of white, heterosexual people, I argue for the necessity of
analyzing the current scientific discourse for such issues.
While there are many issues of concern when analyzing the deployment of ideas
about race in social discourses, for the purposes of this project the analysis is limited to
looking for ways in which the discourse on biological origins of lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women is supported, explicitly or implicitly, by associations with notions
of biological racial differences. Specifically in terms of manifest content the texts are
read for discussion of “race,” “racial categories,” “racial differences,” and references to
skin color or other features thought to differentiate races. For more latent content,
analogies and examples are closely read for any implicit associations with race, such as,
for example, supporting an argument by referring to similarities with “other biological
differences.”
The analysis of manifest reference to race reveals that in this scientific discourse,
as represented by the articles included in this sample, race is only mentioned overtly in
those few articles that describe the racial composition of their research samples (as
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discussed in Chapter 4). These descriptions are done not to make intra-sample
comparisons by race but rather to describe the degree to which the sample is
representative of the population at large, and appears as an effort to acknowledge
potential influences of the social context in which scientific research is done. As such,
such descriptions of the sample composition might be interpreted as positive steps toward
producing socially-situated science, although it cannot be assumed that such information
will never be used to analyze for biologically-based racial differences.
Earlier sexological research on lesbians, such as that from the late 1800s
described by Gibson (1997), and that firom the 1930s described by Terry (1995), did just
that, attributing greater “deviance” to some of the African-American subjects than to the
white subjects. In addition, overt comparisons were made between the “abnormalities” of
the white lesbian subjects and similar “abnormalities” attributed to women of color.
Scientific discourses have a history of finding new ways to justify biologically the
inferiority of oppressed groups. Thus it can be argued that discussion of racial categories
in scientific discourses such as the one analyzed in the current project must be considered
with some caution, even if it has positive aspects.
With regard to more latent imagery and metaphor, my analysis detects no use of
examples or analogies that rely on implicit associations with race specifically. While
certainly understandings of race as a biologically meaningful category still exist in social
discourses, it is my interpretation from this analysis that in this particular scientific
discourse, race as a concept unto itself is not used to help construct the discourse on
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. Not using race in this
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way could be considered a positive step toward reducing the perpetuation of racial
ideologies in this discourse.
However, it would be overly simplistic, and in fact inaccurate, to say that the
discourse is completely free of any ideologies regarding race. I make the assertion that
ideologies regarding race are implicitly present in this discourse because of the fact that it
is thoroughly infused with hegemonic ideologies concerning sex and gender, which are
themselves embedded in a context of race. As discussed in the previous section, without
the context of sex and gender ideology, much of the discourse on biological bases of
lesbian and bisexual orientations in women would fail to make sense. Because ideologies
regarding gender and race have been and continue to be deployed in ways that reinforce
one another, the persistence of hegemonic gender ideals in this discourse argues against
the irrelevance of race. As Collins states of intersections of gender and race: “Viewing
gender within a logic of intersectionality redefines it as a constellation of ideas and social
practices that are historically situated within and that mutually construct multiple systems
of oppression” (1999:263).
Still, overall the analysis of the discourse for racial concepts reveals the most
interesting finding to be the relative absence of such concepts. While meanings
associated with race are certainly interwoven into the use of gender, the more obvious
reinforcing of racial distinctions that occurred in earlier sexological work is not a notable
aspect of the texts analyzed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

268
Discussion
A feminist analysis of the discourse from 1990-2000 of the scientific study of
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women reveals the presence of
several inter related themes regarding gender, sexual orientation, and race. These themes
are revealed by conducting close readings of the texts for the presence of words, phrases,
and concepts related to gender, sexual orientation, and race, and interpreting the
meanings associated with their use. Analyzing the textual construction of themes, in turn,
points to the assumptions on which they depend. As a result, conducting an analysis of
the scientific discourse creates opportunities to understand the ways in which researchers’
assumptions may be informed by cultural ideologies of gender, sexual orientation, and
race, and to understand how those ideologies might be reproduced in the texts of the
scientific discourse.
Critical readings of these scientific texts suggest that gender, sexual orientation,
and their inter-relations run throughout the discourse, but in specific and privileged ways.
Assumptions and expectations of the “naturalness” of hegemonic forms of gender and
sexual orientation are undercurrents to almost every theme uncovered. Because of their
commonalities, the issues present in the themes reinforce each other and work together to
reproduce dominant ideologies of inequalities of gender and sexual orientation.
For example, absent from the discourse are clear, explicit definitions and
explanations of the key concepts such as sexual orientation, heterosexuality, and
homosexuality. Obviously, this lack facilitates the mirage-like status of “sexual
orientation” as a concept that might produce more than one category as an object of
study. The discursive jumble of sex, gender, and sexual orientation is accomplished and
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reflected in part by the textual absence of explicit meanings given to sexual orientation
concepts. Likewise, the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation benefits from
the definitional absence and acts back upon it to provide implicit meaning for the sexual
orientation concepts not clearly defined.
The themes uncovered suggest not only heteronormative assumptions but sexist
ones as well. While heterosexuality’s status as “normal” is upheld by the unproblematic
association of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, so too is the belief in the masculinity of
sexual agency. As seen in the implicit definition of sexual orientation as behavioral and
correlated to animal reproductive behaviors, active sexual roles in this scientific discourse
are defined as belonging to the male sex and masculine gender. In this way, the scientific
study of biological orientations of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women has not
appreciably evolved firom the Sex Variant studies of the 1930s and 1940s, as described by
Terry (1990). Terry explains that that research was so thoroughly gendered that the
existence of feminine lesbians, particularly those who were sexual initiators with more
masculine lesbians, was complete baffling to the researchers. Of course, the conflation of
sex, gender, and sexual orientation also works in support of the view that “reproductive
biology is (sexual) destiny,” against which feminists have long argued.
The failure to be explicit about definitions of central concepts serves several
discursive functions in these texts: first, it erases the agency of the scientists as the
“namers” and “definers.” As stated by philosopher of science Joseph Rouse, “[e]ven in
the natural sciences, our practices are responsible for the intelligibility of the kinds of
things there are, including what counts as identities or differences between them”
(1987:223, emphasis in original). Yet the use of sexual orientation concepts and
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categories without full disclosure of the meanings given them helps to create the
appearance that they have unproblematically “arisen from nature.”
Second, failing to be clear in the use of terms allows the researchers to guide
subtly the process of meaning-making and interpretation that happens in the minds of the
readers of the texts. Cultural expectations, assumptions, and even stereotypes need not be
overtly written into the science; rather, scientists can count on them being brought into
the scientific discourse by readers filling in the gaps of vagueness and ambiguity in the
texts. For example, Bleier (1988b) argues;
It is disingenuous for scientists to pretend ignorance of their readers’
beliefs and expectations, and unethical to disclaim responsibility for
the effects of their work and for presumed misinterpretations of their
“pure” text. Scientists are responsible since they themselves build
ambiguities and misinterpretations into the writing itself. (161)
The knowledge that silences in the discourse will likely be filled in with meanings
derived from and benefiting dominant ideological expectations reflects the cultural
privilege of those hegemonic forms.
Inter related with both these functions is the issue of science’s aura of authority.
The epistemological privilege accorded to science is maintained in part by textual
strategies such as those just discussed, yet also serves to help make those strategies work
in the first place. The same sorts of ambiguities located in a text of a less-valued system
of knowledge creation would not necessarily be given the same kind of leeway. As
Haraway writes: “A scientist 'names’ nature in written, public documents, which are
endowed with the special, institutionally-enforced quality of being perceived as objective
and applicable beyond the cultures of the people who wrote those documents” (1988:79).
The perceptions of which Haraway speaks are both product and producer of the textual
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practices of persuasion—for as Birlœ notes, “scientific articles are texts; they are
rhetorical” (10).
Feminist science scholars suggest that scientific language be analyzed in order to
discover what the discourse allows to be said and what understandings are marginalized
or excluded (Bleier 1988b; Cohn 1996; Keller 1992). By framing the research on
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women in terms of sex and
gender (as well as in terms that are gendered), sexuality caimot be discussed outside this
context. It is not possible to question, for example, in research based on prenatal
hormone theories, whether “masculinization” is an appropriate framework for
understanding lesbian and bisexual orientations. The gendered nature of sexuality is not
open for debate in this scientific discourse, as it is present at the level of assumption.
Emily Martin (1991) asserts we must “wake up sleeping metaphors” in science in
order to “rob them of their power to naturalize our social conventions about gender”
(499). The current analysis attempts to do so in part by uncovering the euphemistic use
of “sexual orientation” to describe the subject matter in studies clearly intent on
explaining homosexuality, and metaphors of “problems” and “deviance” in the discussion
of lesbian and bisexual orientations. It is hoped that demonstrating the problematic
nature of such metaphors and the evidence and assumptions that underlie their use will
provoke additional critical examination and change.
Also, the texts are read critically for language that uses essentialist understandings
of race to help construct the claims regarding gender and sexual orientation. Such
language is not found to be present in this scientific discourse. As constructions of
gender intersect with those of race, it cannot be said that race is completely absent from
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these texts; however, the explicit uses noted in historical sexological work are not noted
here. Since such past scientific uses of race in a biological context have frequently
served to reinforce social inequalities of race, ethnicity, class, religion, and gender, the
relative absence of race in the current scientific discourse may be seen as a positive
change.
hi conclusion, by analyzing the language constructions scientists use, it is possible
to see how they conceptualize their objects of study. This in turn allows for recognition
and examination of the limitations of these conceptualizations. This evidences the ways
in which underlying assumptions are reproduced in scientific discourse, and invites
challenges to ideological truth claims about the natural world. The power and privilege
accorded to scientific discourses require that they be closely monitored to avoid the
reproduction, via naturalization, of social inequalities.
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CHAPTER6

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
hi this chapter I will explain the implications that my findings have for assessing
the knowledge produced by the scientific research I analyzed. The ten articles analyzed
in this project are representative of the past decade of research into biological bases of
lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. The researchers who produced these articles
presumably sought to make contributions to that body of knowledge, and of course did
so. However, I argue that their contributions are limited in specific ways, primarily as a
result of the types of background assumptions and beliefs with which the research is
infused. The knowledge produced from this body of scientific work must be assessed in
order to grasp what the science has truly contributed to understanding women’s sexuality
in general and lesbian and bisexual orientations in particular.
The current project consists of critiques of the methodologies and of the textual
construction of the scientific research studies from the years 1990-2000 concerning
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. I assert that critical
readings of the scientific methodologies and of the language used to construct the
research can provide insights into the assumptions and beliefs that underlie the
researchers’ approaches to their subject matter. By uncovering these assumptions and
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beliefs, it can be detennined whether they reflect hegemonic ideologies concerning
sexual orientation and thus whether the assumptions and beliefs underlying the research
are more or less likely to perpetuate oppressive understandings and unequal social
arrangements concerning sexual orientation.
Taken as a whole, the findings of this research suggest that the scientists
conducting research into the biological bases of lesbian and bisexual orientations in
women do transport some ideological assumptions and beliefs about those orientations
into their research in several different ways. Especially notable is the underlying
conflation of sex, gender, and sexuality noted in the research, as well as the assumption
of sexual orientation categories as self-evident and natural. Revealing ideologies such as
these in the scientific research has implications for evaluating the contributions of the
results of such research to understanding women’s sexuality.
The influence of cultural bias on scientific knowledge and practice limits in
specific ways what can and cannot be inferred or interpreted from the research results,
often in ways that are not made explicit. I have identified four areas of limitation on
interpretation of scientific results that are made visible by my research findings. The first
area concerns the naturalness of the categories of heterosexual, homosexual, and
bisexual, or of “sexual orientation ” as a concept; the second concerns the normality or
abnormality of lesbian and bisexual orientations; third, the issue of embodiment of
characteristics correlated to sexual orientation in women beyond those sampled; and
fourth, the state of the scientific field of inquiry as a whole, in terms of the degree of
consensus in findings.
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The implications of the findings of this research will be addressed by integrating
the results from the two different analyses undertaken—methodological and discursive.
This integration is the logical outcome of the argument (described in Chapter 3) that both
the way in which language is used and methodological flaws and limitations in science
can be reflective of underlying ideologies. Thus when ideologies are revealed, the
intersections andinterwoiidngs of the two different aspects of analysis become clearer.
The link between epistemology, methodology, and method, or between scientific
knowledge and practice, allows for the integration of analyses in evaluating how well the
scientific research may describe “nature” (Bleier 1984; Harding 1986,1989; Keller 1992;
Longino 1989; Spanier 1995b).
It is important to reiterate at this point that I am not suggesting or recommending
that all culturally-based assumption, beliefs, and values be removed from science, or that
the science would be improved if values were removed. Previous work in feminist
science studies makes clear that such a “value-free science” is simply not possible or
desirable (Keller 1992; Longino 1989; Spanier 1995a). For example, Spanier argues that
“politics informs all scientific work, just as it informs all other forms of work and
knowledge production” (1995a:69, emphasis in original). Rather, assumptions, beliefs,
and values should be made explicit, so that findings may be evaluated within their
context.
The four implications to be discussed all reflect limitations on the usefulness or
applicability of the knowledge produced by the scientific research due to the influence of
unacknowledged assumptions and beliefs regarding sexual orientation. In the next
sections of this chapter, informed by the work of feminist and other critical science
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scholars, I will describe in greater detail how elements of my findings lead me to assert
these limitations. To conclude the chapter, I will discuss some of the suggestions made
by feminist science scholars regarding overcoming some of the limitations of traditional
science.

Duplication 1: Results Cannot Provide Insight into
the “Naturalness” of “Sexual Orientation”
or Its Categories
The scientific research analyzed in this project seeks to illuminate the potential
biological origins of women’s sexual orientation. As stated in one article, the researchers
hoped their work would contribute “an important step to unraveling the origins of female
sexual orientation” (2:222). It is important to recognize in evaluating the results of these
research studies, however, that their design does not permit them to be applicable to
understanding whether human sexual orientation “naturally” falls into the categories of
homosexual, heterosexual, and bisexual. Also, I argue that the limitations of design are
not simply methodological errors, but rather that they follow from more fundamental
limitations in the conceptualization of sexuality as a result of culturally-derived,
unacknowledged assumptions and beliefs.
The explanation for the limitation on interpreting the results as providing
evidence for the “naturalness” of the categories of homosexual, heterosexual, and
bisexual can be found in the structure of the explanatory framework and in the research
design. In addition, the textual construction of the research reveals limitations in the
conceptualization of sexual orientation and its categories, as evidenced by the
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impreciseness in defining sexual orientation concepts (theme 1 firom the discourse
analysis in Chapter 5). That these forms of evidence are interconnected should be
expected, as they all appear to be informed by the same or similar sets of assumptions
and beliefs on the part of the researchers. Their interconnectedness also reflects the
inseparableness of scientific practice and the scientific knowledge that drives it.
My argument on this point is significantly informed by the work of Stein (1999).
Stein argues that the existence of sexual orientation categories “in nature”—as an
objective reality independent of social and historical context—cannot be proven by
research that assumes that already to be the case, fii his words, “[i]f the emerging
research program assumes essentialism about sexual orientation, then it carmot possibly
provide evidence to support essentialism” (1999:206). He argues of the work of LeVay
(1991) and others, as do I of the research studies I have analyzed, that the
conceptualization of the studies assumes essentialism, and thus carmot “prove” (or
provide evidence in support of) that same essentialism.
First, the explanatory framework used in each study is conceptualized as
exploring “women’s sexuality” or “women’s sexual orientation, ” yet no possibilities for
understanding or empirically testing sexuality are presented other than the categories of
homosexual, heterosexual, and sometimes bisexual. This is evident in the very beginning
of each article, when the framework for exploring possible biological or genetic
differences is laid out. fir addition, it is most apparent in the explanation of the research
design and categorization of subjects into groupings that can be nothing but heterosexual,
homosexual, and occasionally bisexual. The existence of these categories is assumed and
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is not open for question or empirical testing in any of the research studies analyzed in this
project
Second, the discursive analysis revealed impteciseness in defining concepts
relevant to sexual orientation, particularly in framing the research and discussing the
explanatory framework. Terminology such as “sexuality” and “sexual orientation” went
undefined, and definitions of sexual orientation categories were typically discussed only
by implied meanings and in the context of operationalizing the variables. As Haumann
(1995) states;
The biological discourse on homosexuality commonly relies on a
set of terms whose use is so widespread that their meanings are no
longer questioned. These concepts are reduced to key words (Williams,
1976) that presumably have a clear-cut meaning. A closer look,
however, reveals that these words have a variety of different and often
contradictory meanings.... Their specific meanings have to be
inferred from the context in which they occur. Nevertheless, they
have a strong persuasive effect in the biological discourse because
they seem to have exact and unequivocal meanings. (65)
Terminology central to the project of exploring the origins of women’s sexuality,
then, presumably goes undefined because the words’ meanings are assumed to be known
and accepted. This impreciseness is what allows the researchers to define implicitly
sexual orientation categories as necessarily arising from “nature” without having to
defend or even acknowledge this position. More importantly, failing to acknowledge
explicitly that the categories have been defined using essentialist assumptions opens the
door for the interpretation of the results as providing evidence for essentialism, which of
course they cannot.
Thus the results of my analyses suggest that the terminology concerning sexual
orientation categories is not well defined, yet the categories are discussed and utilized
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methodologically in the research as if they arise naturally from the subjects’ essential
beings. It is my contention that the assumption of essentialism leads to both the
discursive and methodological issues noted—that their origin is the same and that they in
fact provide mutual support for one another. These issues in the research lead to the
limitation on interpreting the results as providing evidence of essentialism, but their
presence is not due to happenstance or error. It is the outcome of an unacknowledged
assumption about the nature of sexual orientation.
The presence of the assumption of essentialism in the scientific research is the
source of the limitation on the interpretation of the results as providing evidence for
essentialism. This is not to say that no scientific research could provide evidence for the
naturalness of the categories, but rather that the ones analyzed here carmot. Similarly, of
LeVay’s (1991) work, Stein writes: “I am not claiming that it is impossible to do a
neuroanatomical study that would provide support to essentialism about sexual
orientation. For this to happen, evidence for the existence of natural human kinds must
emerge from the empirical results” (1999:206). Because my analyses demonstrate that
the existence of sexual orientation categories does not emerge from the results of the
scientific research, a significant implication is that the results cannot be interpreted as
providing evidence for the categories’ natural existence.
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Implication 2: Results Cannot Support Arguments
for Either the “Normality” or “Abnormality”
of Lesbian Orientation
The results of my analyses lead to a second implication for evaluating the
scientific research on biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women;
that the scientific research cannot be interpreted as providing evidence for the status of
homosexuality as either a “normal” or an “abnormal” condition. Several researchers
have gone on record as stating their desire for their work to provide evidence for
homosexuality’s biologically-based status, in order to make a case for ending its
stigmatization (noted in, for example. De Cecco and Parker 1995; Spanier 1995a). Yet in
the body of research analyzed, even a finding of a biological basis for homosexuality is
far from equivalent to establishing a nonheterosexual orientation as a normal condition.
The research also cannot provide evidence for the status of nonheterosexuality as an
“abnormal” biological state, because in the majority of the research, such a deviation
from “normal” is assumed.
As described in the section of Chapter 4 in which the explanatory framework was
analyzed, the majority of the studies (seven of the ten) frame nonheterosexual
orientations in women as being related to some form of biologically-based
“overmasculinization.” Heterosexual women are taken to be the norm for all women in
terms of the appropriate degree of bodily masculinization, and the expression of same-sex
desire serves as a marker for an inappropriate degree of masculinization. Thus in terms
of a study’s explanatory framework, every study that is based on the “masculinization
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hypothesis” assumes homosexuality to be the sign of a biologically abnormal state, in
which a woman has become overly “male-like” in specific ways.
Such studies cannot provide evidence in support of homosexuality’s status as a
normal biological variation, because they are based on an understanding of same-sex
desire that deems it inherently abnormal. They also cannot support an argument for
“abnormality,” as a fundamental abnormality (“overmasculinization”) has already been
assumed to be related to homosexuality. As in the previous discussion regarding the
assumption of essentialism, research that assumes a particular characteristic to be
inherent to the definition of homosexuality cannot then also be used to prove that
characteristic’s inherent status.
The behavioral genetics studies that were analyzed (three of the ten) were not
based in an explanatory structure that relied on “overmasculinization ” as the causal factor
in the origin of same-sex desire in women, although even these tended to incorporate
some degree of this explanation into their work. Just as important, however, is the
presence of other problematic issues that lead to the same implication. For these issues,
we can look to the results from the discursive analysis.
Two main issues from the analysis of the scientific discourse contribute to my
contention that the research analyzed cannot be interpreted as providing evidence for or
against the biological “normality” of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. The
first issue concerns the equivalences and absences noted in the discussion of sexuality,
sexual orientation, and the categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality (theme 2 in
Chapter 5), and second is the discussion of lesbian and bisexual orientations in ways that
revealed their conceptualization as problematic or deviant (theme 4 in Chapter 5). These
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two issues intersect and interact, as they both (as I argued in Chapter S) are textual
manifestations of the imderlying assumption of heterosexuality’s default status.
The argument relating to textual equivalences and absences in discussing sexual
orientation is elucidated by Haumann (1995):
The use of the term “sexuality” in biology is based on two ideological
notions, both of which are important for the biological conceptualization
of homosexuality. The first one, I will call the sexuality-as-heterosexuality
ideology. It underlies most of the research on the neuroendocrinological
basis of homosexuality. Inasmuch as heterosexual behavior is supposed
to be the universal, normal form of sexual expression, heterosexuality is
more or less equated with sexuality. Homosexuality is conceptualized as
the aberration that calls for special attention. Heterosexuality is the
“natural” category which needs no biological explanation. (65-66)
Interestingly on the surface Haumann’s argument appears to be the reverse of my own:
whereas I argued that when the researchers referred to explaining or finding origins of
“women’s sexuality” or “women’s sexual orientation, ”they really meant they were
explaining lesbian or bisexual orientations, Haumann states that it is heterosexuality that
is implicitly equated with sexuality. These arguments, of course, represent two aspects of
the same issue. Sexuality (and sexual orientation) is equated with heterosexuality at the
level of assumption—the unstated—and thus none of these concepts is in need of
investigation. Thus, when “explaining” or “uncovering the origins of” sexuality and
sexual orientation are discussed, it is not heterosexuality but nonheterosexuality that is
being referred to in the text.
The point of all this is to say that the equivalences and absences reflect the
assumption that the origins of heterosexuality are not in need of investigation, but rather
that homosexuality is the “biological aberration calling for explanation” (Haumann
1995:62). In addition the discourse analysis revealed lesbian and bisexual orientations to
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be described in ways that made it even clearer that they were conceptualized as being
problematic or deviant, based on an assumption of the default, normal status of
heterosexuality. It is this assumption that leads to the implication that the research cannot
provide evidence in support of the “normality” or “abnormality” of homosexuality, for
the reasons described above; neither “normality” nor “abnormality” can be proven in a
context in which abnormality is assumed at the most fundamental level.

Implication 3; Results Cannot Be Assumed To
Reflect Innate Differences or To Be
Applicable to All Women
The third implication of the results of my analyses concerns in what way and to
whom any findings of biological differences between heterosexual and lesbian research
subjects can be generalized. I argue that differences found in research samples cannot be
interpreted as being innate, essential characteristics, or as being generalizable to all
women. While this may on the surface appear to be a self-evident conclusion, it is my
contention that it is frequently unacknowledged or ignored either by researchers
themselves, by consumers and publishers of such research, or by both (De Cecco and
Parker, 1995; Spanier 1995a, Zicklin 1997).
There are really two parts to my claim: first, that results suggesting biologicallybased differences between heterosexual and lesbian women caimot be interpreted as
supporting the position that such differences are necessarily iimate or wholly biologically
driven; and second, that results obtained from the research samples cannot validly be
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interpreted as being generalizable to larger populations of women. These issues are
related but also to some degree distinct, and will be discussed separately.
The first issue concerns the origin attributed to findings of difference. I argue that
even if differences are found that appear to be biological in basis, it cannot then be
interpreted that such differences represent totally irmate characteristics. Rather, such
interpretations are to some extent speculative, based on what is currently known about
development, largely gathered from laboratory examination of other species (Bleier
1988b; Fausto-Sterling 2000). The research findings of difference between heterosexual
and lesbian women are subject to interpretation and are viewed through the lens of the
explanatory framework.
My results showed that one type of explanatory framework—the masculinization
hypothesis—dominates the research field. This framework postulates prenatal
“masculinizing” hormone overexposure to be the origin of same-sex desire in women. In
the case of the dominance of one explanatory framework (and its attendant background
assumptions) in a research field, other possibilities tend to go unrecognized and
unexplored (Haumann 1995; Longino 1990; Spanier 1995a). Longino (1990) states:
Background assumptions can also lead us to highlight certain aspects
of a phenomenon over others, thus determining the way it is described
and the kind of data it provides. Background assumptions are the
means by which contextual values and ideology are incorporated
into scientific inquiry. (215-216)
The discursive conflation of sex, gender, and sexuality also suggests that
researchers might be overly likely to attribute findings of difference to innate biology.
Because in these studies gender is viewed as indistinct from an assumed biologicallydetermined sex, and that sexuality follows directly and naturally from sex in a specific
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way (males attracted to females, and vice versa), it is likely that researchers might
similarly locate the processes leading to a homosexual orientation in the realm of the
prenatally determined.
I argue this point because findings of difference between people with whole
histories of life experiences caimot unproblematically be inferred to be solely biologically
determined. Fausto-Sterling makes this point clearly in the following passage:
As we grow and develop, we literally, not just “discursively”
(that is, through language and cultural practices), construct
our bodies, incorporating experience into our very flesh. To
understand this claim, we must erode the distinctions between
the physical and the social body. (2000:20)
Fausto-Sterling argues that “sexuality is a somatic fact created by a cultural effect”
(2000:21, emphasis in original). Thus findings of difierence between heterosexual and
lesbian women may in fact be biological differences, but not ones that were innately
present at birth. Rather, it could be said culture writes itself on the body in ways that
might account for findings of biological difference between groups treated very
differently in a given culture.
The second issue concerns the interpretation of findings of difference as being
generalizable to larger populations of women. This interpretation emerges from the logic
of the belief in the biologically-driven nature of homosexuality (and heterosexuality)—
the biological markers that signify the presence of a particular orientation are not
expected to vary greatly among different people (De Cecco and Parker 1995; Stein 1999).
I argue that one of the implications of my research is to suggest that scientific findings of
apparent biological differences between lesbian and heterosexual women cannot be
interpreted as necessarily generalizable to larger populations of women.
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I make this argument based on three findings fiom my analyses. The first
concerns the limitations imposed by the explanatory fiamework and is essentially the
same argument made above (regarding interpreting bodily differences as necessarily
innate). Because sexual orientation is assumed to be biologically driven, it is
investigated—and the results understood—in ways that make sense for that assumption.
Thus the research structure is not sufficiently open to other ways of interpreting the data,
or even to obtaining other kinds of data, to be able to interpret findings as being
necessarily generalizable (Longino 1990; Stein 1999).
The limitations imposed by the background assumptions are more specifically
manifested in the sampling procedures used and the resulting samples gathered. It is the
findings related to sampling that constitute the second piece of evidence for this
argument. In the articles analyzed, the research samples were recruited using nonrandom methods. In almost every case, lesbian and bisexual subjects were recruited
through means that were directed specifically at people who are to some extent open
regarding their sexual orientation—for example, recruiting was directed at memberships
of gay and lesbian organizations or readers of gay and lesbian publications. As discussed
in the section of Chapter 4 in which the recruiting methods were analyzed, such a focus
can lead to a sample of subjects with characteristics that differentiate them from others
who may feel same-sex desires.
In addition, subjects were almost always recruited only in the locale in which the
research was being conducted (rather than a cross-section of different areas), and tended
to be disproportionately white, of the middle class, and well-educated (when such data
were reported). The local nature of the recruiting and the sample compositions lead to
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the conclusion that research samples probably did not consist of very many (if any)
subjects from cultural backgrounds very different from the dominant culture of the
United States.
The limited nature of the samples thus obtained suggests extreme caution in
generalizing results to populations beyond those very similar to the subjects themselves.
Yet in very few cases were the limitations of the samples used in the research studies
acknowledged in the interpretations of results. Still, it is my contention that the
weaknesses of the sampling procedures contribute to the implication that results cannot
be presumed to be generalizable to larger populations.
The third relevant finding from my analyses comes from the textual analysis. I
argue that two of the themes noted in that analysis—the conflation of sex, gender, and
sexuality, and the discussion of lesbian and bisexual orientations as being problematic or
deviant (themes 3 and 4 from Chapter 5)—represent culturally- and contextually-specific
views. Both the themes are manifestations of underlying assumptions, which combined
can be described as the assumption of binary sexes that lead to binary genders that are
naturally sexually attracted to the opposite (Butler 1990; Jagose 1996).
These assumptions are culturally specific, because it is not universal that people
are thought to be made up of two distinct genders that correspond to one’s sex (FaustoSterling 1992b), nor that same-sex attraction or sexual relations are deviant (De Cecco
and Parker 1995). If our culture is written into our flesh, as Fausto-Sterling (2000)
argues, then it does not make sense to expect that the same biological markers will hold
true across cultures. Di addition the assumptions are contextually specific because even
within the dominant culture of the United States, it is more likely that these assumptions
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would be generated from positions of privilege relative to expectations for sex, gender,
and sexuality. As a result, I argue that the presence of these underlying assumptions in
the scientific discourse leads to the implication that the results obtained cannot
necessarily be generalized, especially cross-culturally.

Implication 4: Consensus in Findings Across
Studies Is Difficult To Determine
The final implication concerns what I am calling the “state of the field”—by
which I mean the degree of consensus or disagreement in findings across the many
different research studies being undertaken. Each scientific article locates its research
questions, and later its research findings, within the body of similar research in terms of
similarities and differences. Findings from other projects are often used as evidence to
explain why a particular line of inquiry might be fruitful, or why a study’s results might
have broader implications beyond the specific research itself. I argue that the findings
from my research suggest that it can be difficult to make an accurate assessment of
similarities in research findings, which impacts the ability to provide sufficient evidence
to accept or reject the hypotheses.
Of course, the search for biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in
women is approached from several different scientific fields and sub-fields, so findings
are not always of a comparable nature. Still, many of the projects are approached using a
similar framework (i.e., the masculinization hypothesis), so some degree of comparison
can be made even when the specific site being studied is quite different. In fact, as just
explained, these comparisons are made all the time. Explaining how a research project
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and its findings fit into the related, existing body of research is a part of almost every
scientific article.
The state of the field, in this case, refers to the degree of consensus regarding
hypotheses, theories, and evidence among different scientists doing research on
biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in women, based on similarities
and differences in what the various researchers have found. Certain aspects of my
research findings, I contend, carry with them the implication that making comparisons of
results, even across studies framed using the same approach (such as the masculinization
hypothesis), is problematic. The problematic nature is related to the high degree of
ambiguity regarding issues such as populations studied and definitions of terms, as well
as the frequently-used strategy of discussing and interpreting results in a way that lends
itself to overstating their potential significance.
Thus I argue that the fourth implication of my findings is that because of poor
standardization regarding essential elements across studies, as well as because of
researchers’ tendencies to interpret their findings in ways that overextend the boundaries
of what the data do say and can say, accurate assessments of the state of the field cannot
be made with confidence. There are several interrelated findings from my analyses that
contribute to this conclusion. They can be divided into three areas: problems in sampling
methods, in interpretation of results, and in defining terms.
The first area concerns the procedures used to gather and categorize the research
samples. As shown in the analysis of how these procedures were followed in the ten
articles I studied, most studies used different methods of recruiting subjects and setting
criteria for their inclusion, with the effect of there being little standardization regarding
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the groups actually being studied. Thus it may be inaccurate or misleading to compare
the results obtained from different studies. For example, most studies recruited
specifically from lesbian and bisexual populations more likely to be open about their
sexuality (which has implications for extending the findings of such research to larger
populations, as discussed above), but a few did not; several of the studies recruited
specifically from university students, while others did not. These differences suggest the
likelihood of obtaining quite different sets of subjects in terms of openness about sexual
orientation (in the first case) and age, race, and social class (in the second case).
k addition, the criteria established for inclusion in the study were different across
studies, relative to the most important element—subjects’ sexual orientation. For
example, some studies set specific criteria that excluded bisexual participants (in at least
one case, even if the “bisexuals” self-identified as lesbian). Other studies did not have
such inclusion criteria, suggesting that the subjects firom whom results were obtained may
have been quite different across studies. As stated by De Cecco and Parker (1995): “The
belief that homosexuality inheres in the body led the biological researchers to be cavalier
in the identification and selection of subjects since one ‘specimen’ was essentially equal
to all others” (10). The complex nature of sexual orientation suggests that comparing
results obtained fix)m lesbian and bisexual subjects who may be very different across
sexual orientation and other important variables is suspect (Allen 1997; De Cecco and
Parker 1995; McGuire 1995; Spanier 1995a).
In terms of categorization of subjects, the different studies also had no
standardization for distinguishing a heterosexual from a lesbian from a bisexual
participant. Some studies relied on self-identification, while others had subjects complete
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self-ratings using questions and scoring derived from the Kinsey research, while in other
studies interviewers applied Kinsey ratings to subjects’ responses to questions. When
included, bisexual subjects were sometimes collapsed into the same category as the
lesbian subjects and sometimes were maintained as a separate category. Thus the sexualorientation categorization procedures used across different studies did not lend
themselves to constructing groupings similar enough to evaluate consistencies in findings
with any confidence.
The second issue relates to the researchers’ interpretations of their data. As
discussed in Chapter 4, researchers tended to overstate their findings in some ways. For
example, correlations that did not achieve statistical significance were, in some cases,
discussed in ways that appeared to give very little acknowledgment to that fact. In some
cases it took careful examination of the actual data reported to recognize that
interpretations and conclusions were being drawn that were not clearly supported by the
data. Certainly it would be hoped that researchers would conduct such close
examinations of others’ data before citing findings in their reviews of the existing
literature or before asserting the presence of consistencies with their own in their
conclusions sections. However, such close examinations of data caimot be assumed,
especially in the presence of interpretations and conclusions that subtly distort findings.
As Bleier (1988b) explains:
In this time of extreme specialization and technical sophistication,
each of us who is a scientist must usually assume, on the basis of little
more than faith, the carefulness and validity of the studies of other
scientists, not only scientists in other fields but also those in other areas
of our own field. Such validity rests not only on the design and execution
of studies, but the completeness and candidness with which investigators
discuss the uncertainties of their studies as well as the contradictory data
that exist and the alternative interpretations that are possible. Few scientists
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have the knowledge of the techniques or database in other fields that would
pennit them to supply what the author omits the final responsibility
rests with scientists (along with science writers) who, intentionally or not,
endow reports of their work with more certainty and relevance than the
evidence warrants. (160)
It caimot be assumed that researchers are necessarily likely to acknowledge or
give credence to potential inconsistencies between data and interpretations in others’
work when citing it in their own. In fact, in the case of work that fits with the dominant
explanatory framework, the opposite may be true—that researchers (and even reviewers
and journal editors) may be more likely to overlook flaws and inconsistencies when the
explanatory framework of a particular project matches their own and the dominant mode
of thinking at the time (Byne 1995; Spanier 1995a).
Belatedly, researchers are, in their articles, building a case for their work and the
framework that informs it, and thus may be more likely to overlook flaws in their own
work and in work that supports theirs. Not only may flaws, inconsistencies, and
weaknesses go unacknowledged, but they may be disavowed outright in the effort to
persuade; Birke (2000) explains that it is in part the “rhetoric of persuasion” employed in
scientific writing that imparts its authoritative tone. According to Namenwirth (1988),
this rhetoric includes projecting an aura of confidence in findings even when such
confidence is not warranted:
k the patterns of words they choose for use in public lectures and
research articles, scientists almost invariably project an image of
impersonal authority and absolute confidence in the accuracy, objectivity,
and importance of their observations. .... The weaknesses and inaccuracies,
the holes in the data, are purposefully hidden as scientists interpose a
shield of confident authority between themselves and the public. (23)
These issues point to the implication that determining the degree of actual
consensus in findings may be complicated by researchers’ tendencies to inflate subtly the
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importance of their own findings and even those of others, when they fit with the
dominant explanatory paradigm.
The last aspect of my findings that contributes to the difficulty in ascertaining the
state of the field concerns the tendency noted in the scientific articles for researchers to
be vague, ambiguous, and imprecise in defining concepts central to the project. This
issue has already been discussed above, in regard to the first implication, yet is very
relevant here as well. To the extent that important concepts (such as sexual orientation
and homosexuality) are not explicitly defined, their meanings are established through
implicit associations in the texts and through assumptions and inferences on the part of
the reader. As Bleier (1988b) states:
The meaning of the words [in scientific articles]... is not fixed; it does
not reside alone in the wor& as they lie on the page or as they represent
authorial intentions or thought (conscious or unconscious), but in the
reading of it by other scientists, by science writers, and by the public who
reads scientific reporting. ... It is disingenuous for scientists to pretend
ignorance of their readers’ beliefs and expectations, and unethical to
disclaim responsibility for the effects of their work and for presumed
misinterpretations of their “pure” text. Scientists are responsible since
they themselves build ambiguities and misinterpretations into the writing
itself. (161, emphasis in original)
The “multiplicity of meanings” (Bleier 1988b: 160) in the scientific texts leads to different
interpretations of what the research being reported in the articles has to say about lesbian
“nature.” For example, without specifying what is meant by “homosexuality,” it can be
meant or understood as referring to “behavior” or “orientation”—different concepts with
different implications (Haumann 1995). Results obtained in a study in which concepts
were understood and applied in one way (i.e., behavior) can, in the absence of clear
definitions, be used as evidence to support an argument that employs concepts in a
different way (i.e., orientation).
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Certainly, as Bleier explains, such misapplications and misinterpretations of
concepts and results can happen even when terms are specified more clearly, as the
construction of meaning on the part of the reader is always a part of the process. Yet
ambiguity and v%ueness do not help, and are particularly ironic in a system of
knowledge production that prides itself on objectivity and standardization. Such
conceptual and definitional ambiguities contribute evidence for the implication that it
may be difficult to determine the degree of actual consensus among the findings of
various researchers studying biological origins of lesbian and bisexual orientations in
women.

Recommendations: Doing Better Science,
Doing Feminist Science
Feminist have to insist on a better account of the world; it is
not enough to show radical historical contingency and modes
of construction for everything. (Haraway 1991:187)
The implications discussed above reflect, in my view, limitations on what the
scientific research analyzed in this project can tell us about human sexuality. These
limitations derive from the specific culturally-based assumptions that underlie the
research. One response to reading the ways in which the researchers’ assumptions lead to
limitations in the research might be to work even harder to eliminate all forms of
assumptions, beliefs, and values in the scientific research, and thus remove the
limitations. As should be clear at this point, this proposal is fundamentally at odds with
the scholarship in feminist standpoint theories and in feminist science studies that informs
this project. The feminist work on which this project is based argues that science not
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only is not value-neutral, but that it cannot and should not be so (Keller 1992; Longino
1989,1990).
Rather, approaches to scientific research that integrate feminist standpoint
epistemologies would take seriously the idea that “traditional” science is likely to
produce knowledge that justifies the social arrangements and power inequalities of its
cultural and historical contexts. Scientific knowledge about the natural world cannot be
produced from a neutral vantage point, and even if it could, would not necessarily be at
all helpful to changing or ending oppressive power structures and relations. Thus
feminist science scholars argue for scientific knowledge construction fiom a position of
commitment to exposing and challenging social inequalities—from a feminist standpoint.
As Longino explains, “[b]y focussing on science as practice rather than content, as
process rather than product, we can reach the idea of feminist science through that of
doing science as a feminist” (1990:188).
This of course does not mean that science done by researchers with feminist
social and political commitments is without standards for validity and soundness. Rather,
feminist approaches to science suggest redefining some traditional standards, like
objectivity, and making sure that some others (like good methodological techniques) are
actually upheld consistently by scientists and enforced by scientific communities.
Spanier writes:
Good politics, like good intentions, are not sufficient to produce
valid science. The successor science envisioned by Sandra Harding,
and increasingly by more scientists, must be sound in more than its
politics, and this requires more collaboration and mutual education
between feminists and scientists. I believe that the rules guiding
Western science can be useful to feminist thinking, if applied with an
understanding of their limitations. (1995a:67-68)
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Feminist and other critical science scholars have made recommendations for how
science might be done in ways that are less likely to reproduce social inequalities. I will
discuss some of these suggestions as they relate to the current project. The
recommendations I will discuss can be divided into three general areas; first, the need to
place scientific research in its proper contexts; second, the need for scientific knowledge
claims and their producers to be locatable and accountable; and third, the need for
scientists and scientific communities to take more responsibility for producing quality
science. ‘ The three areas of recommendation are not completely separable, as they
overlap and intersect—in fact it could be argued that the each of the second two is a
logical outgrowth of the one that precedes it—but I do feel they are sufficiently distinct to
deserve separate discussion.

Recommendation 1; Acknowledging the
Inseparability of Science and Society
Might we, then, seek other ways of describing nature,
which do not ignore context? ^ irk e 2000:19)
The first recommendation is the need for scientific research to be placed in its
social, political, cultural, and historical contexts. Doing this means that scientists need to
acknowledge that their research is a part of the society in which it is conducted. As
Haumann (1995) states: “Science, as a system of knowledge production, is a social
practice inseparable firom its specific historical and cultural surroundings” (64). While
science has elements that make it a particularly valuable form of knowledge production.

' The structuring of these recommendations is based loosely on the work of Namenwirth
(1988).
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it is still a way of understanding the world that was created and continues to be conducted
in social contexts.
For the current project, acknowledging context can have several implications.
Scientists woridng on understanding sexual orientation in biological terms need to be
aware of the cultural and historical foundations of “sexual orientation” as a concept, as
well as the origins of its categories. The notion that sexuality and related concepts such
as “sexual orientation” have a history and have been shown to have been created within
cultures for specific purposes does not enter into the biological approaches to
understanding lesbian and bisexual orientations in women. Spanier (1995a) writes:
Cultural influences, such as compulsory heterosexuality, on sexual
behavior—or, more often, on acceptable sexual behavior—are generally
ignored in biological studies of sexuality. Historical contexts too, such as
changes in the meaning of homosexual and heterosexual activities and
identities (cf. a “homosexual” to “a person engaging in homosexual
activities”), are passed over in silence. (64)
De Cecco and Parker (1995) similarly note that
the biological theorists have little if any knowledge of the psychological,
social, cultural, and historical studies of homosexuality. ... Such intellectual
parochialism has led the biological theorists to adopt very simplistic concepts
of homosexuality as dependent variables, more often expressed as a
measurement technique, for example, a numerical rating on the Kinsey
heterosexual-homosexual rating scale, than as a theory. The historical,
cultural, and human corpus of knowledge and its evolving theory, what
has come to be known as gay, lesbian, and bisexual studies, for most
biologists, is terra incognita. (21)
From these quotes we can see the links between the failure to locate sexual
orientation in its proper contexts and some of the implications discussed previously.
Because only a very limited understanding of sexuality is used in the research, only a
very limited knowledge can emerge from it. As expressed previously, the limited
knowledge is not itself the problem, but rather the fact that the researchers do not
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acknowledge such limitations, and believe their findings say much more than they are
actually capable of saying about the biological origins of sexuality.
Thus what is implied by the general failure of researchers to recognize or
acknowledge the limitations in the scientific work is their lack of familiarity with or
serious consideration of the immense scholarship in gay and lesbian studies and feminist
and queer theories that makes these limitations apparent. To place sexual orientation in
its social, political, cultural, and historical contexts, the scientific researchers need to take
seriously the work of feminist and queer theorists that challenges the facile associations
of sex and gender and of the naturalness of our modem sexuality categories.
Related to understanding the issues involved in the construction of sexual
orientation and its categories is the need to recognize some of the ways in which people’s
sexualities and their experiences of them are impacted by social contexts. In other words,
even the current, culturally-specific categories such as “homosexual,” “heterosexual,”
“lesbian,” and “bisexual” are in people’s actual lives mediated by other factors, such as
experiences and membership in other social identity categories. It is particularly
important for scientists to contextualize sexuality in this way because, first, it bears upon
what interpretations about all members of a certain group (i.e., lesbian women) can be
drawn from results obtained from a given sample of subjects from that group, and second,
because it bears upon the ways in which understandings of one identity category (such as
gay men) may or may not be useful to understanding another (such as lesbian women).
Contextual issues can impact whether someone identifies as heterosexual, lesbian,
or bisexual, as well as what she or he means by that identification. Because of this it may
be difficult to construct categories for research in which all members of a given category
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(such as heterosexual women) have the “same” sexual orientation or are different in a
specific and consistent way fiom all members of the “other” category (such as lesbian or
bisexual women). As Spanier asks, “what of gender, race, class, ethnicity, age in
influencing the construction and meaning of sexual experience?” (12995a: 64) Even if
the construction of meaningfully similar (internally, and different from the “other”)
groups can be accomplished, results obtained fiom those groups may not be generalized
to all other people who share that identity category. Limitations on results must be
considered.
The failure to acknowledge the complexity of sexual identification is a part of
what De Cecco and Parker refer to as “the reification of the notion of gay and lesbian
identity” (1995:21). They point out that it leads researchers to believe that one member
of a given category is essentially (in a literal sense) the same as any other member of that
category. Science that contextualizes sexual identity will need to be far more cautious
both in constructing categories, by recognizing that social (as well as psychological)
factors influence how one feels, experiences, and identifies in terms of sexual desire, and
in generalizing results obtained from research samples. In critiquing the work of LeVay
(1991), Spanier notes: “The more we try to take many real individuals ... into account in
this scientific theory, the more oversimplification becomes a major conceptual error”
(1995a:64).
Thus, for example, results obtained for white, middle-class lesbians should not be
unproblematically generalized to lesbians of color and/or of the working class. Also,
understandings of sexuality based on the experiences of gay, bisexual, or heterosexual
men should not be uncritically assumed to be relevant for lesbian, bisexual, or
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heterosexual women. Both Spanier (1995a) and Terry (1997) discuss that for social and
political reasons, including “women’s complex relationship to questions of sexuality in
general” (Terry 1997:288), men may be more likely to experience their sexuality as
biologically pre-determined than women might
Also, white gay men may be more likely to be welcoming of scientific efforts to
locate a biological base to sexual orientation than might lesbians (of color or white) or
gay men of color, “because biological explanations have been largely in the service of
marginalizing certain groups defined as naturally inferior to white men (Hammonds
1993) ”(Terry 1997:281). Given the scientific interest in “explaining” sexual orientation,
experiences with the institution of science might impact the meanings one attaches to
personal sexual feelings and experiences.
Science practiced in such a way as to challenge heterosexist and heteronormative
understandings of sexual orientation, in particular lesbian and bisexual orientations, must
resist universalizing or reif^ng sexual identity categories. Rather, knowledge produced
should be specific to its social, historical, political, and cultural contexts. From this
recommendation it is hoped that more accurate and useful information regarding
sexuality will be produced from scientific research.

Recommendation 2: Constructing Locatable and
Accountable Knowledge Claims
These are claims on people’s lives; the view fiom a body,
always a complex, contradictory, structuring and structured
body, versus the view fiom above, fiom nowhere, fiom simplicity.
Only the god-trick is forbidden. (Haraway 1991:195)
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The second recommendation concerns the need for scientific knowledge claims to
be locatable and accountable in terms of the contexts firom which they arise. This
suggests that scientists need first to make an effort to explore and uncover the culturallybased background assumptions and beliefs that inform their approach to their topic; and
second, to acknowledge those assumptions and beliefs explicitly as part of the reporting
of the research and the claims to knowledge.
Such recormnendations have been made by many feminist science scholars, often
as part of debates concerning objectivity and its relation to “truth” (Haraway 1991;
Harding 1991,1993; Longino 1990). I want to suggest thinking of the importance of
locatability and accountability of scientific knowledge less in terms of how positions of
power and privilege influence the “truth” of knowledge created, and more for how they
influence the boundaries on knowledge claims. Also, following up on some ideas about
feminist standpoint theory discussed in Chapter 2 ,1 will discuss how locatability and
accountability relate to the usefulness of the types of scientific knowledge produced in
terms of feminist goals.
The implications discussed above, particularly the first three, relate to limitations
placed on what the scientific research in the articles analyzed can say about the biological
bases of women’s sexual orientation, k other words, they describe limitations or
boundaries of the scientific knowledge claims, which derive firom the influence of
culturally-based assumptions and beliefs on the knowledge production process. It is
necessary to uncover the presence of these assumptions and beliefs because the
researchers do not acknowledge them explicitly themselves.
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Every foray into the production of knowledge must begin somewhere. To have a
starting point, some assumptions must be made, and sometimes, beliefs stated. Because
knowledge production is a social process (Hubbard 1989; Longino 1990), the
assumptions and beliefs that help establish a starting point will be at least partly social in
nature. Because people (including researchers) are positioned differently in social
structures and power arrangements on the basis of socially-created hierarchies, they have
different experiences and understandings of the world from which to draw in constructing
starting points for knowledge production.^ Thus it is likely that at least some of the
researchers’ assumptions and beliefs will reflect some influence of those positionings.
Sometimes assumptions and beliefs may arise from aspects of the research topic
considered to be already-established, collectively agreed-upon facts. To the extent that
such “facts” truly are so elementary and accepted that they engender no dispute, they
might be considered “safe” assumptions that do not place any kind of practical constraint
on the knowledge production. Clearly, however, there are very few things that engender
no dispute whatsoever, and this is particularly so when considering a topic as complex as
human sexuality.
Thus most assumptions and beliefs that contribute to a researcher’s approach to
and understanding of her or his topic create some sort of boundaries on what the results
of the research can ultimately explain about the research topic. This is because that
which is assumed to be the case is not the subject of empirical validation in the
knowledge production process. Assumptions are not questioned and thus are not verified.

~It is argued that nature also is to some extent already socially constituted at the
beginning of a scientific knowledge project (Harding 1991), but this issue is out of the
scope of the immediate discussion.
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The presence of socially-influenced assumptions and beliefs in scientific research,
then, is not the problem here; rather, it is expected. In fact, the limitations on scientific
knowledge claims, which are the logical outcome of the assumptions, are not inherently
problematic either. Good cases have been made for creating knowledge that is partial
and socially situated (Haraway 1991). Rather, what should be clear is that the problem
lies in the researchers’ failures to acknowledge the presence of socially-influenced
assumptions and beliefs, as well as the limitations they create.
The reason such failures are problematic is not because they are limited, but
because they lead to knowledge claims that tend to overlook those limitations. This is the
point of the implications discussed above, and is, in my opinion, one of the main
“distortions” to knowledge (Harding 1986,1991) produced by scientific research in
which background assumptions are not recognized. Perhaps the knowledge is also
further fiom the way things “really are” (which is how 1 read some of Harding’s
argument), but my results do not speak to this claim.
Rather, 1 hope my findings help demonstrate how by making claims to knowledge
about sexuality on the basis of unacknowledged, culturally-based assumptions about
sexuality, the researchers’ reach exceeds their grasp. Similar in some ways to the work
of Haraway, 1 seek to construct “an argument for situated and embodied knowledges and
against various forms of unlocatable, and so irresponsible, knowledge claims.
Irresponsible means unable to be called into account” (1991:191). I suggest that locating
one’s approach to and understandings of the research topic by self-reflexively exploring
one’s positionality and attendant assumptions and beliefs, and discussing these explicitly
in the research itself, would help overcome the scientific tendencies toward totalizing and
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universalizing knowledge claims. Namenwirth (1988) offers specific recommendations
on this issue:
I would like to see scientists confiront head-on the probability of cultural
bias and distortion in choice of research problems, use of language for
formulating and describing what ought to be studied, choice of
experimental design, methods of data collection and analysis, and the
evaluation and interpretation of the results. All these should become
matters for introspection, for critique and discussion within research
groups, and for open acknowledgment and analysis within the discussion
sections of research ptqiers. This process would be facilitated by involving
culturally diverse people in the analysis and evaluation of research. Above
all, these scientific quality control circles whether we are not being led
astray by scientific paradigms and modes of analysis that fit poorly with
the evidence at hand. (1988:35)
What is made apparent in Namenwirth’s recommendations is that by itself,
making an effort to reveal the assumptions and beliefs that inform one’s work is
necessary but is not enough. For one thing, the nature of assumptions suggests that they
may have to be pointed out before they can be seen. The key is to bring the scientists
back in—to acknowledge that there are people behind the knowledge claims. This also
suggests the need to transform the standards for scientific writing that tend to erase the
researchers and their actions altogether. Finally, it will be necessary for scientific
communities and others to take responsibility for evaluating the effects of a researcher’s
positionality, assumptions, and beliefs on the research results.
What the above discussion does not really get at are the differences between
assumptions and beliefs based in elite and privileged positions versus those based in
marginalized and oppressed positions. Certainly it is an integral part of feminist
standpoint theories to assert that those positions produce knowledges that are not just
different, but differently valuable for achieving feminist goals. It is argued that
knowledge based in the experiences of the privileged is less likely to have a full
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understanding of relations of domination along the particular axis of privilege, and thus
us more likely to reproduce inequalities along that axis (Collins 1997; Harding 1997).
As discussed in Chapter 2, following my reading of Collins’ (1997) work in
particular, I contend that feminist standpoint theory is best applied to evaluating whether
the claims made from a particular position are more or less useful to understanding and
ending systems of oppression, rather than to evaluating their inherent tmth or falsehood.
I argue that because of the privileged positions of the majority of scientists and of science
as a system of thought, scientific claims to knowledge about women’s sexuality are likely
to reproduce systems of inequality.
I contend that my findings largely bear out this assertion with respect to the axes
of inequality analyzed for, which were sex, gender, sexual orientation, and race. Race,
however, is the one exception to this general trend in my analysis. Analysis for
culturally-based assumptions and beliefs related to race revealed only that research
samples tend to be overwhelmingly white or not to report race information, suggesting
the possibility that ways in which sexuality might be mediated by race in our culture are
going unexamined. The mutual construction of deviant races, genders, and sexual
orientations noted in historical analyses of medical and scientific descriptions (FaustoSterling 1995; Gibson 1997; Gilman 1985; Somerville 2000; Stepan 1996; Terry 1990)
was not found in the current analysis.
Understandings of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, however, demonstrated
underlying assumptions that, as I have argued, are in fact reproductive of systems of
inequality. The recommendation of the need for locatability and accountability may lead,
one hopes, to the recognition on the part of researchers of the ways in which science that
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starts from privileged understandings and experiences may serve to reproduce ideological
beliefs about sex, gender, and sexuality, fri addition, the choice could be made to start
scientific inquiry from positionalities other than privileged ones; in fact standpoint
theorists and other feminist thinkers argue that doing this is absolutely necessary
(Harding 1986,1991). For example, Haraway (1991) writes;
We are also bound to seek perspective from those points of view,
which can never be known in advance, which promise something
quite extraordinary, that is, knowledge potent for constructing worlds
less organized by axes of domination. In such a viewpoint, the
unmarked category would really disappear - quite a (hfference from
simply repeating a disappearing act. (192)
The necessity of starting scientific inquiry from positions other than those of the
powerful is one of the reasons it is so important to increase the diversity of scientific
practitioners. The perspectives from the standpoints of the oppressed may bring
alternative kinds of research questions, answers, and goals for scientific research.
This leads me to my final point about accountability, which concerns a feminist
transformation in the goals and ends toward which science works. Discussions of
accountability by several feminist science scholars assert that feminist scientists should
do science in ways consistent with feminist goals. Longino (1989) explains:
If we recognize, however, that knowledge is shaped by the assumptions,
values and interests of a culture and that, within limits, one can choose
one’s culture, then it’s clear that as scientists/theorists we have a choice.
We can continue to do establishment science, comfortably wrapped in the
myths of scientific rtietoric or we can alter our intellectual allegiances.
While remaining committed to an abstract goal of understanding, we can
choose to whom, socially and politically, we are accountable in our pursuit
of that goal. In particular we can choose between being accountable to the
traditional establishment or to our political comrades. (54)
This ideal for feminist science follows logically from the preceding discussion regarding
the inability to construct scientific knowledge claims from a completely neutral, value-
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free position. Assumptions underlie even the questions a scientist asks about the natural
world, as well as the answers obtained, and to the extent that those assumptions are based
in experiences of privilege, they help construct knowledge claims that serve in
ideological fashion to justify and maintain relations of inequality.
Thus locating one’s assumptions in certain ways, while necessary in order that
they might be evaluated, also reveals political commitments to specific kinds of social
relations. In other words, locatability and accountability must necessarily refer to goals
and uses of scientific research as well as to positionalities and assumptions. For feminist
science, the recommendation that emerges is an unabashed, explicit commitment to doing
science as a feminist, for feminist goals and uses. The hope is that science and society
will benefit. As Birke explains:
Biomedical discourse is ... a motley collection of narratives, building
its tales on a motley collection of human and animal bodies; it is not a
unitary story. Among those are tales that are less reductionist and which
might serve feminist political ends rather better - and which can be more
truthful stories of ‘how bodies work’. (2000:176)
For the current project, this notion of accountability suggests that the scientists
need to be fully aware of the implications of biological reductionist and determinist
explanations of sexuality. It suggests paying attention to feminist concerns about such
explanations, and seeking out other possible approaches, including integrative and
interdisciplinary ones. Interdisciplinarity is necessary for feminist science to occur. As
Fausto-Sterling (2000) writes:
The cell, the individual, groups of individuals organized in families,
peer groups, cultures, and nations and their histories all provide sources
of knowledge about human sexuality. We cannot understand it well,
unless we consider all of these components. To accomplish such a task,
scholars would do well to work in interdisciplinary groups. And while it
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is not reasonable, for exan^le, to ask all biologists to become proficient in
feminist theory or all feminist theorists to be proficient in cell biology, it
is reasonable to ask each group of scholars to understand the limitations
of knowledge obtained from working within a single discipline. Only
nonhierarchical, multidisciplinary teams can devise more complete (or
what Sandra Harding calls ‘less false”) knowledge about human sexuality.
(254-255, emphasis in original)
hi addition, a science accountable to feminist goals would at the very least be far
less likely to assume heterosexuality to be the biologically “normal” state of affairs (and
anything else as deviant or abnormal), because it would recognize the historical and
cultural constraints on women’s sexuality, as well as the conditions that gave rise to
heterosexual and homosexual identities.

Recommendation 3: Valuing
Quality Science
The final recommendation based on the implications discussed above is that
scientists and the scientific communities that validate and help disseminate research
results need to do more to ensure that poorly-done science is not rewarded, and that welldone science is rewarded. This recommendation relates to the fact that despite the flaws
and unacknowledged limitations found in the articles I analyzed, they were all published
and some received much popular attention. Also, based on others’ findings of good
science being rejected apparently because it did not fit with the popular theoretical
frameworks (Byne 1995; Spanier 1995a), one must wonder about the effects of the
predominance of one explanatory firamework (the masculinization hypothesis) in the
articles I analyzed.
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In addition, one must question the poor level of standardization of concepts and
the lack of forthrightness in writing, intentional or unintentional, that leads to what was
described in the fourth implication discussed above—that the degree of actual consensus
in evidence across studies is difficult to determine. Scientists are frequently rewarded for
participating in the obfuscation of actual results of their own and other studies, because
they then can use results from other studies to support their own conclusions (whether
they actually do or not), and thus make their own work appear to have even greater
significance. Changing this is partly about changing the attitudes and behaviors of
individual scientists, but even more, it is about changing the scientific establishment as a
whole. As Namenwirth (1988) writes:
We must redirect the science establishment to reward thorough,
thoughtful, honest, and cooperative researchers while penalizing
scientists who are dishonest, self-serving, and careless of what
they do in the name of science. The structure of the research and
pubUcations system within which scientists work and advance must
be modified to favor high-quality, thoroughly researched pieces of
work published, if necessary, at longer intervals.... Graduate
programs must expect and reward honesty and openness about the
limitations and uncertainties of one’s experiments, while penalizing
bluff and bluster. (36-37)
Researchers need to be rewarded rather than punished for acknowledging that
their results, especially in an area as complex as human sexuality, are necessarily
tentative, influenced by culture, and limited in scope. Scientists may be inclined to
overstate either their own results or their concurrence with other findings in part because
doing so has become so standard that it doesn’t even appear problematic. Also, the risk
involved is relatively low in areas where “cultural values and beliefs that shape the
predominating explanatory frameworks in science hold sway over scientific evidence’
(Spanier I99Sa:56). For example, major publications may not publish critiques of poorly
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done studies (Byne 1995) or studies contradicting a previously-published study when the
new findings fail to reject the null hypothesis (Spanier 1995a).
Because the results produced within a dominating framework are more easily
accepted, less likely to be refuted openly, and more likely to reach wide popular
audiences (Fausto-Sterling 1991; Spanier 1995a), it is all the more important that they be
examined carefully. Examples of the difficulty of discrediting such studies lead Byne
(1995) to assert the following:
These examples, then, should serve as a warning against hasty
interpretations of findings based on limited sample sizes, shaky
methodologies, and extremely limited knowledge about the functions
of particular brain structures and even less knowledge about the
biological substrates of the mind. (336-337)
Allen (1997), discussing genetic research, also notes the importance of a
dominating framework in shaping what kinds of research get funded and published. He
too suggests that it is incumbent upon the scientific community to ensure that good
science is done and that poorly-done science is critiqued as such:
The funds are being made available [for genetic research on
homosexuality], and in a period of shrinking research grants, for
some investigators “any port in a storm” will do. The individual
scientists who pursue such work, gratified that their work is being
funded and has some possible social relevance, are only partly
responsible for the widespread promulgation of biological
determinist theories. The scientific and academic community
bears some responsibility to critique and evaluate these views
openly, and to make it clear where the data is circumstantial or
faulty. (266, emphasis in original)
Ironically, one of the characteristics of science of which many scientists seem
most proud is its tentativeness and openness to challenge. Most of the necessary
standards for ensuring that poorly-done science is not rewarded already exist and need
only to be enforced in all areas of science, not just the ones that contradict popular ideas.
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Regarding the science analyzed in the current project, greater attention needs to
be paid, both by the researchers themselves and by those evaluating the findings, to
sampling issues and their potential impact on results. Researchers need to be explicit
about how they are defining important concepts and categorizing subjects’ sexual
orientations, so that comparisons are not made across studies with very different
definitions, standards and criteria. Overstating the importance of findings (such as
making interpretations based on statistically non-significant correlations) or their
concurrence with others’ findings should be strongly discouraged and are grounds for
serious criticism. Conversely, well-done science that contradicts popular ideas should be
given fair consideration.
Designing good-quality research in studies of sexual orientation is unlikely to be
an easy task. Doing feminist science in this area will necessarily mean looking at how
other influences intersect with biological ones. Issues of social, historical, political, and
cultural context will need to be taken into account. It will mean being specific about
terms and concepts, and acknowledging the limitations and specificity of the research
topic itself. It will mean critically analyzing underlying assumptions and explanatory
frameworks for heterosexist and other biases. Yet when it is accomplished, it needs to be
rewarded with recognition and publication, rather than rejected as being, for example, too
biased toward social and environmental factors in the development of sexuality or sexual
orientation.
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Conclusions
I want us never... to lose sight of the fact that our debates
about the body’s biology are always simultaneously moral,
ethical, and political debates about social and political equality
and the possibilities for change. Nothing less is at stake.
(Fausto-Sterling 2CXX):255)
It might seem logical to conclude, based on the historical and cultural specificity
of our current manner of socially organizing human sexuality and the history of using
science to justify social inequalities, that biological research into the origins of sexual
orientation simply should not be done. Certainly I would argue that it should not be done
with flawed methodologies and unacknowledged biases and limitations, and it is for this
reason that I make recommendations for change.
However, it is not realistic to expect that all such projects will come to a
screeching halt, at least not while the subject has so much popular interest. It also does
not serve feminists and LGB persons and communities well to ignore such research and
hope it will go away. Pertiaps most importantly, though, calling for an end to scientific
inquiry into origins of sexual orientation ignores the notion that feminist science is a
worthy goal and can produce knowledge that may lead to transformation of oppressive
social relations.
It is necessary to continue the task of evaluating scientific claims, as Spanier
(1995a) explains:
All science, all endeavors, are shaped to varying degrees by the
politics of the culture at large, the controlling interests, and the
particular, sometimes counterculture interests of the people and
institutions involved. Instead of rejecting all of science because
of this reality, as a feminist scientist I urge that we do everything
we can to hold science and scientists accountable to the standards
of equity politics and the standards of valid science. (66,
emphasis in original)
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Yet as Spanier and other feminist scientists have also argued, feminist science is more
than a deconstructive process—it is a constructive one (Birke 2000; Fausto-Sterling
2(XX); Hubbard 1989; Spanier 1995a, 1995b). Hubbard (1989) notes that “[sjcience and
technology always operate in somebody’s interest and serve someone or some group of
people” (128). Feminists and LGB persons and communities caimot afford to have only
the dominant groups be served in the scientific efibrt to define lesbian “nature.”
Recommendations for doing better science—feminist science—are steps toward ensuring
that everyone has a say in determining who and what science will serve.
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CHAPTER?

CONCLUSIONS
I do not need epistemology to justify my desire, my life,
my love. I need politics; I need to build a world that does
not require such justifications. (Phelan 1994:55)
In this final chapter, I will present a concluding discussion of the major findings
of my research and their significance to feminist efforts to evaluate the claims of science
regarding origins of sexual orientations in women, fir addition, I will discuss some
possible directions for future research toward which the current project and its findings
might be applied.
With this research project, I sought to answer some questions about the current
scientific research being done to locate biological origins of lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women. Informed by feminist standpoint theories and feminist science
studies, I wanted to evaluate the scientific claims within the context of their social
positioning. To do this, I posed the following research questions: What assumptions and
beliefs regarding sex, gender, sexual orientation, and race inform the scientific research?
Whose interests are served by the way in which the research is conceptualized,
conducted, and interpreted? Last, how is the scientific knowledge produced by these
research projects impacted by the assumptions and beliefs that inform it?
The research methods used to answer these questions were those recommended
by feminist science scholars—critique of aspects of the scientific methodologies and
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textual analysis of the language used in discussing the research constructing knowledge
claims. The findings from these analyses were presented separately and were later
integrated in the process of discussing the implications of the findings for evaluating the
scientific knowledge claims made by the researchers.
My analysis of the scientific methodologies in the articles revealed several ways
in which the findings from the scientific research are limited by the ways in which
researchers’ underlying assumptions and beliefs influenced the ways in which they
approached, conducted, and interpreted their research. I will discuss the major findings
from each of the three aspects of the methodological critique.
First, the body of research is dominated by one type of explanatory framework,
what I have called the “masculinization hypothesis.” This approach sees lesbian and
bisexual orientations in women as the outcome of prenatal overexposure to masculinizing
hormones. This assumption limits scientific research by viewing lesbian and bisexual
orientations as necessarily determined by biological factors, rather than seeking to verify
this conceptualization empirically, and by essentializing culturally- and historicallyspecific associations of sexual desire for women as being associated with maleness and
masculinity. By transporting assumptions of sexual orientation as an essential
characteristic and as following in a specific way from sex and gender, the knowledge
claims of the research are limited to the context of those assumptions.
Second, the sampling procedures used in the majority of the articles analyzed
create research samples that are not representative of larger populations of heterosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual women. Subjects are predominantly white, middle class, well
educated, and relatively young. Lesbian and bisexual subjects are frequently recruited
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from sources that require them to be to some degree open regarding their sexual
orientation. Sample sizes are often quite small.
Also, I contend that subjects are placed into sexual orientation categories in ways
that call the reliability and validity of the sample groupings into question, especially for
making comparisons across different studies. For example, the studies use different
criteria for deciding how to place subjects into different sexual orientation categories.
They also have no way of accounting for subjects’ differing interpretations of their own
feelings or experiences, or for the possibility of change in sexual orientation
identification over the life course.
The use of sample construction procedures that are limited in these ways suggests
the researchers assume the essential nature of sexual orientation. The problems with
these sampling limitations are threefold—first, they place serious limits on the
generalizability of findings to larger populations; second, they call the results themselves
into question, on grounds of validity and reliability; and third, the apparent background
assumption of essentialism makes it such that the claims must be evaluated within that
context.
The final element of the methodological critique was the evaluation of the
researchers’ interpretations and conclusions drawn from their data. My findings from
this analysis were that the researchers rarely include any consideration of the limitations
of their samples when interpreting results and drawing conclusions and that they often
interpret data and draw conclusions in ways that exaggerate findings of difference
between sample groups. Interestingly, it appeared that researchers from the behavioral
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genetics studies were both more lilœly to discuss sampling limitations and less likely to
overstate findings than researchers from studies conducted in other fields.
The overall findings from my analysis of the researchers’ interpretations and
conclusions suggest that much caution must be exercised in accepting scientific
knowledge claims and in attempting to determine consistency in findings across different
studies. I argue that the assumption of essentialism is again present in the failure to
consider sample limitations. O f the overstatement of significance of findings of
difference, I suggest that it perhaps reflects the researchers’ assumption that their
explanatory framework, informed by the masculinization hypothesis, is correct and not in
need of serious evaluation.
The second research method employed in this project was a textual analysis of the
language used in discussing women’s sexualities, especially as it intersected with sex,
gender, sexual orientation, or race. This analysis revealed four major themes: first, the
impreciseness of definitions given to key concepts related to sex, gender, and sexuality;
second, the equivalence of “sexual orientation” and “homosexuality ”in the framing of
the central issue, combined with a lack of actual investigation of heterosexual identity;
third, the conflation of the concepts of sex, gender, and sexuality; and fourth, language
reflecting the understanding of lesbian and bisexual identities as either problematic or
deviant. In addition, a fifth theme of language related to race was analyzed but did not
reveal the presence of such language.
From these themes and their textual construction I concluded primarily that
heterosexuality’s privileged status in culture is carried into the scientific discourse.
Heterosexuality is largely absent from these scientific texts on sexual orientation.
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reinforcing its default status. Sexual orientation is posed as following naturally from sex
in a way that makes heterosexuality the only “normal” sexual orientation. Lesbian and
bisexual orientations are discussed in terms that reinforce their deviant status. Thus it
appears the researchers assume the abnormality of lesbian and bisexual orientations even
as they conduct and report on their “objective” scientific research.
The findings and conclusions from both analyses were applied to constructing a
set of implications for assessing the scientific knowledge claims. I asserted that the
researchers’ assumptions manifested themselves in their scientific research in ways that
placed limitations on what the science can and cannot say about women’s sexualities.
First, the scientific research caimot provide evidence in support of the “naturalness” of
sexual orientation categories, as they are assumed; second, the findings cannot make
claims as to the “normality” or “abnormality” of lesbian or bisexual orientations, as
abnormality is assumed; third, the findings caimot speak to the innateness of differences
found, or their applicability to all women; and finally, the ways in which the researchers
construct their knowledge claims makes it difficult to ascertain the degree of consensus in
terms of actual evidence produced by different studies.
My conclusions also led me to construct some recommendations for conducting
science in ways more consistent with feminist goals, including the need to acknowledge
the inseparability of science and society, to constmct locatable and accountable
knowledge claims, and for scientific communities to reward well-done science.
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Significance to the Field
In terms of findings, this project adds to the body of knowledge regarding
understanding the current scientific conceptualizations of women’s sexuality, and lesbian
and bisexual orientations in particular. Compared to historical studies of medical and
scientific knowledge claims regarding lesbian and bisexual women (in Chapter 2), my
findings suggest that some aspects have demonstrated little change. Lesbian and bisexual
women are still overwhelmingly viewed as deviant, and as manifesting a condition of sex
and/or gender inversion, for example. The change in this view seems to be in the sites in
which scientists expect to see evidence of this inversion. Whereas earlier studies
examined the external body, and later, circulating hormone levels, today’s science looks
to subtler elements of sex differentiation and to inferred genetic correlations.
My research also contributes the finding that in the body of scientific research
analyzed, past uses of tropes of race to understand sexual orientation and construct
certain categories of both race and sexual orientation as deviant appear to be no longer in
use. This is a positive change in terms of what can be inferred as a decrease in scientific
conceptualizations of race in ways that maintain oppressive social relations, at least as
represented in this body of research. However, concerning the analysis of race in this
project, I am as guilty as anyone of doing precisely what is described by Mayberry,
Subramaniam, and Weasel (2001), when they write that “[wjhile it is commonplace to
speak of the importance of race, class, nationality, ethnicity, and sexuality, in practice
these variables rarely shape the final analyses presented ” (10). My interpretations of my
findings would likely benefit from a deeper analysis of the role played by race in
sustaining the ideologies that underlie the scientific research.
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Directions for Future Research
There are several directions in which this project could be taken for future
research. The findings of the research point to some possibly productive avenues of
further inquiry, as do some aspects of the project that got less attention than they deserve.
I will discuss three general areas in which I imagine there may be interesting and useful
ways to build upon this project; further investigations into how heterosexuality’s
centrality is maintained through science; additional inquiry into the role bisexual
orientations and identities play in constructing (and deconstructing) knowledge about
sexual orientation; and for critical analyses of scientific sexuality research in particular
and for feminist science studies in general, continued imagination and exploration of the
ways natures and cultures overlap and intersect.
The first avenue for further study concerns the possibility of refocusing
investigation in both science and science studies on the construction and maintenance of
heterosexual orientations and identities. Some of my findings suggested that there is a
great deal of relatively invisible labor occurring in scientific research that serves to keep
heterosexuality’s “normal” status unexamined and unquestioned. Such work ranges firom
scrutinizing only nonheterosexual orientations in a project ostensibly about the origins of
sexual orientation to overstating findings of difference between heterosexual and lesbian
subjects relative to the actual data gathered.
Future research in science might take seriously the notion of examining
assumptions and practices in order to understand how they contribute to the maintenance
of heterosexuality’s position of dominance in culture, and develop means to conduct
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science in ways less likely to reproduce social inequalities. In feminist science studies
and other critical examinations of these bodies of scientific research, a challenge might be
to hold scientists accountable for studying all of sexual orientation and for designing
research in a way that serves interests besides those of dominant groups.
I make the suggestion that future research focus on the scientific construction and
maintenance of heterosexuality for two reasons: first, because I think my findings provide
useful ways to enter into such analysis, and second, because I want to head off any
temptation that might exist to see my findings as continuing the effort to “explain”
lesbian “nature.” I argue that this project is concerned with the relations of power in the
scientific construction of knowledge concerning lesbian and bisexual orientations, and as
such, does not examine who or what lesbian and bisexual women “really are.”
Thus I envision this project and future ones that may build firom it as shining a
spotlight on how structures of power work to maintain the dominance of maleness,
masculinity, and heterosexuality, so that they might be changed. My thoughts on this are
informed by Phelan (1994), who writes:
Lesbianism provides a critical space against heteropatriarchy most
keenly insofar as lesbians turn from self-explanation to analysis and
demystification of the heterosexual order(s) that define “woman” and
“man” and make lesbians so scandalous. Examining my own being
as a lesbian, even in celebration, reinscribes that heterosexual space
within which lesbians are an anomaly. This réinscription does not
preclude any self-examination, but it mandates a measure of humility
and critical distance on the constructions and narratives of identity that
we produce and live within. (Phelan 1994:53-54)
The potential for disruption of structures of power that rely on the coherence of sex,
gender, and sexual desire comes not from explaining lesbianism or lesbians, but
explaining how and why they are considered anomalous and heterosexuals are not. Thus
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I see this project as contributing to and useful for further feminist research in how the
“heteropatriarchy” is maintained and ultimately can be changed.
The second area of further inquiry I see arising from this project relates to
bisexual identification. While I set out to analyze the treatment of bisexual orientations
in addition to lesbian ones in the scientific articles, I think I fell short of giving sufficient
attention to bisexuality. As in the previous discussion, I am not proposing continuing the
effort to “explain” bisexual orientations in women. Rather, I think what should be
examined is bisexuality’s potential to be even more disruptive than lesbian orientation of
the systems of presumed coherence of sex/gender/sexuality upon which heterosexism and
heterononnativity rest (Phelan 2001).
It has been argued that the scientific research into biological origins of sexual
orientation may have a difficult time dealing with bisexual identification (Spanier 1995a;
Stein 1999). For example, the view of same-sex desire as representing a manifestation of
a form of sex and/or gender inversion cannot easily account for sexual desire for persons
of both sexes and/or genders. Bisexual orientations may, then, interfere with dominant
understandings of sex, gender, and sexual orientation in ways that lesbian and gay
orientations can, but often don’t. For this reason bisexuals are sometimes seen as
problematic by both heterosexuals and by lesbians and gay men on two grounds, as
Phelan (2001) writes:
First, the push to assimilate into existing cultural and legal categories
is facilitated by notions of sexual orientation as fixed and binary. If
homosexuals are “bom that way,” their presence does not pose a
challenge to the heterosexual identities and futures of others.... The
second element... is the assertion that gays and lesbians do not
challenge prevailing gender structures. If they are, as many insist,
just like heterosexuals in their gender conformity, then they are not
a threat to existing conceptions of masculinity, femininity, or sexual
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difference. (118-119)
My findings suggested that bisexuality was handled in an ambiguous and
inconsistent manner in the scientific research. For example, women self-identifying as
bisexual were excluded entirely firom some studies, while in others, the category was
collapsed into the lesbian (or “nonheterosexual”) category for the convenience of
constructing an opposition with the heterosexual category for purposes of analysis. Such
results would preliminarily appear to uphold the assertion that the scientific research as
currently conceptualized depends upon, or at least benefits from, understanding sexual
orientation as dualistic.
The “threats” described by Phelan that bisexuality may pose to the understandings
of sex, gender, and sexual orientation that help maintain relations of domination need to
be explored further by feminists and others wishing to end such inequalities. I think
additional examination into how bisexuality is treated in the scientific search for
biological origins of sexual orientations might be useful for such explorations.
The final direction for additional research that I wish to discuss concerns the
efforts of feminist science scholars to envision and enact different possibilities for
understanding the world using science. Specifically, I would like to see future scientific
research on sexual orientations—as well as social scientific research and critical analyses
of both—consider seriously what feminist science scholars are increasingly proposing—
that biology (or “nature”) and culture interact in complex ways not amenable to
reductionistic causal models (Fausto-Sterling 2000).
For example, my findings suggest that ideological understandings of sex, gender,
and sexuality are influencing the scientific research on origins of women’s sexual
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orientation in many ways. One of these ways is a limited approach to obtaining subjects
for research—an approach that does not appear to consider seriously how sexual
orientation might be mediated by cultural differences, age differences, differences of
class, race, or ethnicity, and others. Ignoring all these contextual influences in turn helps
replicate and reinforce the notion that sexual orientation is purely essential, as the
variations in results that might have been introduced by conducting research that could
account for or consider different influences simply never have the opportunity to emerge.
The false dichotomization of nature and culture helps contribute to limited
understandings of both (Mayberry, Subramaniam, and Weasel 2001:4). Feminist
scientist Arme Fausto-Sterling suggests that we need to consider many different cultural
components if we are to gain a better understanding of human sexuality (2000:255). Like
others located in the natural sciences, Fausto-Sterling does not suggest we give up
scientific efforts to understand our world. Rather, we need “new and better ways to
conceptualize the problems at hand” (2000:255). I suggest that future research in this
area continue to critique the false dichotomization of nature and culture and insist on the
importance of their intersections.

Conclusion
hi the introduction to their edited volume on new contributions to the field of
feminist science studies, Mayberry, Subramaniam, and Weasel (2001) write the
following:
Despite our differences, what brings us together is a passion for a
common set of questions: How do natures and cultures interact?
How do we produce knowledge about the natural and cultural
landscapes we inhabit? What consequences does this knowledge
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have? The heterogeneous, multi- and interdisciplinary field devoted
to exploring these questions has been increasin^y called “feminist
science studies.” (2)
The questions they mention get at the main issues being examined by feminist science
scholars in many academic fields: How is our production of scientific knowledge
impacted by the cultures in which it is produced? What aspects of natures and cultures
are benefited and disadvantaged by the ways in which we understand and explain them?
How can feminist science help us understand the world in ways that are less
reductionistic and deterministic—in terms of complex interactions between “natures” and
“cultures”?
These questions are critical, analytical, and deconstructive of oppressive power
relations and the knowledge and materiality constructed by and for them. Ultimately,
however, these questions get at the constructive goals of feminist science studies—as I
see them, to produce the best understandings of the world we live in while working to
create the least damaging or harmful conditions possible for all natures and cultures.
Similarly, with this project I posed critical and deconstructive questions and
methods to the written descriptions of scientific research and knowledge claims, in the
hope of going beyond deconstruction. As a feminist researcher, I am committed to
feminist praxis, and have sought with this project not only to understand the world, but to
change it (to paraphrase Marx). By uncovering some of the ways in which the
assumptions and beliefs informing the current scientific search for biological origins of
lesbian and bisexual orientations in women may help justify and perpetuate systems of
sexism and heterosexism, my hope is to contribute to the development of better science
and better relations among social and natural worlds. I am committed to creating a world
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in which, as suggested by the quotation from Shane Phelan that opened this chapter, we
need no justifications, scientific or otherwise, for our desires, our lives, and our loves.
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APPENDIX

LIST OF ARTICLES IN THE SAMPLE
The following is a list that represents the sample, constructed for this project, of
articles that report results of research related to biological origins of lesbian and bisexual
orientations in women, published in English-language scholarly journals from 1990-2000
(sample collection procedures described in Chapter 3). The articles are listed in the order
utilized in Table 1 of Chapter 4: first, the subsample of 10 articles that were analyzed in
this project; second, the remaining 20 articles that were not selected for analysis; and
third, the five articles that were excluded from consideration for the sample that was
analyzed. They are divided into the groupings described in Chapter 3: genetic,
brain/cognition, and neuroendocrine approaches. The numbering of the articles
corresponds to the numbering in Table 1 of Chapter 4 and to the numbers by which the
articles were referred to in the data analysis chapters (Chapters 4 and S). The citations
are in CBE format to correspond to the preferred style for scientific articles.

Subsample of Ten Articles Used in Analysis
Genetic studies:
1. King M, McDonald E. Homosexuals who are twins: a study of 46 probands. Brit
J Psychiat 1992; 160:407-409.
2. Bailey JM, Pillard RC, Neale MC, Agyei Y. Heritable factors influence sexual
orientation in women. Arch Gen Psychiat 1993; 50: 217-233.
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3. Pattatucci AML, Hamer DH. Development and familiality of sexual orientation in
females. Behav Genet 1995; 25: (5) 407-420.
Brain-fimction and cognitive studies:
4. Gladue BA, Beatty WW, Larson J, Staton RD. Sexual orientation and spatial ability in
men and women. Psychobiol 1990; 18: (1) 101-108.
5. Wegesin DJ. A neuropsychologic profile of homosexual and heterosexual men and
women Arch Sex Behav 1998; 27: (1) 91-108.
Other neuroendocrine studies:
6. McCormick CM, Witelson SF, Kingstone E. Left-handedness in homosexual
men and women: neuroendocrine implications. Psychoneuroendocrino 1990; 15:
69-76.
7. Holtzen DW. Handedness and sexual orientation. J Clin Exp Neuropsychol 1994;
16 (5): 702-712.
8. Hall JA, Kimura D. Sexual orientation and performance on sexually dimorphic motor
tasks. Arch Sex Behav 1995; 24 (4): 395-407.
9. Bogaert AF. Physical development and sexual orientation in women: height, weight,
and age of puberty comparisons Pers Indiv Differ 1998; 24 (1): 115-121.
10. McFadden D, Pasanen EG. Spontaneous otoacoustic emissions in heterosexuals,
homosexuals, and bisexuals. J AcoustSoc Am 1999; 105 (4): 2403-2413.

Remaining 20 Articles Not Selected for Analysis
Genetic studies:
11. Bailey JM, Bell AP. Familiality of female and male homosexuality. Behav Genet
1993; 23 (4): 313-322.
12. Bailey JM, Benishay DS. Familial aggregation of female sexual orientation. Am J
Psychiat 1993; 150: 272-277.
13. Whitam FL, Diamond M, Martin J. Homosexual orientation in twins: a report on 61
pairs and three triplet sets. Arch Sex Behav 1993; 22 (3): 187-206.
14. Hu S, Pattatucci AML, Patterson C, Li L, Fulker DW, Cherny SS, Kruglyak L,
Hamer DH. Linkage between sexual orientation and chromosome XQ28 in males
but not in females. Nat Genet 1995; 11 (3): 248-256.
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15. Hershberger SL. A twin registry study of male and female sexual orientation. J Sex
Res 1991; 34 (2): 212-222.
16. Bailey JM, Dunne MP, Martin NO. Genetic and environmental influences on sexual
orientation and its correlates in an Australian twin sample. J Pers Soc Psychol
2000; 78 (3): 524.
Brain-fimction and cognitive studies:
17. Tuttle G, Pillard R. Sexual orientation and cognitive abilities. Arch Sex Behav 1991;
20: 307-318.
18. McCormick CM, Witelson SF. Functional cerebral asymmetry and sexual orientation
in men and women. Behav Neurosci 1994; 108 (3): 525-531.
19. Gladue BA, Bailey JM. Spatial ability, handedness, and human sexual orientation.
Psychoneuroendocrino 1995; 20 (5): 487-497.
20. Wegesin DJ. Event-related potentials in homosexual and heterosexual men and
women: sex-dimorphic patterns in verbal asymmetries and mental rotation. Brain
Cognition 1998; 36 (1): 73-92.
21. Neave N, Menaged M, Weightman DR. Sex differences in cognition: the role of
testosterone and sexual orientation. Brain Cognition 1999; 41 (3): 245-262.
Other neuroendocrine studies
22. Domer G; Poppe I; Stahl F; Kolzsch J; Uebelhack R. Gene- and environmentdependent neuroendocrine etiogenesis of homosexuality and transsexualism. Exp
Clin Endocrinol 1991; 98 (2): 141-150.
23. Gladue BA. Aggressive behavioral-characteristics, hormones, and sexual orientation
in men and women. Aggressive Behav 1991; 17 (6): 313-326.
24. Domer G, Lindner R, Poppe I, Weltrich R, Pfeiffer L, Peters H. Partial 21hydroxylase deficiency in homosexuals and transsexuals: Molecular basis.
Neuroendocrinal Lett 1995; 17 (4): 325-331.
25. Gladue BA, Bailey JM. Aggressiveness, competitiveness, and human sexual
orientation. Psychoneuroendocrino 1995; 20 (5): 475-485.
26. Bogaert, AF. Birth order and sexual orientation in women. Beh Neurosci 1997;
111 (6): 1395-1398.
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27. Blanchard R, Zucker KJ, Siegelman M, Dickey R, Klassen P. The relation of birth
order to sexual orientation in men and women JBiosoc Sci 1998; 30 (4): 511519.
28. McFadden D, Pasanen EG. Comparison of the auditory systems of heterosexuals and
homosexuals: Click-evoked otoacoustic emissions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
1998; 95 (5): 2709-2713.
29. Tenhula WN, Bailey JM. Female sexual orientation and pubertal onset. Dev
Neuropsychol 1998; 14 (2-3): 369-383.
30. Williams TJ, Pepitone ME, Christensen SE, Cooke BM, Huberman AD, Breedlove
NJ, Breedlove TJ, Jordan CL, Breedlove SM. Finger-length ratios and sexual
orientation. Nature 2000; 404 (6777): 455-456.

Five Articles Excluded firom Consideration for Analysis
31. Dittman RW, Kappes ME, Kappes MH. Sexual behavior in adolescent and adult
females with congenital actenal hyperplasia. Psychoneuroendocrino 1992; 17 (23): 153-170.
32. Slijper, FME, van der Kamp, HJ, Brandenburg, H, de Muinck Keizer-Scharma,
SMPF, Drop, SLS, Molenaar, JC. Evaluation of psychosexual development of
young women with congenital adrenal hyperplasia: A pilot study. J Sex Educ Ther
1992; 18: 200-207.
33. Berenbaum SA, Snyder E. Early hormonal influences on childhood sex-typed activity
and playmate preferences - implications for the development of sexual
orientation. Dev Psychol 1995; 31 (1): 31-42.
34. Meyer-Bahlburg HFL, Ehrtiardt AA, Rosen LR, Gruen RS, Veridiano NP, Vann FH,
Neuwalder HF. Prenatal estrogens and the development of homosexual
orientation. Dev Psychol 1995; 31 (1): 12-21.
35. Zucker KJ, Bradley SJ, Oliver G, Blake J, Fleming S, Hood J. Psychosexual
development of women with congenital adrenal hyperplasia. Horm Behav 1996;
30 (4): 300-318.
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